The Material Poetics of Digital Voice: A Creative-Critical Inquiry by Anderson, Erin R.
 THE MATERIAL POETICS OF DIGITAL VOICE: 
A CREATIVE-CRITICAL INQUIRY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Erin R. Anderson 
Bachelor of Arts, University of Washington, 2004 
Master of Arts, Clark University, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
2014 
 
 ii 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented 
 
by 
 
 
Erin R. Anderson 
 
 
 
It was defended on 
May 15, 2014 
and approved by 
Stephen Carr, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of English 
Neepa Majumdar, PhD, Associate Professor, Department of English 
Lisa Jackson-Schebetta, PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Theatre Arts 
 Dissertation Chair: Don Bialostosky, PhD, Professor and Chair, Department of English 
 
 
 iii 
  
Copyright © by Erin R. Anderson 
2014 
 
 iv 
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Erin R. Anderson, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2014 
 
This dissertation theorizes the aesthetic and ethical potential of digital voice as a material for 
composing and (re)inventing texts in multimedia platforms. Traditionally, the field of 
composition and rhetoric has imagined voice as either a silent textual metaphor or an embodied 
instrument of live oratory. However, as we turn to embrace digital writing, voice reemerges in a 
new form, no longer reducible to language nor tied to the time and place of the live speaking 
body. Building on recent discussions of orality and aurality, I argue that we must also attend to a 
related but distinct concept of vocality—as a newly accessible compositional material, which 
raises complex questions about the relationship between language, bodies, and technologies in 
digital composing contexts.  
Providing a survey of the ways that voice has been employed in composition and rhetoric 
over the past half-century, I argue that the inventive potential of voice is constrained by linguistic 
and representational values that we continue to ascribe to recorded voices in the age of digital 
reproducibility. Next, I draw on interdisciplinary theories of voice from philosophy, physiology, 
film, and digital aesthetics in order to rearticulate voice’s relationship to language, bodies, and 
technologies, and to propose a more flexible, material theory of digital vocality. Finally, I put 
 v 
this theory to work through a pair of critically informed media projects, which experiment with 
voice’s affective, performative, malleable potential across media platforms.  
In a video series, Coerced Confessions, I employ a technique of reverse remix to digitally 
“coerce” reenactments of real-life confessions from the bodies of unwitting actors, reflecting on 
the materiality of language and the boundaries of performance and agency in digital editing. In 
an experiment in posthumous poetics, I take up recorded voices of deceased individuals from 
oral history archives and reimagine them as “actors” or “performers” in a fictional audio drama, 
considering possibilities for collaboration with archival voices of the dead. Ultimately, by taking 
seriously the possibility that we might write not only with words, but with voices, my 
dissertation contributes a more expansive sense of the methods, materials, and ethics available to 
contemporary composition practice. 
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like to dedicate this project to the memory of my grandmother, Olive, whose voice started it all.   
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1.0  WRITING VOICE AND ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION IN STORIES 
The voice is elusive. Once you’ve eliminated everything that is not the voice 
itself—the body that houses it, the words it carries, the notes it sings, the traits by 
which it defines a speaking person, and the timbres that color it, what’s left? What 
a strange object, what grist for poetic outpourings. 
— Michel Chion, The Voice in Cinema 
 
This dissertation is a story about voice, materiality, and ethics in contemporary writing practice. 
It is a story of how I came to tell stories about voice by telling stories through voice—or, 
perhaps more aptly, with and alongside the recorded voices of others. And, if you keep reading, 
you will encounter some of these stories—stories told in voices that are not my own, that will 
never be my own, that perhaps were never anyone’s “own” to begin with, at least not in the sense 
that I once imagined them to be. But before we get to that, I would like to begin with another 
story altogether: a story about mermaids. 
This story grew out of a conversation I had a few years ago with a studio arts undergrad 
named Ashley, in which she politely informed me that my work is (and I quote) “very Little 
Mermaid.” At first, I’ll admit, I was more than a little put off by the comparison, finding it hard 
to move past the image of those perky purple seashells or to imagine how I could possibly make 
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this a selling point on the job market. But the more I thought about it, the more I realized: she 
was right. And the more intrigued I became by the implications. 
While I don’t remember the exact details of my conversation with Ashley, I’m pretty sure 
the trigger point for the mermaid revelation was when I boiled down my research to something 
like this: “Basically,” I told her, “I’m interested in what happens when we extract the voice from 
the body, and in what we can do with it once we do.” Looking back, it is hard not to cringe at 
everything that’s wrong with this statement, ontologically speaking, as if the voice weren’t 
always already beyond the body from the moment it is heard as voice, as if the voice were free to 
do something other than to leave the body behind.1 (Or, as voice scholar Steven Connor so 
cleverly puts it, “What I Say Goes.”) At the same time, though, it is also easy to see how 
Ashley’s mind would have gone straight to that classic scene in Ursula’s lair.2   
So bring yourself back to that fateful moment when Ariel gives her voice over to the sea 
witch. (Or, better yet, search for it on YouTube).3 As Ariel sings—that inane melody I loved so 
much as a child—and Ursula cheers her on, an enormous pair of green hands floats across the 
salty ether, penetrates Ariel’s convulsing body, and extracts from it the glowing orb that is her 
voice. We watch in horror as Ariel clutches her throat and the golden voice-orb floats away, 
carrying with it the sound of a song now beyond her control, to be locked away in a seashell for 
safe keeping. And future redeployment.4 
                                                
1 See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of the relationship between voice and the body.  
2 As it will become clear, I am referring to Disney’s 1989 film adaptation of Hans Christian Andersen’s 
fairytale and, specifically, to the character of the sea witch, who, in the original story, remains nameless. 
3 Ironically, perhaps, copyright restrictions do not permit me to embed a clip of the scene directly in the 
text, but, at least at the time of this writing, it is widely available for streaming on YouTube. The 
widespread availability of this particular clip, presumably posted on YouTube by avid fans, speaks to the 
scene’s iconic role in Disney’s adaptation. And, even if you have already seen it, it is worth returning to. 
4 In Disney’s film adaptation, Ursula, the sea witch, transforms herself into human form, as a beautiful 
woman named Vanessa and uses Ariel’s voice (which she keeps in a seashell around her neck) to seduce 
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This probably won’t come as a surprise, but this is not how the scene unfolds in the Hans 
Christian Andersen original, where the sea witch simply cuts to the chase and slices out the poor 
mermaid’s tongue. Of course, it’s easy to see why this wasn’t a viable plot-point for Disney 
screenwriters. All I have to do is picture myself in a darkened theater at age six, sipping a Capri 
Sun and watching the carnage ensue. But, if you think about it, there is actually much more 
going on here than a cheap trick for a G-rating. Because, in the roughly 150-year time span 
between Andersen’s fairytale and Disney’s summer blockbuster, a pretty massive historical event 
took place that would change the way we relate to and imagine the human voice forever: the 
invention of sound reproduction technology.  
Naturally, back in 1837, the logical way to “steal” a person’s voice would have been to 
go straight for the tongue. But with the invention of the phonograph, it became suddenly possible 
to imagine a voice beyond the time and place of its initial utterance; to abstract its vibrations 
from the living, breathing body that produced it; and to capture and re-present them in material 
form as media. And if we watch this scene carefully—the glowing orb, the sound waves, the 
seashell—it doesn’t take much to map onto it a technological narrative of sound transmission, 
reproduction, and capture. On its own, I find this parallel fascinating, but I am ultimately less 
interested in the analogy itself than in the possibilities and problematics it opens up.  
Of course, for Andersen’s “Little Mermaid,” there is very little that can happen with the 
voice plotline after the sea witch has done her deed. The mermaid’s voice is gone, or at least 
rendered inarticulate, but, in the end, it has not been stolen; it simply no longer works. In this 
story, the mermaid’s voice does nothing for the sea witch beyond its lack. In the end, all the 
witch is left with is her sadistic pleasure and a slimy organ in a jar, and the narrative has no 
                                                                                                                                                       
the prince into proposing marriage in an attempt to coerce Ariel’s father, King Triton, into abdicating his 
throne to Ursula in order to save his daughter.    
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choice but to sow its conflict elsewhere. But this is not the case in the Disney adaptation. For 
Ariel, her voice is not simply a capacity, it is a commodity—something she owns and is therefore 
at risk of losing. Crucially, when her voice is stolen, it is not destroyed; it continues to exist with 
the terrifying potential to speak beyond her intention and sound beyond her control. And it is 
precisely this resonant potential—the erotic charge of the stolen voice object—that the sea witch 
arms herself with as she sets out to woo the prince and destroy the world. Or whatever it is she 
sets out to do. For our purposes, it doesn’t really matter. All that matters is that it is evil.  
So why have I told you this story? What can we do with it? And what does it tell us about 
the role of voice in contemporary digital writing? For me, this story is, first of all, a striking 
example of the kinds of stories we tell ourselves, as a culture, about the human voice. It is a 
reflection of the power that we ascribe to the voice—as one of our most precious possessions, 
even as a piece of ourselves that we cannot fully be ourselves without. It is also a powerful 
reminder that, while our voices might be produced by our bodies, they are not self-identical with 
our bodies; that, in fact, our voices have the capacity to circulate as vibrational bodies in 
themselves, the potential to act and affect beyond the life we breathe into them. But, more than 
anything, I think this story serves as a provocative commentary on the polarizing ethics of voice 
in the age of digital reproducibility.  
On the surface, it is easy to take this story as a neat moralistic allegory for the dangers of 
technological deception, as an argument for why we must fortify our guard against those who 
wish to use our voices to do us harm. But, in this dissertation, I suggest we imagine it otherwise: 
As an opportunity to reflect on some of our deepest values and assumptions—about identity, 
about ownership, and about the boundaries between word and voice, meaning and material, 
representation and performance. Indeed, at its heart, I like to imagine this story as a call to 
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consider what it might mean, and how it might sound, for writers to embrace voice not only as a 
silent, textual metaphor, but as a core material of our practice; to explore the possibilities for 
writing not only with words, but with voices—even with the voices of others. Because, whether 
we like it or not, this possibility is no longer the stuff of fairytales. It is a very real affordance of 
our present technological culture, made imaginable with the invention of sound reproduction, 
which first decoupled voice and body in the late nineteenth century; made achievable with the 
novelty of magnetic tape, which rendered the voice spliceable and rewritable in the middle of the 
twentieth; and made radically accessible, today, with the rise of digital audio, which so readily 
transforms the voice into an object of mass circulation, manipulation, and play.5 But while these 
technological developments may have opened up new possibilities for writers to engage with the 
voices of others, to what extent do our present ethical frameworks account for these emergent 
compositional practices?  
Taking this question as a point of departure, my dissertation explores the compositional 
possibilities and ethical complexities of digital voice as a material for (re)inventing texts in 
multimedia writing platforms. Traditionally, voice has been taken up in the field of composition 
and rhetoric as either a silent, textual metaphor—for style, agency, or writerly presence6—or an 
embodied instrument of live oratory. However, as the field moves to embrace digital media 
technologies and to reimagine writing as a multimodal pursuit, voice reemerges in a new form, 
no longer reducible to language nor tied to the time and place of the live speaking body. 
Crucially, with the rise of digital audio, it becomes possible for writers to compose texts not only 
in their own voices, but also in the recorded voices of others. In this context, vast archives of 
                                                
5 I will return to this question of voice and technology in detail in Chapter Three.  
6 I will address the spectrum and variation of ‘voice’s’ metaphorical usage at the opening of Chapter Two. 
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voices open themselves as malleable materials that may be cut up, recombined, and made to 
speak in ways that rearticulate and even resist the intentions of the original speaker. While recent 
scholarship in the field has begun to account for the affordances of orality and aurality,7 missing 
from this conversation is any attention to a distinct but related concept of vocality8—and, more 
specifically, the mediated, digital vocality—as a newly accessible compositional material, which 
raises complex ethical questions about the relationship between language, bodies and 
technologies in digital composing contexts. Ultimately, by theorizing this paradoxical materiality 
across inter- and extra-disciplinary contexts—and by experimenting with its compositional 
possibilities through creative-critical media practice—my dissertation seeks to contribute to a 
more expansive sense of the methods, materials, and ethics available to digital composition, 
broadly defined. 
1.1 PROJECT ORIGINS 
I first became interested in the question of digital voice through my longstanding work with the 
voices of oral history, and, in particular, through close compositional work with my 
grandmother’s recorded voice in a multimedia webtext called “The Olive Project: An Oral 
History Composition in Multiple Modes” (Anderson). Beginning as a personal experiment in 
                                                
7 Prominent examples include Cynthia L. Selfe’s 2009 College Composition and Communication article, 
“The Movement of Air, the Breath of Meaning: Aurality and Multimodal Composing” and Jeff Rice’s 
2006 Computers and Composition article, “Making of Ka-Knowledge: Digital Aurality.” 
8 While “vocality” has become a common term throughout interdisciplinary voice studies over the past 
decade, it has yet to enter into the disciplinary lexicon in the field of composition and rhetoric. The first 
instance of its usage that I have encountered in my research is in Paul Zumthor’s 1990 book Oral Poetry: 
An Introduction, where he makes a point of distinguishing between orality, as speech, and vocality as 
voice. This distinction between speech and voice—which continues to be mobilized by philosophers like 
Mladen Dolar and Adriana Cavarero—is central to my theoretical framework in this dissertation. 
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composing family history, “The Olive Project” brings together fragments of audio from my 
grandmother’s oral history recording, alongside photographs from family albums, and assembles 
them into an interactive, audio-visual archive of her material memories. As an experiment in 
narrative disruption, the main section of the webtext takes the form of a horizontally-scrolling 
webpage with no scroll bars, inviting the user to navigate through the materials by listening to a 
brief audio anecdote and then clicking on one of several textual hyperlinks to activate an 
animated scroll and bring a new audio anecdote—and a new set of links—into reach. In this 
space, the audience encounters a story with no clear beginning or ending, only seemingly endless 
(and often arbitrary) associations, juxtapositions, and repetitions, which enlist the user’s 
participation while at the same time resisting her control. Drawing, most immediately, upon 
public historian Michael Frisch’s call for a “post-documentary” approach to oral history, this 
project attempts to mobilize the interactive affordances of web-based media to enable a “fluid, 
flexible, multi-pathed, non-linear access” (“Digital Revolution” 112) to audio-visual archives, 
seeking to engage its audience in a “shareable” experience of creating connections between the 
materials contained within them.9 In this sense, you might say that “The Olive Project” stands as 
an elaborate (if flawed) effort to avoid telling my grandmother’s life story—or at least to share 
the ethical burden of attempting to do so. 
While my grandmother, Olive, was still alive during the production of “The Olive 
Project,” it was an undertaking I entered into with the knowledge that, soon, she would not be. 
When we sat down to record her oral history in the summer of 2009, she was six months in to a 
                                                
9 Frisch’s work on digital oral history in this essay is the latest incarnation of his longstanding 
commitment to the project of engaging audience in the analysis of oral history. Notably, in his 1990 book-
length work, A Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft and Meaning of Oral and Public History, Frisch 
argues that, “in the same sense that both interviewer and interviewee are the ‘authors’ of an oral historical 
document, public-historical presentation has the challenge of finding ways of sharing the ‘author-ity’ of 
interpretation with the public” (226). 
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battle with pancreatic cancer. I came to her with my request for an interview not as a scholar or 
an artist, but as a granddaughter, anticipating the loss that was coming and seeking to hold on to 
whatever I could. At the time, I had no intention of doing anything with the stories we recorded, 
beyond distributing them to my family as a record of my grandmother’s life. And, schooled in 
the classical tradition of alphabetic transcription, I certainly had no intention of using the voice 
recording itself—a fact that is reflected in the quality of the audio. However, when, months later, 
I moved across the county to begin my PhD and left my grandmother behind, it was, without 
question, the sound of her recorded voice that I cherished most. And while it was my deep 
emotional attachment to that voice—and to the person who felt as if she were behind it—which 
inspired me to set out to compose my grandmother’s story in the first place, I have since come to 
realize that it was also that same attachment that frightened me away from properly doing so. 
Coming from a background in feminist and community-based oral history, I brought to 
my work on this project a deep concern with the ethics of representation—with the extent to 
which the act of “giving voice to the voiceless”10 is always just as much an act of taking. But it 
wasn’t until I began to cut and paste, overlap and rearrange my grandma’s voice recording in 
digital audio software that I began to really feel the power I had over the meanings and 
performances these materials conveyed. In contrast to my previous work with the silent, textual 
“voices” of oral history transcripts, I felt my ethical responsibility to this audible, vibratory 
voice—and to the person who felt as if she were behind it—in a profoundly visceral way. And, 
and least at first, I found it profoundly unsettling. While I had asked my grandmother for 
permission to use her voice recordings for the project before she died—and while I knew that we 
                                                
10 As I will discuss in Chapter Five, oral history is perhaps the only field outside of composition and 
rhetoric (and writing more broadly) with a stronger attachment to the ‘voice’ metaphor, which stands as a 
symbol of agency and representation in the field’s struggle to democratize history. 
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both knew that I had the best intentions at heart—in the end, I think I was paralyzed by the fear 
of not getting it “right,” and, as such, I set out to find another way around. Uncomfortable with 
the “author-ity” (Frisch Shared Authority 226) that I had over my grandmother’s story, as the 
self-appointed custodian of my grandmother’s voice, my approach to this dilemma was to devise 
a way to distribute that authority more broadly: namely, by creating a system within which my 
audience might share in the activity—and the responsibility—of putting the pieces together to 
construct the narrative.  
Looking back, I now recognize my work on “The Olive Project” as my first attempt to 
confront the ethical challenges of composing with the voices of others. But, looking back, I also 
recognize the extent to which, at the time, I was so concerned with my grandmother’s story, with 
the words she spoke and the meanings they conveyed, that I all but ignored the question of her 
voice itself. And, to the extent that I did consider my grandmother’s voice as an audible, 
vibrational, performative material, I have since begun to comprehend the great difficulty I had in 
separating the sound of that voice from the person who produced it. Indeed, the more I began to 
consider the role of voice in this project, the more fascinated I became by the contradictions it 
presented, and the more I began to wonder: What if we were to ask of voice not only whose it is, 
what it says, or what it means, but also what it is, what it can do, and what we can (and should) 
do with it? 
As a way in to these questions, in this dissertation, I embark upon an exploratory 
investigation of the human voice, drawing from diverse theoretical ‘voices’11 on voice in order to 
                                                
11 I invoke metaphorical ‘voice’ here, partly as a provocation, in anticipation of a larger theoretical 
conversation that I will broach in Chapter Two around the implications of the voice metaphor on our 
contemporary notions of audible, material voice in composition and rhetoric. At the same time, it is worth 
noting the extent to which the more naturalized alternatives (“perspectives,” “viewpoints,” etc.) appear 
inappropriate in their visualist bias. 
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understand, and ultimately unsettle, some of the most deeply-rooted values and assumptions that 
govern our relationship to our own voices and to the recorded voices of others, both within and 
beyond the purview of composition and rhetoric. Over the course of this research, I began to 
comprehend, firstly, the extent to which we, as a culture, tend to conflate voice with language, 
forgetting that, as Mladen Dolar puts it: “if we speak in order to say something, then the voice is 
precisely that which cannot be said” (15). Secondly, I began to recognize the extent to which we 
confuse voice with identity—for example, letting our metaphorical attachments to notions of “the 
writer’s voice” spill over into the very forms of metaphysical thinking that Jacques Derrida and 
the poststructuralists have so famously critiqued. And finally, and most importantly, I began to 
question the extent to which these lingering attachments to voice as speech and voice as self 
might ultimately serve to limit our compositional engagement with the digital voices of others to 
strictly semantic and representational forms of meaning-making. Taking these limitations as a 
point of departure, in this dissertation, I set out to reimagine the possibilities of digital voice as 
something quite different, exploring opportunities for alternative forms of compositional practice 
that far outstretch our field’s current representational methods and ethics. 
1.2 ON CREATIVE-CRITICAL METHODS 
Drawing on my creative practice as a digital storyteller and media maker, I approach the question 
of digital voice in this dissertation through a hybrid, practice-based methodology, which 
integrates rigorous theoretical analysis with practice-based experiments in digital media 
production. My decision to engage this “creative-critical” approach responds, first and foremost, 
to the distinct requirements and possibilities of the topic at hand. In the course of my research on 
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digital voice and composition practice, I have come to realize that there are limits to what I can 
achieve—intellectually and politically—by exploring this topic solely through traditional 
methods of scholarly analysis and alphabetic text production. In the end, it matters, both literally 
and figuratively, that the model of digital vocality I have proposed in this dissertation is one that 
seeks to move beyond the boundaries of language and alphabetic text to explore its sensory and 
affective possibilities. In order to take up media artist and theorist Norie Neumark’s call for 
attention to the performativity of digital voice—to the questions of “what voice does” and how 
voice contributes to “an aesthetics of intimacy and intensity” in digital arts and media (95)—it is 
crucial that we approach digital voice not as a theoretical abstraction, but rather as an 
experimental material, ripe for creative and ethical intervention. Thus, in this dissertation, I 
explore how the form of my work might enact or perform rather than simply represent or reflect 
upon the questions at the heart of my research. By drawing upon creative methodologies—from 
art, theater, music, film and poetics—I aim to bring them into conversation with a longstanding 
tradition of critical analysis, both in English Studies and the Humanities writ large.  
Of course, this turn toward creative methods and forms is not without precedent in the 
field of composition and rhetoric. Among contemporary scholars, Anne Frances Wysocki’s work 
at the intersections of aesthetics, politics, and embodiment is perhaps the most prominent 
example of this trend, as evidenced by not only her writing on digital art, but also her 
provocative presentations of her own experiments with poetic, interactive, and kinesthetic 
compositions at major conferences in the field. Suggesting that “[a]ny text we compose engages 
us aesthetically” and that “bodily perceptions” go hand-in-hand with ethics (“Unfitting Beauties” 
110), Wysocki pushes us not only to consider artistic practices and forms as serious objects of 
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scholarly inquiry, but also to compose these texts and forms ourselves.12 This potential for 
fruitful crossover with creative disciplines has also been proposed more broadly, at a pedagogical 
level, by other composition scholars in response to the rise of digital and multimodal writing 
pedagogy. For example, in his book Remixing Composition, Jason Palmeri uncovers a 
longstanding, if largely hidden, tradition of connections between composition pedagogy and the 
so-called “allied arts”—visual arts, drama, film, etc.—and calls for further attention to these 
potential connections. By employing practice-based inquiry and creative media production as a 
heuristic, I hope to imagine further opportunities for these forms of mutual exchange. 
Looking beyond the field of composition, my work here is also invested in helping to 
bridge the longstanding gap between creative and critical pursuits within English Studies more 
broadly. In their article “Converging the ASS[umptions] between U and ME,” Cheryl E. Ball and 
Ryan M. Moeller argue that digital media technologies provide us with a particularly productive 
inroad into this project. Because “[n]ew media texts make meaning with both form and content,” 
Ball and Moeller argue that they might help to heal the cleft between disparate areas of English 
Studies, which have become increasingly oppositional: namely, between scholarly vs. creative 
writing and literature vs. rhetoric. While “there are multiple possibilities of what can count as 
knowledge in our field,” these possibilities tend to be compartmentalized (literary criticism vs. 
creative writing vs. rhetoric) and placed into hierarchies (literary criticism over creative writing 
and rhetoric). As all of the subfields of English Studies increasingly take up digital media 
technologies and forms as a core part of their practice, we might well see increasing possibilities 
for productive conversation across their boundaries and perhaps even a dissolution of those 
                                                
12 Over the past few years, at the margins of the field, we have seen increasing interest in and support for 
such experimentation with aesthetics and form in scholarly publishing. In addition to longstanding 
multimedia journals, such as Kairos and Enculturation, we have seen the rise of new multimedia 
publishing platforms—for example, Itineration, which launched in 2012. 
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boundaries altogether. By locating my methodology at this point of intersection between form 
and content, I hope to help chart out what this creative-critical “convergence” might accomplish. 
At stake in this opening to questions of form is necessarily an opening to questions of 
audience—to questions of how scholarship circulates and for whom scholarship is produced. 
While the recent movement for Open Access publishing13 has made great strides in broadening 
the potential networks of distribution for the products of scholarly inquiry, it seems safe to 
suggest that the question of “access” is much more than a purely economic or practical concern. 
Indeed, if our goal is to engage broader audiences and publics in conversations around twenty-
first-century humanistic inquiry (and some might say that the very survival of humanistic inquiry 
depends on our ability to do so), then perhaps we should consider how the forms and genres of 
our scholarship might more readily invite this engagement; perhaps we might consider new ways 
of engaging not only the minds of the public, but also their bodies and senses—after all, as Anne 
Wysocki reminds us, “our senses are persuadable” (“Unfitting Beauties” 110)—or even engaging 
different audiences at different levels in the texts and knowledges we produce.  
With this in mind, the two practice-based media projects that I have developed for this 
dissertation have been designed for multiple audiences and contexts. In addition to their 
immediate function as components of my doctoral research, I have created these projects with 
the intention that they might also have lives in the world beyond the academy—as installation 
pieces, as radio broadcasts, and as web-based exhibitions. While the critical reflection I offer in 
Chapters Four and Five is a vital element of my scholarly engagement with digital voice, I would 
like to emphasize this: That the projects I have produced here in no way depend on this text for 
                                                
13 Notably, this conversation around access—once at the margins of our field—is beginning to gain 
traction and generate attention within the mainstream of composition discourse, as evidenced by the 2014 
CCCC theme, proposed by Adam Banks: “Open | Source(s), Access, Futures.” 
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their purpose or meaning. Rather, it is my intention that they stand on their own as works of 
creative production, which provoke curiosity and questions and confusion and pleasure in their 
own right and among diverse audiences. In this sense, the media projects that you will encounter 
in this dissertation should not be taken as merely instrumental catalysts for traditional academic 
theory-making, nor as demonstrations of a theory-already-formed. Instead, I offer them as an 
attempt to imagine the possibilities for theory-in-the-making, for theory-made-by-making, for 
theory that emerges from the material itself.  
This integrated, creative-critical methodology also responds to a broader intellectual and 
political endeavor to rethink the forms and modes of knowledge production in the twenty-first-
century humanities. Working to reimagine critique as only one form of knowledge production 
among many, prominent scholars such as Brian Massumi have called for a “productivist” or 
“inventionist” approach to the humanities (12)—a shift toward “affirmative methods: techniques 
which embrace their own inventiveness and are not afraid to own up to the fact that they add (if 
so meagerly) to reality” (13). Crucially, for Massumi, in order to take seriously this move toward 
affirmation, we must reorient our activities toward invention—and, as he reminds us, 
“[i]nvention requires experimentation” (17). In a similar vein, science studies scholar and 
philosopher Bruno Latour has famously argued that the utility of critique might have run its 
course, that the practice of “poking holes in delusions” is ultimately fruitless “if nothing more 
true is revealed beneath” (“An Attempt” 475). Calling for an alternative model of 
“compositionism,”14 Latour suggests that we might instead take up the many “ruins” left in the 
wake of critique and work to “reassemble” them “piece by piece” to create something new (475). 
                                                
14 While Latour’s “compositionism” admittedly makes no explicit reference to composition as a field, a 
number of compositionists (in the narrow disciplinary sense) have recently begun to take interest in his 
thinking as a possibility for rethinking rhetorical theory and method, as evidenced by well-attended panels 
on Latour’s work at both the CCCC and RSA conferences in 2012. 
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What these scholars are proposing, then, is an approach to knowledge-making that is 
fundamentally generative, that seeks out and builds upon potentialities, and that works to “invent 
or reinvent concepts” rather than simply “apply[ing] them” (Massumi 17, emphasis added). 
Missing from this framework, however, is any concrete methodological proposal for how this 
alternative approach to knowledge production might play out in practice. Thus, I see my 
dissertation as a valuable opportunity to begin imagining what such a “productivist,” 
“compositionist” approach might actually look like—or, better yet, how it might sound. 
1.3 PROJECT OVERVIEW 
As an exploratory opening to this project, in the chapters that follow, I offer a multifaceted, 
creative-critical investigation of digital voice, which engages the field of composition as a 
disciplinary point of entry, while also engaging the practice of composition (broadly defined) as 
a methodological launch pad for a fundamentally material inquiry. In the first half of this 
dissertation, I employ traditional modes of text-based analysis, drawing together a rich body of 
disciplinary and interdisciplinary scholarship to lay the groundwork for a reconceptualization of 
voice—and more specifically digitally mediated voice—in contemporary composition theory and 
practice. Then, in the second half, I take up some of the theoretical openings—to questions of 
embodiment, agency, and performativity—which have emerged out of my analysis and 
experiment with their compositional possibilities in a pair of creative media projects, using the 
projects themselves as a platform for theoretical elaboration. Finally, I conclude with a critical 
reflection on the broader ethical implications of my research, working to propose—or, perhaps 
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more aptly, to compose—the beginnings of a new ethics of digital voice: an ethics-in-the-
making, which begins from the material itself. 
In Chapter Two, “From Metaphor to Material (and Back Again?),” I trace the 
history of voice across the contemporary disciplinary landscape of composition and rhetoric, 
investigating the ways in which our longstanding metaphorical traditions of ‘voice’15 have 
impinged upon and ultimately limited our subsequent approaches to audible, material voice in 
composition pedagogy and practice. I begin this chapter by describing how the ‘voice’ metaphor 
has been shaped by various mobilizations of and assumptions about the human voice itself, as an 
audible, vibrational, value-laden phenomenon. Then, I move to consider a range of pedagogical 
approaches to voice-as-sound, which have emerged at the margins of the field over the past half-
century, from early cognitive behaviorist “talk-write” pedagogies16 to recent efforts to reclaim 
voice through the canon of delivery in digital rhetoric. Ultimately, I illustrate how these 
approaches to voice have been limited, in various ways, by our lingering metaphorical 
attachments to language and identity and propose the need for a more flexible, nuanced approach 
to voice for contemporary composition practice. By highlighting the distinction between 
metaphorical and material voice, which has been too often obscured in the mainstream 
disciplinary discourse, this chapter positions my project in relation to historical and 
contemporary conversations in the field and establishes the exigency of my intervention in the 
chapters that follow.  
                                                
15 Hereafter, I will refer to voice in its metaphorical sense as ‘voice,’ while references to the sounding, 
speaking voice will not include these single quotation marks. 
16 As I will discuss, Robert Zoellner was the first to propose this methodological approach in the late 
1960s, coining the term “talk-write,” which would later be taken up and reimagined by other scholars in 
the decades that followed.  
 17 
In Chapter Three, “A Resonant Material Vocality for Digital Composition,” I offer 
an interdisciplinary intervention into the field’s vocal imagination, proposing the value of a more 
robust, material theory of digital vocality. Taking the limitations in our field’s current 
frameworks of orality and aurality as a point of departure, in this chapter, I pose the question: 
What would happen if we were to start not from the linguistic, metaphorical, and oratorical 
tradition of voice in composition, but rather from the material complexities of the voice itself? 
And, how might a more nuanced approach to voice force us to recompose composition as we 
know it? I begin this chapter by drawing together an interdisciplinary body of voice scholarship 
from fields such as philosophy, physiology, film studies, and digital aesthetics, in order to 
interrogate and ultimately rearticulate our commonplace understandings of voice as it relates to, 
and is often subsumed by, notions of speech and of self. In the process, I suggest that we might 
address voice, instead, as an event or an effect—one with paradoxical relationships to language, 
bodies, and technologies—and argue that, in doing so, we might productively open voice to new 
forms of compositional intervention. I close this chapter by bringing these interdisciplinary 
theories of voice back into conversation with contemporary disciplinary concerns in the field, 
proposing ways in which digital voice might enable us to reimagine the embodied, performative, 
and collaborative possibilities of digital composing practice.  
Chapter Four, “Coerced Confessions: Performance, Editing, and Manipulation,” 
represents the first of two hybrid, practice-based chapters, which use methods of creative-critical 
media production as a springboard for theoretical reflection. In this chapter, I discuss an 
experimental video series called Coerced Confessions, in which I employ a technique I call 
reverse remix in order to digitally “coerce” performative reenactments of real-life public 
confessions from the bodies of unwitting actors. Exploring the contradiction between the 
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perceived “fidelity” and practical “flexibility” of digital voice (Neumark 95), I illustrate how, in 
a digitally “coerced” performance, voice might exert material force and produce performative 
effects that outstretch the boundaries of live, intentional speech. Building on Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
sociological theories of language—in particular, his discussion of “expressive intonation” 
(“Speech Genres” 90)—I use this project as a platform for enacting the materiality of language 
and reflecting on the implications of “revoicing” recorded speech through digital audio editing. 
Drawing on the work of prominent film scholars like Rick Altman and Michel Chion, I also 
consider the relationship between the visible body and the audible voice in audio-visual media. 
Ultimately, by situating my practice in relation to theories and practices of vocal remix from 
across literary, artistic, and popular contexts, I aim to suggest ways in which the manipulable 
materiality of digital voice might compel us to expand our understanding of performance and 
agency in digital composing environments. 
In Chapter Five, “Our Time is Up: Archives, Co-labor, and Imagination,” I discuss 
my work on a second practice-based media project: an experimental audio drama titled Our Time 
is Up. Speaking back to the dominant preservational and representational values surrounding 
archival voice recordings, in this project, I mobilize the recorded voices of deceased individuals 
from oral history archives and reimagine them as “actors” or “performers” in a collaborative 
work of fictional storytelling. I begin this chapter by laying out the landscape of voice (and, 
inevitably, ‘voice’), as it has evolved across the history of oral history, from a silent metaphor of 
the alphabetic transcript to an analytical tool for uncovering hidden meanings of performative 
oral narratives. Situating my posthumous audio drama in relation to like-minded artistic 
interventions into conventional archives and documentary forms, I pose the questions: How 
might we mobilize the performative potential of archival voices beyond their representational 
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functions? And what are the ethical implications of doing so? I address these questions, first, by 
drawing on theories of “posthumous duets” by musicologists Jason Stanyek and Benjamin 
Piekut—in particular, their proposal for the possibility of co-agential participation and 
“intermundane collaboration” (17) between living and nonliving voices. Then, I apply this 
concept to my own experience composing audio drama with posthumous voices, bringing 
Bakhtin’s theories of “heteroglossia” and “polyphony” into the conversation in order to extend 
the possibilities for such collaboration toward speech-based narrative genres. At the close of the 
chapter, I turn to the unlikely practice of ventriloquism for ethical inspiration, proposing a model 
for ethical composing practice, which encourages us to reimagine our relationships to one 
another and to the materials we engage in our work.  
In my conclusion, Chapter Six, “Making. Voice. Matter. A Reflection on Material 
Ethics,” I briefly revisit the trajectory I have taken in the preceding chapters before stepping 
back to consider in more detail the ethical potential that digital voice represents. Aiming to move 
beyond simple correctives to our negative ethical proscriptions against interfering with the voices 
of others, in this chapter, I propose possibilities for positive, generative ethical alternatives. 
Drawing from work by philosophers Mladen Dolar and Adriana Cavarero, I begin by briefly 
examining the historical role of the human voice in the development of Western ethics and 
political philosophy. Next, I consider the complexities posed by a move away from idealized 
notions of the unmediated, singularly embodied human voice of Western political philosophy 
toward the fractured, disruptive multiplicity of (non)human voices in the digital age, taking up 
Anne Frances Wysocki’s work on ethics and digital aesthetics as a point of entry. Finally, I 
reflect back on my personal experience of composing with voices—and with the digital voices of 
others—in the experimental media projects that form the basis of my practice-based inquiry, 
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considering the role of relationality, performance, and sensory experience in my composing 
process. Ultimately, in this concluding chapter, I suggest the value of such practices in helping us 
to reimagine our relationships with one another and with the broader material world and argue 
for further experimentation and invention across creative fields and disciplines. 
1.4 CONVERSATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Before proceeding to this analysis, I would like to briefly gesture to some of the principal 
disciplinary and interdisciplinary contexts in which my research is situated, as well to as the 
various theoretical and artistic conversations to which I hope my work here will contribute. 
Stemming from my present institutional grounding in an English department with a well-
established commitment to critical and cultural approaches to writing, in this dissertation, I take 
the field of composition and rhetoric—and writing practice more broadly—as my most 
immediate point of entry into the question of digital voice and, indeed, as the primary impetus 
for the project’s emergence and exigency. However, this project is also informed by my broadly 
interdisciplinary background17—bringing together studies in philosophy, media studies, oral 
history, and geography—as well as my many extradiscinplinary investments in the work of 
storytelling, performance, and the visual arts. In this sense, while my dissertation certainly 
speaks to the theory and practice of composition, in its most narrow, disciplinary sense, I also see 
it as speaking more widely to a rich array of academic, professional, and creative communities, 
which share a common interest in the act of composing, broadly defined. 
                                                
17 I came to my PhD in Critical & Cultural Studies (English) with undergraduate degrees in Comparative 
History of Ideas and Communication and a Masters degree in Community Development and Planning. 
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As I have noted, I imagine this dissertation, firstly, as an intervention into a longstanding 
metaphorical tradition in the field of composition and rhetoric, which has overwhelmingly 
imagined ‘voice’ as a silent, textual metaphor. While the ‘voice’ metaphor has largely fallen out 
of favor with the decline of expressivist writing pedagogy, in this dissertation, I will suggest that 
metaphorical voice has, in fact, had a lasting effect on the ways we imagine voice-as-sound in 
the field of composition today. At a basic level, I argue that the field has become so accustomed 
to debating the politics of silent, textual ‘voice’ that we risk forgetting that such a thing as the 
audible human voice exists in the first place. And, going one step further, I propose that this easy 
slippage between voice and ‘voice’ suggests a deeper dilemma, in which the linguistic and 
metaphysical values that we associate with metaphorical ‘voice’ might risk being mapped back 
on to our understanding of its material predecessor. In this sense, while my dissertation is not 
concerned with the ‘voice’ metaphor for its own sake, I find it useful to consider metaphorical 
‘voice’ in composition literature to the extent that it impinges upon or otherwise obscures our 
approach to voice as a sounding, vibrational material in digital composition contexts. This effort 
to “re-vocalize voice”—or to remind the field that voice is sound, as opposed to text or 
identity—is one of the principal interventions I aim to make. 
As an intervention in the theory and practice of digital rhetoric, my exploration of 
vocality also suggests ways that we as a field might reimagine our relationship with the materials 
of our practice more generally. For the most part, digital and multimodal approaches to 
composition and rhetoric have tended to take up new media technologies as mere “tools,” setting 
up binary oppositions between subject and object, human and nonhuman, agent and instrument. 
And as the field has recently moved to recover the classical canon delivery for digital rhetoric, 
we have seen an explicit disavowal of embodied performance in favor of technologized models 
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of media or design (McCorkle 13). While this theoretical shift has opened the field to a range of 
emerging compositional technologies and practices, it also risks reducing the body to a function 
of reception—a receiver of the multiple sensory modalities that digital media open up, rather 
than a core participant in the process of their production. In this context, my work with digital 
voice offers two crucial points of intervention: Firstly, because voice is, as Jonathan Rée has 
noted, the only “active organ”18 of the human sensory apparatus—that is to say, “You can use 
your voice to populate your auditory world at will, and nothing remotely comparable applies to 
the other senses” (55)—it is uniquely well suited to serve as a fundamentally compositional, as 
opposed to merely perceptual, bodily mode. And, secondly, because digital voice is not either 
embodied performance or mediated material, but rather both/and, it stands as a provocative and 
paradoxical case for reconsidering the relationship between human bodies and technologies in 
digital composing practice.  
Using my practice-based experiments with digital voice as a point of entry, my 
dissertation also contributes to longstanding debates around the materiality of language in 
English and literary studies more broadly. Certainly, prominent language theorists like J. L. 
Austin and Mikhail Bakhtin have drawn much-needed attention to the vital role of speech in both 
literary and everyday language contexts. However, while such approaches to the study of 
language certainly imply a notable regard for the actual, embodied act of vocalization, as some 
scholars have argued,19 they frequently end up instrumentalizing or obscuring the rich materiality 
of voice beneath a privileged focus on words, text, and meaning. Furthermore, because these 
                                                
18 Rée attributes this observation, originally, to Rousseau, in his work Émile, or On Education. 
19 For example, as I will discuss further in Chapter Four, scholars like Annette Schlichter (41) and Norie 
Neumark (96) have pointed to a striking oversight in J. L. Austin’s speech act theory, which frames the 
“performative” as a purely linguistic question of “doing things with words,” with no attention to the 
material role of voice in that act. 
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scholarly works themselves are produced in traditional alphabetic modes, even the most ardent 
attempts to get at the “expressive intonation” of human speech (Bakhtin “Speech Genres” 85) 
have understandable difficulty escaping the material constraints of their form, as primarily visual 
(as opposed to aural) modes of inquiry. Addressing these limitations in the literature, in my 
dissertation, I work to extend these conversations to more explicitly—and more audibly—
consider the vibrational materiality of the human voice. And, importantly, I do so not simply by 
representing the relationship between voice and language, but rather by enacting that 
relationship through experimental media practice20—practice which “perform[s] the voice” 
(LaBelle “Background Noise” 134) through acts of recombination, reinvention, and disruption. 
Beyond the boundaries of English Studies, my dissertation also speaks to the 
interdisciplinary field of Sound Studies—and Voice Studies more specifically—offering a 
nuanced exploration of the relationship between voice and technics, through both analytical and 
practice-based inquiry. As media scholar Frances Dyson has argued, sound theorists have too 
often “substituted aurality for what is in fact audio,” approaching mediated sound as “ephemeral” 
or “immaterial” in such a way as to obscure the role of technology involved in audio production 
and reproduction (6).21 And according to Annette Schlichter, this avoidance of technology is also 
characteristic of the work of many prominent voice scholars,22 who “do not account for sound 
                                                
20 Here, I am implicitly mobilizing Neumark’s distinction between performance and representation: 
“performative works enact and make evident, rather than represent or express” (96). 
21 Notably, Dyson attributes this tendency to our essentialist attitudes toward the human voice. In other 
words, it is because we have such a difficult time imagining the voice as something separate from its 
source and the identity of the person who produced it that we tend to forget the fact that the transduced 
voice is not in fact the same as the “original” (which is arguably not “original” at all) but rather something 
produced through an interaction with technologies and with dramatically different material conditions. 
22 Mladen Dolar’s work on the “object voice” in A Voice and Nothing More (the title speaks for itself) 
and Adriana Cavarero’s work on a “vocal phenomenology of uniqueness” in For More Than One Voice: 
Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression are two prominent examples of this erasure of sound 
technology from theories of voice. 
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technologies but prefer to present the voice as a medium of an unmediated body” (46). While 
recent scholarship in the area of voice and digital aesthetics23 has begun to close this gap, more 
work needs to be done in the area. By challenging its associations with metaphysical presence, 
taking seriously its interaction with audio technologies, and at the same time refusing to reduce it 
to a question of pure “audio,”24 the theory of digital vocality that I propose in this dissertation 
offers a productive inroad into theorizing voice at the boundary of humanness.  
Speaking more broadly, my dissertation also participates in conversations across 
aesthetic, production-based fields—such as film, poetics, oral history, music, and art—which 
work closely with voice as a core material of their practice. Conventional approaches to vocal 
performativity in the arts and humanities have tended to situate the voice as something to be used 
in performance, as a vehicle for delivering semantic meanings that lie somewhere beyond it. 
Under this framework, not only is the material intensity of voice25 too easily obscured by its 
service to speech, but our ability to take up that intensity as a material for compositional 
invention is also constrained by the proscriptions of representational ethics. As many scholars 
have noted,26 music is one notable exception to this trend, as a practice which, as Mladen Dolar 
puts it, “brings the voice energetically to the forefront, on purpose, at the expense of meaning” 
                                                
23 For example, work by scholars such as Norie Neumark, Philip Brophy, and Brandon LaBelle in Voice: 
Vocal Aesthetics in Digital Arts and Media. 
24 While Douglas Kahn argues that the phonograph served to “equalize [voice] with all other sounds amid 
exchange and inscription” (9), I would argue that there is simply too much excess in voice—our 
expectations that it is “destined toward [speech]” (Cavarero 127) and its special place in the so-called 
“hierarchy of perception” (Chion 5)—to collapse it entirely into the notion of audio. I will discuss these 
boundaries and definitions in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
25 I’m using the term “intensity” here in the spirit of Brian Massumi’s definition of affect in Parables for 
the Virtual, as a set of “autonomic reactions” that occur “at the surface of the body, at its interface with 
things” (85), which precede language and cognition and happen outside of the boundaries of conscious 
experience. 
26 Among them, Roland Barthes in “The Grain of the Voice,” Christoph Cox in “Beyond Representation 
and Signification: Toward a Sonic Materialism,” and Mladen Dolar in A Voice and Nothing More. 
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(30) and thus offers an inroad into voice’s nonrepresentational potential. Building on this 
foundation, scholarship in performance studies and digital aesthetics27 has begun to take 
seriously the capacity of recorded voice to act and affect in its own right as a performative 
material, in ways that foreground sound and privilege effect over meaning. By drawing 
inspiration from these experimental approaches to voice—and by putting them to work through 
my own creative experiments in digital media production—I aim to challenge the accepted 
boundaries around conventional uses of voice in the creative arts writ large and propose new 
methods and conceptual approaches.  
At the same time, by approaching this question of digital voice through the lens of 
writing, and from the disciplinary perspective of English Studies, more broadly, my dissertation 
also speaks back to those more radical approaches to vocal aesthetics, which have sought to 
define voice in opposition to language and meaning.28 Indeed, across the spectrum of avant-garde 
art and poetics—for example, in the history of twentieth-century sound poetry29— we find a 
striking desire to reclaim voice’s material potential precisely by stripping it of its connection to 
linguistic and representational practice, a tendency that only ends up reinforcing the primacy of 
language and essentializing the body.30 In order to complicate this reductive, either/or posture, in 
this dissertation, I approach voice, instead, as philosopher Mladen Dolar does: as a radical 
excess, as that which language and the body have in common, but which neither can rightly 
                                                
27 See Norie Neumark’s “Doing Things With Voices: Performativity and Voice,” which argues for the 
innate performativity of digital voice as an “authenticity effect” with the capacity to enact and disrupt 
identity as much as it represents or expresses it (95). 
28 According to Amanda J. Weidman, “The idea that aurality and orality are closer to lived, embodied 
experience but are nonrational or pre-analytical faculties is pervasive in the ideas and methodology of 
many academic disciplines” (287). 
29 As I discuss further in Chapter Three, scholars like Steve McCaffery and Brandon LaBelle have 
characterized the development of avant-garde sound poetry as a progressive move away from language 
and toward an idealized, primal embodiment, which defines voice in opposition language and meaning.  
30 As LaBelle puts it, “sound poetry yearns for language by rupturing the very coherence of it” (150). 
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claim as its own (73). By bringing theories of writing and language to bear on discussions of 
vocal materiality and performance, and by experimenting with voice as a compositional material 
in literary and narrative genres, my dissertation works to contribute critical nuance to the ways 
that voice is understood and mobilized as a compositional material across broad spheres of 
creative practice. Ultimately, it is this paradox—the fundamental tension between voice’s 
relationship with and resistance to language, bodies, and meaning—which drives my ethical 
inquiry in the chapters that follow, with relevance to creative and compositional practice across 
disciplines, contexts, and genres. 
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2.0  FROM METAPHOR TO MATERIAL (AND BACK AGAIN?) 
Metaphor is a bilateral-bidirectional turning, ‘inter-revolution,’ revolving 
transformation, intervolving transmutation, between the familiar and the 
strange. 
— Kuang-Ming Wu, On Metaphoring 
 
It goes without saying that the question of ‘voice’ in rhetoric and composition has been most 
widely understood as a question of metaphor. Making its debut as a benign grammatical 
descriptor (“active” vs. “passive” verb form) at the height of current-traditional rhetoric in 
the late 1930s (Bowden 175), ‘voice’-as-metaphor came to assert a more formidable 
presence—as a question of presence—alongside the expressivist push for the personal in the 
late 1960s (179). After years as the uncontested golden child of “authentic” writing 
pedagogy, with the rise of social construction in the 1980s, ‘voice’ found its politics under 
scrutiny by a wave of scholars leery of stable identity and personal discourse (Yancey 
“Introduction” xv). And alongside increasing interest in dialogical approaches to 
composition, came a reworking of ‘voice’ as a fundamentally social practice of 
appropriation. 
That’s one version of the story, anyway—a compelling if mildly abridged account of 
‘voice’s’ historical trajectory, which composition scholar Darsie Bowden traces in her essay 
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“The Rise of a Metaphor: ‘Voice’ in Composition Pedagogy.” For Bowden, “one could argue 
that these three uses represent the move from current-traditional rhetoric with its emphasis on 
form and product through subjective rhetoric and its emphasis on author to transactional rhetoric 
and its emphasis on audience” (175). While she ultimately offers a more nuanced historical 
account, taking into consideration the formative influences of classical rhetorical education and 
early American writing instruction, Bowden also argues that this admittedly “oversimplif[ied]” 
narrative does in fact capture the essence of the ‘voice’ metaphor: its radically shifting 
allegiances and its location “at the nexus” of the most pressing debates in the field—
contestations between “oral and written language, social and individual perspectives, and 
creative and expository writing” (174).  
This dual notion of the essential indeterminacy and simultaneous centrality of 
metaphorical ‘voice’ is intrinsic to Kathleen Blake Yancey’s argument in her introduction to the 
edited collection, Voices on Voice: Perspectives, Definitions, Inquiry. As the spatial equivalent to 
Bowden’s chronological tracing, Yancey’s text works to map “The Landscape of Voice” in 
composition. In the process, she finds ‘voice’ to be variously figured as: 
infusing the process of writing; as a reference for truth, for self; as a reference for human 
presence in text; as a reference for multiple, often conflicting selves; as a source of 
resonance, for the writer, for the reader; as a way of explaining the interaction of writer, 
reader, and text; as the appropriations of others: writers, texts; as the approximations of 
others; as a synecdoche for discourse; as points of critique; as myth (xviii). 
Like Bowden, Yancey sees these contradictory mobilizations of ‘voice’ as intricately tied up in 
many of the larger trends and movements that have come to define the field, arguing that the 
‘voice’ metaphor is, in fact, “paradigmatic of composition studies itself, of its recent history and 
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its current concerns” (xviii). 
In the two decades that have followed the publication of these accounts (published in 
1995 and 1994, respectively), the “current concerns” facing the field of composition have come 
to look—and sound—quite a bit different than either Bowden or Yancey might have imagined. 
Over the past decade, amidst the increasing accessibility and cultural pervasiveness of digital 
technologies, media and multimodality have staked their claim on the disciplinary terrain as what 
is arguably a new “paradigm” for twenty-first-century composition. Coincidentally, it was 
Yancey, in her 2003 Chair’s Address to the CCCC, who would ultimately set the tone for this 
shift, heralding an alternative future of “Composition in a New Key.”31 Admonishing the field 
for its mounting “anachronis[m]” (302), Yancey calls here for an embrace the many diverse 
forms and platforms in which people are actively participating in composing practices, broadly 
defined, outside of formal writing instruction, beyond the traditional academic essay, and in 
conversation with these emerging technologies. The new composing environment that Yancey 
describes is one in which texts are “Made” rather than only written and, crucially, “Made Not 
Only in Words”32 but in all of the available modes, media, and materials of communication.  
If multimodality and digital media do indeed constitute the current “current concerns” for 
the field as we know it (which, if it is not already obvious, is what I would like to argue here), 
then the question arises: Given our present “paradigm,” to what extent does ‘voice’ remain a 
                                                
31 Despite the musical metaphor that Yancey uses for the title and structure of her CCCC Address—
calling for an approach to “Composition in a New Key” and dividing her talk into four “Quartets”—it is 
notable that she in fact never explicitly discusses sound (and certainly not voice) as an emerging 
compositional modality. Instead, the majority of the examples upon which she draws in her effort to 
rethink the composition curriculum have a decidedly visual bias (posters, PowerPoint presentations, etc.) I 
believe that this oversight is indicative of a larger tendency to silence sound as a valued composing 
modality in the early discourse on multimodal composition. 
32 I’m referring here explicitly to the title of Yancey’s speech and its republication in the CCC journal as 
“Made Not Only in Words: Composition in a New Key.” 
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formative figure on the contemporary compositional landscape? Or, put more bluntly: In the 
wake of the alphabetic empire, how much does ‘voice’ really matter? On one hand, the easy 
answer is that ‘voice,’ technically speaking, doesn’t “matter” at all—at least not as we’ve been 
addressing it thus far. To the extent that it remains a fundamentally silent, textual metaphor, 
‘voice’ appears to have little to say to a paradigm shift that is premised upon a radical de-
privileging (though clearly not a dismissal)33 of alphabetic, print-based writing as the only valued 
form of expression. On the other hand, if we reimagine what we mean by ‘voice,’ the situation 
changes entirely; if we shift our attention from voice as silent metaphor to voice as sounding 
materiality, then it becomes anything but expendable. In fact, I would like to argue that, in this 
context, voice matters to composition as it has never mattered before; that voice-as-matter—as 
the material vibration of an embodied utterance—is, in fact, among the most pressing “matters of 
concern” (Latour “An Attempt” 478) at the heart of contemporary compositional practice. In 
other words, as the field begins to open itself to the affordances of orality, aurality, and audio 
technologies, voice resurfaces not as a tangential metaphorical concern, but rather as one of the 
core materials with which we make meaning, express feeling, and compose a common world.  
But to what extent has the field recognized, embraced, and theorized voice as a material 
potentiality? To what extent have we approached voice as voice in light of composition’s digital 
futures? In this chapter, I will address these questions by working to recompose the “landscape” 
of voice for contemporary composition and by reintegrating voice-as-sound into the disciplinary 
narrative. In the first section, I will revisit voice’s roots in the field as a silent, textual metaphor, 
                                                
33 This is not to suggest that alphabetic text is somehow absent from our present concerns in composition, 
or that metaphorical approaches to ‘voice’ might not have some potential relevance to other 
compositional modes. I am merely arguing that these concerns are not at the crux of the core questions in 
the field in the same way that they were, for example, in the struggle between expressivism and social 
construction in the Bartholomae/Elbow debates.  
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asking how various traditions of metaphorical ‘voice’ draw upon and propel forward particular 
assumptions about voice, which might influence our ability to engage it as a sounding material. 
In the next section, I will turn to examine a range of approaches to sounding voice itself that 
have emerged at the margins of the field, identifying three prominent strands of practice—voice 
as method, voice as mode, and voice as material—and exploring moments of limitation and 
potential in each. Finally, I will turn to discuss how these past configurations of voice in the field 
speak to the realities and potentialities of voice’s technological future, arguing for the need to 
construct a more robust, interdisciplinary theory of digital voice as a compositional material. 
2.1 ON ‘VOICE’ AS METAPHOR(ING) 
When approaching ‘voice’ as a metaphor, it is important to understand that ‘voice’ is definitively 
not a metaphor, in the sense of a stable, singular substitution. Instead, we might better consider 
‘voice’ as multiply and adjectivally metaphorical. As Kathleen Blake Yancey has suggested, 
“[W]e use the metaphor of voice to talk generally around issues in writing: about both the act of 
writing and its agent, the writer, and even about the reader, and occasionally about the presence 
in the text of the writer” (“Introduction” vii). Indeed, in her “landscape of voice,” Yancey 
identifies no less than five distinct approaches to metaphorical voice—ranging from 
expressivism (x), to Bakhtinian dialogics (xii), to non-Western views of voice (xvii)—all of 
which represent radically different (and often contradictory) pedagogical and political projects. 
Noting the vast proliferation of texts exploring ‘voice’ in the field’s major journals—for 
purposes as diverse as “feminist theory,” “the writing process,” “political dissent,” 
“advertisements,” and “evangelical discourse”—Cynthia Selfe argues that perhaps the only thing 
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these works have in common is metaphor itself, or, in other words, the use of voice as “a 
characteristic of written prose” (630). 
On one hand, this multiplicity might be read positively as a sign of ‘voice’s’ enormous 
elasticity—its enabling potential to be something for everyone. However, for scholars like Darsie 
Bowden, ‘voice’s’ lack of clear definition—Is it “style,” “persona,” “stance,” or “ethos”?—is 
actually a liability. “[A]s a consequence,” Bowden argues, “there has never been a consistent 
methodology for how to use it in the teaching of writing” (173). Even Peter Elbow—perhaps 
‘voice’s’ most enthusiastic and longstanding supporter—admits that, over time, the term has 
become “warm [and] fuzzy” and “has been used in such a loose and celebratory way as to mean 
almost anything” (“What Do We Mean” 2). In the midst of this great multiplicity, and indeed 
great ambiguity, it is perhaps not surprising that the debates around ‘voice’ in composition have 
been all but dominated by a single, deceptively simple question: “What Do We Mean When We 
Talk About Voice in Texts?”34 (Elbow).  
Let me begin by saying that this is not the question I will take up in this chapter. Not only 
does any attempt to answer this question risk coming off as grossly reductive, but, more 
importantly, this question holds little potential to yield substantive insight on the primary matter 
at hand—that is, the matter of sounding voice. Because, when all is said and done, this question 
is not about voice at all; it is about ‘voice,’ long ago abstracted and co-opted and, as I will argue, 
on the verge of forgetting where it came from—even forgetting that it is a metaphor at all. In 
other words, I am not interested here in entering into familiar debates on the empirical validity, 
pedagogical utility, or political integrity of metaphorical voice. ‘Voice’-as-metaphor interests me 
only to the extent that it impinges upon voice-as-material, only from the perspective of its 
                                                
34 This is the title of Peter Elbow’s essay in Yancey’s collection Voices on Voice: Perspectives, 
Definitions, Inquiry. 
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effects. For my purposes, then, rather than continuing to ask “What is voice?”35 (Leggo 145) in 
its many shifting metaphorical guises, I would like to shift the direction of the conversation 
entirely, asking instead: What happens to voice-as-sound when we metaphorize voice in the first 
place?  
As a way into this question, I find it useful to begin by examining the ways in which 
metaphorical ‘voice,’ by its very nature as metaphor, has drawn upon particular understandings 
of sounding voice—both what it is and how it works as a fundamentally “embodied, physical 
[and] human” phenomenon (Selfe 630). In this section, then, I will talk through a range of 
approaches to metaphorical ‘voice’ that have surfaced in the dominant disciplinary conversations 
on the topic in recent decades, starting from the key assumptions about the human voice 
underlying each. I will aim to connect these assumptions to a set of broader theoretical 
discourses and scholarly traditions that appear to have informed the field’s approach to voice 
thus far. And, finally, I will discuss how these mobilizations of metaphorical ‘voice’—and the 
assumptions upon which they are based—may be continuing to reverberate in contemporary 
approaches to voice-as-sound in the field of composition. 
2.1.1 Identity 
Without a doubt, the single most alluring—and single most maligned—principle underlying the 
‘voice’ metaphor (at least in its strongest form) is the image of voice as a profoundly 
                                                
35 It is telling, I believe, that this question appears at the very top of a list of 100 “Questions I Need to 
Ask Before I Advise My Students to Write in Their Own Voices” in Carl Leggo’s 1991 essay in Rhetoric 
Review. Furthermore, of the 99 additional questions on his list, the vast majority function largely as 
extensions of the first, in that they take metaphorical ‘voice’ as a starting point and inquire less into what 
‘voice’ does than what it means or is. And #33—“Can voice be defined with definiteness?” (147)—even 
hints at the possible futility of the question in the first place. 
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“individual,” “personal,” and “authentic” expression of a unique and unrepeatable human 
subjectivity. Indeed, this presumed connection between voice and identity lies at the foundation 
of the expressivist movement in composition. Under this framework, ‘voice’ is an ineffable, 
almost magical quality in the text that gives it “life” and makes it “human,” drawing on the 
resources of both natural language (i.e. rhythm, cadence, intonation) and individual identity (i.e. 
lived experience, embodiment, the unconscious) to express “the sound of more of a person 
behind the words” (Elbow “What Do We Mean” 18)—or even to produce “the individual human 
being composed of words in the text” (Yancey “Introduction” ix). Here, ‘voice’ is figured as a 
function of authentic authorship and, indeed, as a direct point of access to the humanity of an 
absent writer behind the text (Elbow 17). Despite the fact that it has no universally identifiable 
features, this notion of ‘voice’ exists as a special quality that readers, on one hand, may sense in 
the text of another author, and writers, on the other hand, can “listen” for in their own writing, in 
order to identify and develop “a voice that feels like one’s own” (Elbow 27). In practice, the so-
called “voicist pedagogies” (Bowden 181) associated with expressivism tend to “posit a writer 
developing ‘naturally,’ somewhat as do toddlers in an oral context” (Yancey x), engaging 
students in exercises such as freewriting, in order to block out the distracting static of audience 
and listen for the ring of this originary voice. 
This strong instantiation of ‘voice’—which Peter Elbow distinguishes as “resonant voice” 
(16)—is rooted in a longstanding metaphysical tradition, which has figured voice as a form of 
“presence.” We find an influential example of this perspective in the scholarship of Walter Ong, 
particularly in his aptly titled text The Presence of the Word. For Ong, because spoken language 
both preceded written language in its historical development and developed “naturally” in 
contrast with the “artificiality” of writing technologies (the alphabet, the printing press, etc.), 
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voice stands as the “native habitat” of human language (22). Furthermore, because voice “moves 
from interior to interior” of conversing bodies (125), it is seen to express a profound, even divine 
sense of “interiority” itself, and thus serves as language’s most immediate point of access to 
human consciousness or the soul. In many ways, then, Ong’s scholarship represents one of the 
most emphatic contemporary celebrations of vocal authenticity—framed through a return to 
“primary orality” and the “natural” roots of language in speech—upon which the ‘voice’ 
metaphor in composition has drawn.   
It is well known that these notions of “authentic” or “resonant” ‘voice’ in writing have 
been widely attacked as essentializing and arhetorical, not least by poststructuralist approaches to 
writing instruction. For example, in his iconic “debate” with Peter Elbow, David Bartholomae 
figures the ‘voice’ metaphor as a “sentimental” fiction of personal ownership and expression, 
which depends on a presumption of stable and individualized identity (“Writing With Teachers” 
67). For Bartholomae, the idea of a writer’s “‘own’ presence” in a text obscures the extent to 
which all discourse has “already [been] written by a culture” prior to the writer’s arrival on the 
scene (“Responses” 85). On the surface, then, we might say that ‘voice’ is taken up by social 
construction as the symbol of all that is wrong with personal and expressive approaches to 
writing in ways that apparently have little to do with material, sounding voice. On second glance, 
however, we see at the root of this critique a much larger body of contemporary theory, which 
has rallied not only against the notion of metaphysical “presence,” but also against the voice 
itself.  
I am referring here, most explicitly, to poststructuralist scholar Jacques Derrida, and his 
crusade against “phonocentrism” in Of Grammatology. Here, Derrida protests against a supposed 
valorization of speech over writing, which he sees as implicit in the logocentric tradition of 
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Western philosophy, which links the signified with an originary, divine connection to breath and 
voice.36 In arguing for a revaluation of language as pure trace, with no connection to a stable, 
human presence, Derrida effectively banishes the voice—as an embodied phenomenon—from 
critical consideration. Thus, because of their genealogical connection to these influential 
poststructuralist theories, perhaps we might consider social constructionist perspectives on 
‘voice’ in composition to be directed not only at the metaphor, but also at the materiality—and in 
ways that have had enormous repercussions on voice’s reputation throughout the field. 
2.1.2 Embodiment 
But if social construction has implicitly done away with the body in favor of discourse, other 
discourses on ‘voice’ have taken up the body as a key site through which voice—and thus 
‘voice’—might be figured. This express interest in the body has manifested itself most 
commonly as a widespread fascination with the concept of the “voiceprint”—the so-called 
“speaking analogue to fingerprints,” which is fundamentally “individualized” and by which we 
recognize an individual speaker (Yancey viii). While not literally present as audible “voice 
quality” in written texts,37 the “voiceprint” provides a useful correlate to metaphorical ‘voice’ 
imagined as style, or what Elbow classifies as “Recognizable or Distinctive Voice” (“What Do 
                                                
36 It is important to note that recent philosophical and phenomenological studies of voice (see Mladen 
Dolar’s The Voice and Nothing More and Adriana Cavarero’s For More Than One Voice: Toward a 
Philosophy of Vocal Expression for two prominent examples) have begun to question Derrida’s claim of 
“phonocentrism,” arguing, to the contrary, that voice has been largely feared (Dolar) or devalued 
(Cavarero) rather than privileged within the Western framework of logos. These texts will serve as fruitful 
points of departure in my larger attempt to return voice-as-sound to the center of composition theory and 
practice. 
37 For a detailed discussion of “voice quality” as a factor in identification, see Jody Kreiman and Diana 
Van Lancker Sidtis’s introduction in Foundations of Voice Studies: An Interdisciplinary Approach to 
Voice Production and Perception. 
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We Mean” 13). The assumption here is that a writer’s ‘voice’ is the means by which reader will 
come to recognize him or her as distinct—presumably in the same way that we recognize an 
individual speaker by his or her unique voice.  
Given that the “voiceprint” is based in empirical evidence gleaned from vocal physiology 
and forensics, it stands as a decidedly less controversial approach to the ‘voice’ metaphor—one 
that is still highly individual, but without treading into the dangerous territory of metaphysics. As 
Elbow insists, “If I have a ‘distinctive and recognizable voice,’ that voice doesn’t necessarily 
resemble me or feel to me like ‘mine’ or imply that there is a ‘real me’” (14). Instead, Elbow 
underplays the “genetic” determination of the voiceprint analogy (3) and emphasizes instead the 
role of repeated behavior—figuring writing as a habitual practice through which a recognizable 
‘voice’ eventually emerges (13). However, despite this deliberate move away from authenticity, 
as Bowden suggests, there is often a fine line between “identifiability” and “identity”—a line 
which many proponents of metaphorical ‘voice’ have been quick to disregard (185). Indeed, 
because the other side of voice’s “identifiability” is its identifiability over time—as Elbow 
argues, “[s]omething constant persists despite the change” (3)—there is a clear temptation to 
return the fact of vocal uniqueness to something essential, even something owned. Thus, while 
the body here certainly offers a more material or “empirical” grounding for the ‘voice’ metaphor, 
there also seems to persist a prevailing notion that “[t]he voice comes from the body; the body is 
utterly personal and this personalness somehow […] is [what is] powerful” (Bowden 182). 
2.1.3 Emotion 
This highly personalized approach to voice is also evident in parallel discussions about the 
relationship between voice and emotion: namely, the idea that ‘voice’ in writing has the potential 
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to express something “authentic” about what we might call the life of the mind. Here, rather than 
focusing on changes in the voice that might have occurred “after a number of years” (Elbow 
“What Do We Mean” 3), this strand of scholarship is concerned with the way the voice shifts 
continuously to express the internal feelings and attitudes of the speaker. Elbow describes this 
process as a kind of “naked” or “candid” exposure, in which “our voice quavers with fear or 
unhappiness or lilts with elation or goes flat with depression” (3). The body here shifts from 
being a closed container for an essentialized soul, to being a permeable membrane across which 
a person’s interior, mental state can be transmitted. And it is ultimately the voice—by virtue of 
its flexibility—that has the power to reveal this interior to the outside world. In this sense, while 
still deeply personal, ‘voice’ is afforded the capacity to function semi-autonomously, beyond 
conscious authorial intention.  
This appreciation for voice’s innate expressive capacities is a key principle of the 
elocutionary movement in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.38 For British actor-
turned-elocutionist Thomas Sheridan, the most effective approach to vocal delivery requires that 
speakers “unlearn” the so-called “artificial and constrained” methods of expression typically 
associated with reading aloud in favor of tapping into the “natural” tones and gestures of 
everyday speech (140). These tones can only be produced properly if speakers immerse 
themselves entirely in the emotions and passions they seek to express, seeking to feel them in 
their own minds and bodies.39 Crucially, however, these passion-driven, even “animalistic” tones 
                                                
38 The extent to which this idiosyncratic and vastly underappreciated educational movement directly 
influenced our own field’s approach to metaphorical ‘voice’ is difficult to say. However, I find in its 
distinctive approach to vocal delivery a number of resonances that are worth considering. 
39 John Walker explains this process as a kind of feedback loop, in which “each passion produces an 
agitation of the body, which is accompanied by a correspondent agitation of the mind” and further argues 
that, in fact, “certain sounds naturally produce certain bodily agitations, familiar to those produced by the 
passions” (325).  
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have the capacity to “of themselves excite analogous emotions, without the intervention of any 
thing else” (Sheridan 119). Thus, there is a way in which voice’s expressive capacities have an 
almost autonomous power not only to “expose” the inner passions of the speaker (and, 
conversely, to expose his or her lack of passions if they are not in fact genuinely present), but 
also to transmit these passions to an audience—an audience that must ideally be not only 
“instruct[ed]” and “please[d]” but also “moved” (Sheridan 143). After all, the voice, in elocution, 
is imagined to appeal not to the head, but to the heart. As Sheridan puts it, it is “understood by 
being felt” (119).  
Of course, it’s important to note that Sheridan’s “natural” approach to vocal delivery is 
the exception, not the rule, in the mainstream elocutionary movement. Indeed, for many 
elocutionists, voice’s innate capacity to express human emotion is only valuable to the extent 
that it is harnessed and finessed through a practice of rigid, imitative performance. As 
elocutionist John Walker explains, while it is true that “the expression of every passion ought to 
commence within” (331), in fact, these expressions often “stand in need of the regulation and 
embellishments of art” (324). As he understands it, it is the task of the “eloquent” orator “to 
acquire such tones and gestures as nature gives to the passions; that he may be able to produce 
the semblance of them when he is not actually impassioned” (324). Thus, the primary method by 
which elocution is taught is through the study of painstaking taxonomies that describe—and 
indeed prescribe—the “natural” and “appropriate” vocal and gestural expression of “the 
principal passions, humours, sentiments, and intentions” (Burgh 18)40 for scripted reanimation. 
For rhetoric scholar Ben McCorkle, it is through this process—“one that values the mechanical 
                                                
40 Burgh’s list of categories range everywhere from “desire” (26) to “anger” (28) to “death” (32), each 
described in dictionary-like specificity and sometimes cross-referenced for convenience—i.e. 
“Dependence. See Modesty” (25). 
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regularity of print and reinscribes the attributes back upon oral processes of oral delivery” 
(107)—that elocution works to elide the differences between speech and writing, ultimately 
privileging the values of “a print-centered communication environment” over instrumentalized 
vocal delivery.  
2.1.4 Performance 
This shift in attention toward audience and performance is also characteristic of another strand of 
metaphorical discourse in composition pedagogy—one that figures voice as fundamentally 
rhetorical. In these discourses, the voice is not only capable of “revealing” the inner truth of a 
person’s emotional state of being, it can also be deliberately mobilized and manipulated by the 
speaker for particular rhetorical effect. One of the key ways in which this performativity has 
been figured is through a sharp distinction between two “dimensions” of voice: its basic “sound” 
and the “manner or style” in which it is used. Elbow frames these distinctions using a musical 
metaphor, which figures voice as a “physical ‘instrument’” (“What Do We Mean” 3). As he 
explains, on one hand, the instrument itself constrains and determines the range of possible 
sounds that can be produced, and, on the other hand, the musician can use that instrument to play 
a range of “tunes, rhythms, and styles” of her own invention (3). This distinction—between what 
we might think of as voice quality and vocal delivery—has enabled the field to figure ‘voice’ in 
writing as flexible and rhetorical. Based on audience and circumstance, the writer—imagined as 
a player of her own voice-as-instrument—may chose to modulate and deploy her voice in a 
variety of ways to create a diversity of intended effects.  
This musical metaphor represents a longstanding tradition that goes back to early 
discussions of delivery in classical rhetoric. In his reflection “On the Character of the Orator,” 
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Cicero celebrates the enormous flexibility of the human voice by comparing it to the “strings in a 
musical instrument,” which are able, when “moved by the affections of the mind,” to express 
every imaginable human emotion (256). For Cicero, the expressive capacity of the voice appears 
to be innate to its instrumental character, such that “the tones of the voice, like musical chords, 
are so wound up as to be responsive to every touch, sharp, flat, quick, slow, loud, gentle” (256). 
From this perspective, as a person is “touched” by emotional stimuli from the outside, his or her 
voice-as-instrument responds with a pre-given tonality that corresponds to the given emotion. 
However, as we see in Quintilian’s approach to voice-as-instrument, it is also possible and even 
essential that this variety and flexibility be made “obedient to the will of the speaker” through 
careful management and modulation (353).41 Under this framework, voice is imagined as 
something outside of and distanced from the speaker herself, but something that is at the same 
time capable of delivering what is inside—raw “affections,” certainly, but more ideally 
performed rhetorical intention. As an “instrument” of rhetorical delivery, the voice is figured as a 
singular, closed, natural object, possessed of its own capacities to resonate and affect, as well as 
its own internally determined limitations to this flexibility. Ultimately, it is up to the speaker-as-
musician—the owner of a singular voice-instrument—to activate the capacities of her voice, as 
well as to keep their dangerous excesses at bay.  
                                                
41 In The Philosophy of the Human Voice, American elocutionist James Rush takes up the comparison 
between the human voice and the musical instrument as an ultimately incongruent one, identifying the 
“radical and vanishing movement” (63) of the human speaking voice through a tone and contrasting this 
with the “discrete” movement from pitch to pitch made by an instrument (33). At the same time, he also 
seeks to develop a notational system that makes voice’s excesses accessible to the same kind of recording 
and performative reanimation as music, thus setting up a fascinating tension between the desire to harness 
and tame voice and the inability to actually do so. 
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2.1.5 Dialogue 
Carrying forward this notion of rhetorical performativity, I would like to turn now to address one 
final approach to ‘voice’ in writing—one that is equally invested in voice’s intonational 
flexibility, but that figures this flexibility very differently. I’m referring here to “dialogical” 
approaches to composition, which draw upon the thinking of Mikhail Bakhtin. In contrast to the 
closed, singular, personal voice-instrument proposed by traditional approaches to rhetorical 
delivery, Bakhtinian approaches to composition have worked to reconfigure ‘voice’ as 
fundamentally multiple, dialogical, and social. As composition scholar Frank Farmer explains it, 
in this context, “voice is always voices. A voice in isolation has no reason to speak, no motive to 
be heard, and thus is meaningless” (62). Such pedagogies encourage students to “become self-
conscious about and attentive to the language they use” as writers (Halasek 6). Rather than 
imagining themselves as owning their voice—or ‘voice(s)’—as solitary authors, students are 
pushed to consider how language functions instead as “a continuing heterogeneity and diversity 
of or tension among voices” (18) and to imagine themselves as participating in a social process 
of “revoic[ing]” (Farmer 69), which is always already imitating, responding to, and anticipating 
the responses of existing conversations and genres. Thus, in place of a speaker who adapts and 
modulates her own personal voice to meet a variety of rhetorical situations, this approach to 
voice imagines a speaker who is constantly borrowing from the intonations and accents of others 
and adapting them to her own purposes. In this sense, dialogical approaches to ‘voice’ in 
composition pedagogy represent a radical disavowal of voice-as-authorship in favor of an 
alternative model of voice-as-appropriation.  
The theories of Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin—which provide the impetus for 
this “revoicing” of ‘voice’ in writing—represent a radical effort to reimagine the nature of 
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language itself, not as a neutral linguistic system but as a living practice of situated social 
“utterance.” Central to this theory is the idea that speakers do not, in fact, draw their words from 
the dictionary, but rather encounter them “in other people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts, 
serving other people’s intentions” and then appropriate them for their own purposes (“Discourse” 
294). As such, one’s own speech is always first and foremost invested with “echoes and 
reverberations” of the speech of another (“Speech Genres” 91), often in the form of audible 
“accents” and “expressive intonations” that are constitutive of meaning (85).42 On one hand, 
given that Bakhtin’s theory of language draws its inspiration directly from the social contexts of 
everyday utterance, voice-as-sound plays an essential and formative role. On the other hand, 
while audible voice provides the impetus for Bakhtin’s thinking, its sounding potential is 
ultimately silenced when the theory is collapsed into alphabetic discourse. ‘Voice’ in this context 
is not, to be sure, a sounding vibration. Instead, it is perhaps something closer to the notion of 
perspective as it is inflected by questions of style, intention, and context.43 However, with few 
exceptions,44 Bakhtin tends to mobilize terms like “voice,” “accent,” and “intonation” in 
alphabetic contexts as if they were actually audible. Crucially, such a move risks erasing the 
                                                
42 In his essay “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art,” Bakhtin’s collaborator, Valentin Volosinov, 
describes the place of intonation in language, arguing: “Intonation always lies on the border of the verbal 
and the nonverbal, the said and the unsaid. In intonation, discourse comes directly into contact with life. 
And it is in intonation above all that the speaker comes into contact with the listener or listeners—
intonation is social par excellence. It is especially sensitive to all the vibrations in the social atmosphere 
surrounding the speaker” (102). This interest in “vibration” is notable as precisely that which ‘voice,’ 
when transformed into textual metaphor, does not possess.  
43 In this sense, we might see Bakhtinian approaches to ‘voice’ in composition as most closely allied with 
the social construction movement, which seeks to shift the focus from “voice” to “citation” (Bartholomae 
67). However, if the social constructionists have all but banned the use of the ‘voice’ metaphor as a result 
of their iconic clash with expressivism, Bakhtin has allowed for a reworking of ‘voice’ that is more 
palatable to poststructuralist politics.  
44 For example, in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin explicitly draws attention to the 
fundamental incongruence between the “material of music” versus that of the novel and explains that 
ultimately, “the term ‘polyphonic novel,’” is thus necessarily “a graphic analogy, a simple metaphor” 
standing in for lack of a “more appropriate label” (22). I will return to this notion of polyphony in Chapter 
Four. 
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distinctions between metaphor and materiality, ultimately working to silence sounding voice in 
favor of its textual manifestations. 
2.2 MATERIAL RELATIONS 
Stepping back for a moment from this discussion, I would like to pose the question: So what, 
then, does this silent, textual ‘voice’ have to do with the project at hand, with voice as a sounding 
material? On the surface, it would seem, the answer is very little. After all, despite what we may 
have been led to believe, the range of generic conventions, stylistic features, and linguistic 
philosophies that apparently give ‘voice’ to textual discourse ultimately bear little resemblance to 
the audible vibrations we emit from our speaking, breathing, bellowing bodies in an act of vocal 
utterance. While it is clear, as I have argued here, that the ‘voice’ metaphor indeed draws from 
ideas about the human voice as “its most immediate reference” (Yancey “Introduction” viii), it is 
also just as clear that the ‘voice’ metaphor is not equivalent to the human voice itself. Certainly, 
theories of subvocalization have suggested the possibility that our own bodies might approach 
the act of reading text with the same basic nerve and muscular activity we use in speaking it 
(Elbow “What Do We Mean” 7). But in the end, it is fair to say that we cannot actually “hear” 
alphabetic text (unless, of course, we read it aloud); that no matter how we figure it, 
metaphorical ‘voice’ in all its forms is fundamentally devoid of voice’s essential quality of 
vibrational resonance.  
If this is the case, then the question becomes: Why attend to metaphorical ‘voice’ in the 
first place? Wouldn’t it be easier to simply declare a break with voice’s silent, textual past and 
push voice forward into its sounding material future? Admittedly, when I first approached this 
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dissertation, that is precisely how I imagined my intervention—and, indeed, it was tempting to 
simply dismiss metaphorical ‘voice’ as an anachronistic relic with little bearing on the task at 
hand. However, as I have progressed in my research, I have come to realize that, in fact, to 
approach voice as a binary of metaphor vs. material, silence vs. sound, past vs. future would be 
both to blatantly ignore the extent to which ‘voice’-as-metaphor has inflected—and continues to 
inflect—the diverse approaches to voice-as-sound that have emerged in its wake, and to grossly 
misunderstand the nature of metaphor itself.  
In my previous discussion of Bakhtin, I alluded to the possibility that his work—precisely 
by attending to sounding voice only to collapse it into alphabetic text—might inadvertently be 
serving to erase the distinction between the metaphor and the materiality, ultimately to the 
privilege of the former. However, it is important to point out that Bakhtin is in no way alone in 
this tendency—and neither are the compositionists who have drawn on his work in order to 
reimagine the internal dialogics of writing. Rather, this slippage between material voice and 
textual ‘voice’ seems to be endemic to the disciplinary discourse around ‘voice’ in general and 
indicative of a larger trend in which voice, in the field of composition, is imagined first-and-
foremost as a textual phenomenon. Undoubtedly, this fact speaks to the power and popularity 
that the ‘voice’ metaphor has garnered over time, and in spite of the enormous controversy it has 
generated. In fact, I would argue that we might even consider ‘voice’ to be among what 
composition theorist Robert Zoellner calls the primary “instrumental metaphors” of writing 
pedagogy—that is, not the metaphors we teach, but the metaphors we use to teach (268). As 
Zoellner suggests, such metaphors often become “so fundamental and pervasive that we tend to 
forget that they are metaphors and act as if they were ‘fact’” (269). While, certainly, there have 
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been notable exceptions to this rule45—moments in the disciplinary discourse in which explicit 
effort is made to acknowledge the existence of “the literal thing itself, the human voice”—more 
often than not, such efforts are framed explicitly as “remind[ers]” of ‘voice’s’ status as metaphor, 
suggesting that there is a felt need for such reminders in the first place (Elbow “What Do We 
Mean” 2). 
But if it is indeed the case that we, as a field, have often forgotten that ‘voice’ is a 
metaphor, then I am not suggesting that this fact on its own is somehow inherently problematic. I 
am not a literalist, and neither am I against the ‘voice’ metaphor purely on principle. 
(Admittedly, in my own teaching, I have often found ‘voice’ to be a useful point of entry into 
questions of style and representation.) However, I would argue that the widespread metaphorical 
amnesia surrounding the question of ‘voice’ in our field does become troubling when it serves to 
close down the possibilities for substantive discussion around the voice itself. Because, when we 
forget that there exists a physical, material reality behind the metaphor, it is all too easy to 
exclude this reality from consideration—crucially, even in conversations that call for explicit 
critical attention to the materiality of sounding voice. 
Janet C. Eldred’s 1997 CCC article—promisingly titled “The Technology of Voice”—
stands as a prominent example of the implicit silencing, which characterizes the very disciplinary 
conversations that appear ready to take up voice as a sounding phenomenon. In this personal-
critical essay, Eldred discusses her relationship to her mother’s ‘voice’ over time, from her early 
childhood experiences of exchanging handwritten letters, through her mother’s struggle to 
communicate as her body deteriorated due to terminal A.L.S. Implicit in Eldred’s narrative is an 
                                                
45 Peter Elbow’s essay “What Do We Mean When We Talk About Voice in Texts?” is a notable example 
of this, stating: “When there is so much metaphorical talk about voice, I find it intellectually cleansing to 
remind myself that it is a metaphor and to acquaint myself better with the literal term—and even try to 
immerse myself better in the experience of the literal thing itself, the human voice” (2).  
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underlying sense of congruency between the “written voice” that her mother used in letters and 
emails and the audible speaking voice that she ultimately lost to the disease—and, furthermore, a 
familiar assumption that “written voice” is, in fact, just as audible (334). Describing the 
strangeness of the technologies that helped to mediate her mother’s “voice” when she could no 
longer speak—the “technological voice” of the hand-held “Crespeaker” (340) and the “stranger’s 
voice” of the T.D.D. telephone (345)—Eldred ultimately expresses a preference for “the old 
[voice], the written [voice]” of her mother’s letters and even the “online voice” of her email 
communication (346). Beginning the essay by suggesting (rightly, I think), that “in any 
discussion of voice, we necessarily hear technology’s inflections” (334), Eldred ultimately skirts 
around any substantive consideration of these sounding technologies by framing them only as 
poor substitutes for the textual metaphor.  
In many ways, it is hard to argue with the sincerity of the feelings and experiences behind 
Eldred’s heartfelt reflection. And, indeed, her essay does raise some provocative questions—
about the uncanny disruption of the wrong voice, about the ways in which mediated and 
synthetic speech infuses our day-to-day lives, and about the affective experience of listening vs. 
reading. Unfortunately, however, because of the ease with which we seem to be able to collapse 
the distance between textual ‘voice’ and its sounding equivalent—and to the privilege of the 
former—these questions are largely left unaddressed. At the essay’s end, we are left with an 
unresolved conflict between Eldred’s mother’s desire to hear her daughter’s voice on the T.D.D. 
telephone and Eldred’s own stubborn preference for the more ‘authentic’ voice of her mother’s 
writing—followed by an awkwardly placed argument against grading personal writing in the 
composition classroom. What concerns me about this essay, then, is not the argument itself, 
which is profoundly sympathetic, but rather the missed opportunity that this argument represents: 
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the extent to which pressing questions about the future of the material voice are obscured by the 
residue of ‘voice’s’ metaphorical legacy.  
As we will see in the section that follows, this muddying effect represents a much larger 
pattern in the dominant discourse on voice, wherein many of the core principles that undergird 
the field’s attachment to ‘voice’-as-text continue to inform its efforts to imagine the possibilities 
for voice-as-sound. Thus, just as the ‘voice’ metaphor has precluded discussions of sounding 
voice from happening in the first place, it may also have the potential to infuse these discussions 
when they do happen with its own assumptions and values. In this context, perhaps it is not 
enough that we simply shift our understanding of ‘voice’ from a singular metaphor to a 
multiplicity. Instead, it seems to me that we might best understand ‘voice’ as participating in a 
dynamic process of “metaphoring” (Wu 37)—a reciprocal process through which ‘voice’ 
borrows from particular ideas about the human voice itself, reaccentuates those ideas to meet its 
own purposes, and then maps those ideas back onto the original term in ways that have lasting 
implications—both promising and limiting—on our relationship to it.46 
2.3 SOUNDING VOICE IN COMPOSITION 
 
Looking back at the previous discussion, we have seen how different ideas about the sounding 
human voice make possible different approaches to and mobilizations of the ‘voice’ metaphor. 
                                                
46 As Kuang-Ming Wu explains it, “This is the two-way metastasis of metaphor from the familiar to the 
novel and back. Seeing the novel in terms of the familiar digests the novel to turn it intelligible—as 
‘novel familiar’ and no more alien. As we do so, we cannot help but perceive the familiar in terms of the 
novel, ‘digesting’ the familiar to turn it sparkling new.” (49-50). 
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Whether we imagine voice as individual or social, embodied or linguistic, agential or 
instrumental ultimately has enormous consequences for what we can do with voice in 
composition pedagogy and practice. I have also suggested how these various assumptions about 
voice are not only drawn from common sense understandings of our own voices—or what Peter 
Elbow calls “everyday empiricism” (“What Do We Mean” 11)—but, in many cases, are also 
connected to larger scholarly traditions—from metaphysics, to classical rhetoric, to literary 
criticism—already circulating at the margins of the discipline. Building upon this foundation, in 
the analysis that follows, I will turn my attention toward a range of pedagogical and practical 
mobilizations of voice-as-sound emerging out of the disciplinary literature.  
Just as it would be a fallacy to approach ‘voice’ as a metaphor, in any unified sense, I 
have found that it is just as problematic to assume a singular approach to vocal sound. Thus, as a 
parallel to the multiplicity of metaphoring ‘voice,’ which I have just laid out, I will work my way 
through a symphony of sounding voice in three movements: voice-as-method, voice-as-mode, 
and voice-as-material, posing the questions: How do approaches to voice-as-sound in 
composition figure the voice and its relationship to language, bodies, and technologies? How do 
they figure voice in ways that resonate with or depart from the metaphorical tradition? And to 
what extent do these approaches account for the complexities and potentialities of digital voice at 
the present moment of compositional practice?  
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2.3.1 Voice as Method 
Emerging around the same time as the ‘voice’ metaphor itself, we find one of the earliest 
contemporary approaches47 to the compositional potential of sounding voice in Robert Zoellner’s 
1969 proposal for “talk-write pedagogy.” Emerging out of a cognitive-behavioral strand of 
composition theory, Zoellner’s “talk-write” approach proposes to mobilize speech behavior as an 
instrument for inventing and refining ideas in the early stages of writing. He situates his method 
as a deliberate corrective to the dominant “think-write” model of writing instruction, which, as 
Zoellner explains, “equates the act of thought with the act of writing” (269), “glosses over certain 
central elements of the act of writing” (270), and thus “become[s] entirely dissociated from both 
reality itself, and from whatever verbal-vocal ‘voice’ the student may have developed in coping 
with that reality” (306). In contrast, his “talk-write” method encourages students to draw on their 
natural abilities to produce thought in the oral modality of spoken language and then to utilize 
this language as a generative inroad to the writing process.  
Drawing on the experimental methods of behavioral psychology—and even going so far 
as to compare students to the rodents of behaviorist experiments (197)—Zoellner reimagines the 
writing process as a highly structured and fundamentally recursive practice of “vocal-to-scribal 
dialogue between teacher and student” (297). The process unfolds as follows: first, the student 
“says the thing he was unable to write”; then he receives verbal reinforcement from the teacher, 
who records the student’s speech as alphabetic text for his examination; and finally, the student 
                                                
47 When I say “early,” I am referring here to the period following composition’s iconic split from speech 
communication in the early part of the twentieth century, which Ben McCorkle outlines in his historical 
study Rhetorical Delivery as Technological Discourse (134). Certainly, before that point, the interest in 
spoken language, and thus sounding voice, would have had a strong presence in the disciplinary 
discourse.  
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continues to move back and forth between voice and writing until he has ultimately refined his 
“protoscribal” but “rhetorically viable” speech into a finalized piece of writing (296). As 
Zoellner imagines it, this repetitive practice would not only condition a student into more 
productive, inventive modes of writing behavior (as opposed to abstract cognition) through 
embodied habituation,48 it would also help to invest the student’s “written ‘voice’” with some of 
the features that make his “speaking ‘voice’” lively and distinctive (301), improving the quality 
of his writing overall.49 In this sense, we could say that Zoellner’s approach mobilizes both 
metaphorical ‘voice’-as-style and material voice-as-sound simultaneously, with the latter serving 
as a practical method for achieving the former.50 And, indeed, when sounding voice becomes 
merely a means to an end of alphabetic writing, it can only “sound” metaphorically as a stylistic 
residue of spoken language. 
Interestingly, this instrumental approach to the spoken voice as a means toward “good 
writing” has reemerged in a strikingly similar form—if decidedly less “rodential” (Zoellner 
320)—over forty years later, in Peter Elbow’s book, Vernacular Eloquence: What Speech Can 
Bring to Writing. Here, Elbow argues that “unplanned speech”—a concept more or less on par 
with what Zoellner calls “cortical utterances” or “visceral blurts” (273)—has the potential to 
                                                
48 As an explicitly embodied mode of pedagogical practice, Zoellner’s “behaviorial” approach to writing 
is in some ways reminiscent of what Debra Hawhee calls the “three Rs of sophistic pedagogy—rhythm, 
repetition, and response” (135). While Zoellner explicitly addresses the functions of repetition and 
response, as they fit within the framework of behaviorialist conditioning, I wonder to what extent rhythm, 
as it functioned through the experience of speaking and hearing oneself speak, might also have played an 
important role in the learning process Zoellner proposes. However, because he limits voice’s embodiment 
to its neurological function, this level of sensory experience is conspicuously absent from his discussion. 
49 I use the gendered “his” to refer to the student here in keeping with the usage in Zoellner’s article. 
50 Perhaps because he is writing at a moment prior to metaphorical ‘voice’s’ full naturalization in the 
discipline, Zoellner does appear to appreciate the difference (indicated with quotation marks) between 
‘voice’-as-metaphor and voice-as-sound. At the same time, the fact that he doesn’t feel the need to 
discuss this fact further suggests perhaps there was already certain degree of slippage between the two 
concepts. 
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serve as a resource both in the early stages of writing through “talking onto the page” and in the 
later stages of revision, through reading aloud (5). As Elbow explains, “These two uses of the 
tongue can help people write better and with more enjoyment” (5). Like Zoellner, then, Elbow’s 
method is working to reimagine voice precisely as a method—a practical “resource” (5) for 
achieving the dual objectives of invention and style in alphabetic writing.51  
In many ways, Elbow’s project in Vernacular Eloquence appears as an extension of a 
much larger, even career-long project to “rethink the very nature of speech and writing and how 
they relate to each other” (5).52 Working against a longstanding prejudice that spoken language 
and written language are fundamentally disparate in style and purpose,53 Elbow’s work seeks, 
first, to put speech and writing into productive conversation by minimizing the distance between 
them and, second, to reclaim the value of spoken language itself as an avenue toward better 
writing. Crucially, while he acknowledges that there are important differences between speech 
and writing “as physical processes” and “as physical media or sensory modalities,” Elbow 
argues that, ultimately, “when we look at speech and writing as language or products, the 
distinction is not so simple (“Vernacular” 19). In other words, language is precisely the thing 
that speech and writing have in common. Thus, as a method for writing improvement, voice 
becomes necessarily reduced to a function of language itself—inseparable from and subordinate 
to the values of “grammatical, syntactical, semantic, and connotational meaning” (106). 
                                                
51 While Elbow is perhaps best known as an advocate for the “authentic” voice of expressivist pedagogy, 
his approach to the ‘voice’ metaphor has always included a keen interest in the speaking voice itself, and, 
indeed, this book brings together both in a single, unified model. 
52 It was as early as 1985, in his CCC article, “The Shifting Relationships between Speech and Writing,” 
that Elbow first took on this challenge. 
53 See Robert J. Connors’s “The Differences Between Speech and Writing: Ethos, Pathos, and Logos” 
and Gary Sloan’s “The Subversive Effects of an Oral Culture on Student Writing,” both published in 
1979 issues of CCC, for prominent examples of such critiques.  
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It is in this sense, and perhaps only this sense, that we can logically approach Elbow’s 
suggestion that “writing can conserve speech—speech that time wipes out” (“Vernacular” 41). 
For if speech is nothing more than language (however rhythmic or stylized), then, certainly, 
writing is as good a tool as any for conserving it. Following this assumption, there is ultimately 
little reason to attend to the many other technologies for conserving the spoken voice, imagined 
fundamentally as sound. And, indeed, beyond a fleeting nod to the existence of “recording 
device[s]”54—followed by a quick assertion of writing’s superiority “for anything longer than 
voicemail messages” (41)—the only form of technology that Elbow engages is alphabetic 
writing itself. In this context, the extent to which voice-as-sound actually matters to Elbow’s 
method is questionable. ‘Voice’-as-metaphor remains a privileged term here, but voice’s 
sounding material seems almost incidental—as the “rich” but superfluous expression of 
linguistic intonation. 
That being said, it is important to note that Elbow’s disavowal of emerging technologies 
is not representative of the larger approach to voice-as-method, at least as I am imagining it here. 
Indeed, despite the fact that Zoellner’s “Talk-Write” approach is over four decades old, and 
despite the fact that he does not actually employ audio technologies as a core component of his 
practice, he does explicitly situate his method as a response to the dawning “electronic age” 
heralded by scholars like Marshall McLuhan and Walter Ong (319). Zoellner takes this shift in 
the technological landscape as grounds to question the continued relevance of some of the core 
values at the heart of writing pedagogy. In the context of these changes, Zoellner suggests:  
                                                
54 For example, in his discussion of the “ephemeral” nature of speech, Elbow argues that, in fact “spoken 
words decay the moment they are heard […and] are gone forever unless a recorder has been on” 
(“Vernacular” 14, emphasis added).  
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one might begin to suspect that an entirely intellective, rational, representational, linear, 
serial, and essentially asocial pedagogy, stressing private thinking and private writing 
with little or no attention to voice, may be becoming less and less relevant to the cultural 
configurations within which our students will have to lead their lives (319). 
Thus, it seems that—even in the analog age—voice and technology are beginning to be seen as 
fundamentally intertwined, and their combined effects on writing practice are already palpable. 
Following from this prospect, it is notable that many of the variations of “Talk-Write” 
pedagogy, which emerged just a few years after Zoellner’s in the early 1970s, do in fact 
explicitly incorporate analog recording devices—“tapes, cassettes, dictabelts” (Snipes 203)—as 
essential components of the method. For some of these scholars, the tape recorder serves merely 
as “a means of storing the subject’s speech communication behavior and […] a means of 
transferring his speech communication to paper” (Radcliffe 194). Here, sound reproduction is 
imagined as little more than an instrument to the instrument—a novel memory aid ensuring the 
accurate transfer of language, via voice, to its final destination in written form. However, in a 
noteworthy departure from this shallow instrumentality, Wilson Currin Snipes proposes a “talk-
retalk-write-rewrite” (200) method of “oral composing,”55 which takes up sound reproduction as 
a fundamental aspect of both invention and self-reflection. Under Snipes’s method, the initial 
“Talking Stage,” which is performed in conjunction with a recording device, is first and foremost 
“an opportunity to play with [one’s] thoughts, to say absurd things, to take ridiculous and silly 
stands, and to hear [oneself] in such stances” (203). Thus, rather than a mere conduit for storage 
                                                
55 This shift from “writing” to “composing” constitutes a significant move toward asserting the value of 
everyday spoken language not merely as an instrumentalized step toward alphabetic writing, but, in fact, 
as an important composing practice in and of itself. Indeed, for Snipes, “A discussion between two people 
is a composition; a classroom discussion is a composition” (203). Thus, the student comes to the 
composition classroom already possessing important capacities as an everyday “composer.” 
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and transfer, technology here serves as a fundamentally experiential and experimental 
platform—one suited both for playing with new possibilities for “self-expression” and for 
playing back a sonic record of these utterances as a means to auditory “self-discovery” (200).  
Of course, for Snipes, writing in 1973, the material limitations of analog audio serve to 
restrict this potential for “play” to the living utterance itself—and largely to the practice of 
recording and playback. By drawing on the technological capacities of vocal capture, this 
approach to sounding voice in composition begins to demonstrate an appreciation of voice’s 
potential as an instrument of playful delivery, but one that must always, in the end, be submitted 
to an iterative process in which it is rearticulated as alphabetic text. Thus, as is the case for all of 
these approaches to voice-as-method, it is ultimately language—and definitively not voice—that 
remains the primary material of compositional practice.56 Certainly, these approaches make 
valuable strides toward reclaiming the relevance of speech to composition pedagogy and 
practice. At the same time, precisely by approaching voice under the framework of speech, these 
pedagogies tend to lose sight (or sound) of voice’s sonic materiality as a valuable potentiality in 
and of itself. Indeed, as a means to an end of alphabetic textuality, voice becomes a utilitarian 
method, operating in the service of linguistic style, linear argument, and semantic meaning.  
2.3.2 Voice as Mode 
What I see as the second key approach to sounding voice in composition is one that hearkens 
back to a much earlier moment in the field’s pre-history: the classical rhetorical canon of 
                                                
56 As Zoellner argues, “[W]ords are in many ways as plastic and artistic a medium as paint or clay, and 
the talk-write classroom should reflect this fact” (299).  
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delivery. This approach—which essentially takes up voice as a mode of delivery—is part and 
parcel of a larger effort in the field to recover this long-disparaged canon for contemporary 
compositional practice. In “Writing Technologies, and the Fifth Canon,” her keynote address at 
the 2006 Computers and Writing conference, Andrea Lunsford situates this turn toward delivery 
within the broader context of what Walter Ong has called “secondary orality,” wherein 
developments in electronic media have fundamentally changed the means and modes of 
communication in our day-to-day lives. In an effort to keep up with the affordances (and, indeed, 
the requirements) of the current technological landscape, Lunsford proposes a parallel 
framework of “secondary literacy.” As she explains it, secondary literacy is “both highly 
inflected by oral forms, structures, and rhythms and highly aware of itself as writing, understood 
as variously organized and mediated systems of signification” (170), thus bringing together 
orality and writing into a new, mutually constitutive configuration of compositional modalities. 
Certainly, there is a sense in which, under this framework, “writing,” “literacy,” and 
“signification” continue to hold privileged ground as the key terms of composing practice, 
suggesting a certain degree of consistency with the method-based approaches to voice that I have 
just outlined. Lunsford is clearly not interested here in unseating alphabetic writing as the 
primary means through which we make and communicate meaning—nor, for that matter, in 
moving beyond persuasion as the traditional function of writing practice.57 But neither is she 
interested in simply using orality as a methodological stepping stone toward rhetorical invention 
and stylistic refinement, only to slough it off once the objective of “good (alphabetic) writing” 
has been achieved. Instead, and in line with the broader discourses of multimodal composition, 
                                                
57 Indeed, in discussing her experience creating a new model for digital, multimodal, delivery-based 
curriculum in undergraduate composition, Lunsford expresses anxiety around the possibility of moving 
too far from “persuasion” toward “production” in ways that privilege the media over the message (176). 
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Lunsford calls for “the inclusion of aural and visual elements” (176) alongside and in 
conversation with alphabetic writing practice—elements with the potential to infuse writing with 
their own sensory logics and effects. By drawing upon these additional modalities, and by 
attending to “the material conditions of production” out of which texts emerge (176), Lunsford 
argues that we might productively reimagine writing itself: “as epistemic, performative, 
multivocal, multimodal, and multimediated” (171).  
While many scholars working in this area have tended to take up voice only indirectly 
and by implication, often within a broader framework of “orality” (speech) and “aurality” 
(sound),58 Lunsford’s work is notable for its explicit acknowledgement of voice as a distinctive 
modality in and of itself. In fact, for Lunsford, voice stands as one of the three primary 
modalities involved in the writing process, which she nicknames the “three v’s: vocal, visual, 
[and] verbal” (176). On one hand, it seems significant that the “vocal” is separated off from the 
“verbal” here, suggesting the possibility that voice-as-sound might be taken seriously apart from 
its traditionally perceived connection—and, indeed, conflation—with language. On the other 
hand, it is striking to note that (1) this is the only time that Lunsford makes mention of voice 
itself (aside from a fleeting reference to the “multivocal”) and (2) there is no room in this trio for 
the many other forms of sound, which do not coincide with the peculiar subcategory of human 
voice. With this in mind, one has to wonder if voice is being mobilized here either for the 
novelty of alliteration alone, when “aural” might in fact be a more fitting term, or precisely for 
its instrumental function as a carrier of language—or, as Lunsford calls it, a mode of 
“perform[ing] knowledge” (176)—with no sense of sound’s value beyond this purpose. 
                                                
58 See Cynthia L. Selfe’s “The Movement of Air, the Breath of Meaning: Aurality and Multimodal 
Composing” and Cheryl Ball and Byron Hawk’s 2006 Special Issue of Computers and Composition, 
“Sound in/as Compositional Space: A Next Step In Multiliteracies” for two prominent examples. 
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What is at stake here, I believe, is our understanding of “delivery” itself. At the root of 
Lunsford’s argument is a celebration of “the return of orality, performance, and delivery to the 
classroom” (170)—a notion that explicitly conjures the classical rhetorical context of live, 
embodied speech. However, as Lunsford attempts to map this context onto the realities of the 
present digital landscape, her express interest in embodiment shifts—subtly but significantly—
from a productive framework of vocal and gestural performance to a receptive framework of the 
“visual and aural components” of textual design (170). This transformation of delivery—from 
embodied performance to multimodal design—is, according to Ben McCorkle, the central 
feature of the contemporary move to recover delivery for digital rhetoric. As McCorkle explains, 
amidst the “explosion” of digital writing technologies, “delivery no longer means simply the 
physical and vocal characteristics of embodied speaking but also the formal, aesthetic, and 
logical elements of a given medium of communication” (32).59 In this context, viewed from the 
perspective of reception, the “vocal” might in fact fit neatly into the category of the “aural,” on 
one hand, as a sound-among-sounds, which is taken up by the audience through the ear, or the 
“verbal,” on the other, as a sound whose primary function it is to transmit semantic meaning.  
We see this same struggle—to reconcile the history of live delivery with its technological 
futures—in another of the key texts that positions voice as a mode: Heidi McKee’s “Sound 
Matters: Notes Toward the Analysis and Design of Sound in Multimodal Webtexts.” As the title 
indicates, this article is essentially interested in the question of design—the production and 
analysis of digital compositions. In this context, as it does for Lunsford, voice becomes one of a 
                                                
59 In his recent book, Rhetoric Delivery as Technological Discourse: A Cross-Historical Study, Ben 
McCorkle situates his project as an extension of this recovery effort, which reimagines delivery as media 
or design. By setting out to demonstrate the fact that “this interaction between delivery and various 
technologies of communication occurs throughout the disciplinary history of rhetoric” (36), McCorkle 
fails to address the erasure of the body’s role in performing digital delivery in this context—a project that 
I believe is crucial to understanding digital voice as a compositional material. 
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series of discrete “elements” in the design of a multimodal text, which McKee frames as “vocal 
delivery” (337). The explicit use of the term “delivery” here is clearly evocative of the familiar 
notion of a singular, embodied, live speaker drawn from the tradition of classical oratory. And, 
indeed, McKee argues that “[a]s with any spoken performance, the qualities of vocal delivery in 
a web composition create tone and convey mood” (341). We hear in this statement an effort to 
both collapse the distance between spoken performance and web-based composition as two sides 
of the same coin, and to mobilize the familiar terms of metaphorical ‘voice’ in its attachment to 
contemporary writerly notions of “tone” and “mood.” By drawing on these idealized histories of 
voice—which privilege an authorial speaking (or writing) subject and their aural effects—
McKee successfully asserts the value of voice on its own terms, but, in doing so, also glosses 
over all that separates the digitally mediated voice from both the live speaking body and its 
metaphorical counterpart. 
In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that, in her discussion of multimodal voice, 
McKee draws most directly on the eighteenth century elocutionists—a movement that practiced 
and preached methods for the artful, embodied performance of printed texts. On one hand, the 
elocutionary tradition no doubt provides a valuable inroad into considering “the nonverbal 
aspects of vocal delivery,” demonstrating the fact that “meaning is carried not solely by the 
verbal content but, as oral performers and oral readers continually show, also by the vocal 
qualities” (340). At the same time, the strange marriage of body and text that characterizes the 
elocutionary performance is one that imagines the body first and foremost as a vehicle for 
transmitting a pre-given textual composition, not a material for compositional invention itself. 
As Ben McCorkle has suggested, elocution was not only a reaction against print technology—
which was supposedly “incapable of dealing with the canon of delivery, at least as it was 
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classically defined” (92)—but also an active agent in the promulgation of print culture and print-
based values, which it then “reinscribe[d] […] back upon oral processes of oral delivery” (108). 
Thus, voice here is necessarily confined to the role of a “representational mode” (McKee 337), 
valuable for what lies behind it, for the meanings it delivers—but meanings which ultimately 
inhere in the text itself.  
Perhaps for obvious reasons, then, McKee’s approach to “vocal delivery” tends to assume 
what we might call an eloquent model of “clarity and seamlessness,” in which “the digital 
reproduction of the person speaking needs to be understood” (343). The idea that it is actually 
“the person speaking”—as opposed to the sound of a person’s voice—which is being reproduced 
in the process of digital audio recording is telling, and, I believe, is an inevitable consequence of 
any approach to voice that subscribes to either the classical ideal of the singularly embodied 
orator performing herself to a live audience or the metaphorical ideal of the singularly subjective 
writer revealing herself to a reader on the page. Whether understood as rhetorically constructed 
“ethos” or metaphysically intrinsic “presence,” the voice here becomes inextricably anchored to 
the values of both linguistic transmission and ethical personhood in ways that limit its potential 
to act and affect beyond print-based or oratorical conventions. While McKee does briefly, and 
productively, make a nod to the importance of “postmodern, disruptive approaches” (343) to 
voice—those made possible precisely through the interactive web-based interface—the model of 
“vocal delivery” on which she draws ultimately seems unable to account for the complexities of 
this disruptive potential.  
Of course, one of the key complexities of mediated voice—and perhaps that which 
distances it most profoundly from the embodied performance of oratorical delivery—is its 
potential to sound beyond the time and space of its original utterance by a living, breathing, 
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speaking body. As Brenda Jo Brueggeman argues, the field of rhetoric has always approached 
the voice within a framework of intentionality, taking it as self-evident that “those who hoped to 
control the will of an audience had first to control their own voice and body” (19 emphasis 
added). Indeed, Demosthenes—as the poster boy for rhetorical delivery in the ancient world—
was celebrated precisely for his ability to assert control over his incorrigible voice, which, in the 
act of stuttering, operated beyond his conscious intention and in excess of the semantic meaning 
he sought to deliver. In taking up the question of broken voices, disruptive utterances, and 
disobedient bodies, which operate beyond the control and intentionality of disabled orators, 
Brueggeman suggests that there might in fact be a certain power intrinsic to such a “voice that 
transgresses the boundaries of rhetorical propriety” (21)—or, as she puts it bluntly, “a voice we 
are drawn to but don’t much want to hear” (24). In a sense, then, what Brueggeman is proposing 
is that voice might have value not only for its ability to give “mood” or “tone” to the semantic 
meaning it seeks to “deliver,” but also precisely in its inability to transmit the sense and meaning 
that we have come to expect. In this context, at least some aspect of voice’s capacity for 
“nonverbal” performance emerges here as independent from both language and selfhood, 
suggesting alternative possibilities for voice to act and affect. 
If it is true that “the Western rhetorical tradition that has insisted on interpreting selfhood 
in terms of speaking ability” (25), then the question arises: What happens when voice escapes or 
exceeds the conscious intention of the speaking subject? In Brueggeman’s case, this excess is a 
factor of human embodiment itself—namely, the potential of the disabled body to act beyond the 
mind’s control. However, I wonder if we might not also fruitfully apply this question to the 
context of vocal mediation. In her discussion of sign-language interpretation, Brueggeman 
effectively shifts her attention from the singular speaking body to a fundamentally mediated 
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form of communication, one that complicates the neat distribution of speaker-audience-topic in 
the classical rhetorical triangle (26). Here, the interpreter serves as “informational conduit,” on 
one hand, and “interactive participant,” on the other—“both one who affects the discourse as a 
full participant, and one who delivers it, impartially, like the U.S. Mail” (26). In response to this 
provocation, Brueggeman raises the question of “rhetorical complicity,” asking: “[W]ho is really 
‘the speaker’ here?” (27). By shifting the question of embodiment from a framework of 
reception to a framework of production in this manner, Brueggeman is working to challenge the 
agency of the speaking subject. Thus, it is in this final approach to vocal delivery—ironically, the 
least “technological” and the most distant from traditional compositional practice—where we 
begin to approach the complexity of voice as a mediated material. 
2.3.3 Voice as Material 
This final category of approaches to voice-as-sound—that which attends most explicitly to 
voice’s materiality—is only recently beginning to emerge at the margins of scholarly and 
pedagogical discourses on multimodal composing. We find a fascinating example of this trend at 
work in the pedagogical experiments of Tara Rosenberger Shankar, as outlined in her article 
“Speaking on the Record: A Theory of Composition.” Here, Shankar sets forth a framework for 
an oral/aural composing practice she calls “spriting”—an amalgam of “speech” and “writing”—
which mobilizes our technological capacities to capture and edit the sound of spoken language as 
digital audio to produce a structured “talkument” (375). Following in the footsteps of scholars 
like Peter Elbow, Shankar’s approach is motivated by a desire to reclaim the value of speech 
(and, by extension, voice) in the face of a “graphocentric bias” in the Western intellectual 
tradition, which privileges practices of reading and writing over speaking and listening (375). 
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However, unlike Elbow, she does not shy away from the realities of audio technologies, but 
rather takes them up as a core element of her practice. Because, with sound reproduction, 
“speech can be made permanent” (379), Shankar suggests that we might submit speech and voice 
to forms of knowledge-making that have until recently only been accessible to alphabetic text 
production. With her “spriting” pedagogy, Shankar aims to bring together the “unrecuperable, 
untranslatable characteristics of speech material” (379) with the structure and permanence of 
alphabetic composing practices, ultimately aiming to “elevat[e] the status of speech itself to a 
writerly media” (380). 
One of the unique aspects of Shankar’s approach is her work in developing a customized 
software platform, which she calls the “SpriterWriter,” to enable spriting practice among school-
aged children. This software allows students to record their speech, parse it into visually 
demarcated units, and rearrange those units into a linear, essayistic composition with indented 
paragraphs and automated line-breaks. By using “Western text conventions as a metaphor for the 
visual representation of spriting,” the SpriterWriter reimagines the audio editing process as a 
means to support essayistic, textual literacies (384). In a sense, then, rather than reasserting the 
value of speech—as sound and voice—on its own terms, Shankar ultimately opts to reshape 
speech (quite literally) in the image of writing, using the technological affordances of digital 
media to adapt spoken language to the conventional practices of alphabetic inscription. And 
because it starts from the familiar forms and conventions of alphabetic composing (i.e. linearity 
and singular authorship), we might argue that the SpriterWriter ultimately does little to mobilize 
the particular affordances of vocal material, with its potential for layering and multivocality. 
Indeed, Shankar admits that, at the outset, “I had the conservative (and erroneous) idea 
that spriting would function as a part of a writing process: It would enable composers to focus on 
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higher-level aims in a mode with fewer mechanical requirements” (383). Under her initial model, 
she imagined children approaching spriting as a two-part process: “first, shaping ideas in speech 
and, second, translating those ideas to text” (383). By imagining spriting in this way—as a linear, 
teleological progression from speech to writing—Shankar proposes a model, which, in many 
ways, looks like an updated, software-enabled approach to Zoellner’s “Talk-Write Pedagogy”—a 
classic example of the traditional method-based approach to voice in composition, which, as we 
have seen, tends to instrumentalize the speech as a practical tool for achieving the ultimate end 
of alphabetic textual production.  
What is interesting, though, at least for our purposes, is not necessarily what Shankar sets 
out to do with her “spriting” experiment in theory, but rather what she discovers as she puts it 
into practice. Crucially, and despite her expectations to the contrary, Shankar finds that the 
students she worked with indeed “perceived and treated spriting itself as the product” (384) and 
responded to the sounds of their own recorded voices with new, adaptive vocal practices—
“words, dialects, language patterns, and voice qualities” (381). Thus, for Shankar, the 
SpriterWriter emerges as a platform for sonic experimentation and play, opening up a space for 
students to take up their own voices as “composition material—malleable and plastic” (381) to 
create embodied, rhythmic, and even musical artifacts60 with value as sound in itself. While she 
ultimately frames the potential of this outcome in conventionally metaphorical terms, wherein 
voices become opportunities to reflect on authorial “constructions of self and meaning,” (381) 
Shankar’s discovery stands as a promising opportunity to reimagine voice’s potential as material 
                                                
60 Reflecting on the children’s tendency to “sing” their talkuments in the course of their experimentation, 
Shankar reflects upon the nonrepresentational aspects of voice—as “orchestration,” “tonal and 
rhythmic”—and poses the provocative question: “Why are music and linguistic composition in separate 
boxes?” (387). This potential conversation between what we might call the “two compositions”—musical 
and textual (though not necessarily only linguistic)—is an area worthy of further exploration. 
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in both senses of the term: as a fleshy, vibrational substance61 and a “malleable” resource for 
compositional invention.  
We find a parallel opening to this dual materiality emerging out of Michelle Comstock 
and Mary E. Hocks’s “Voice in the Cultural Soundscape,” which, to my knowledge, stands as 
the only full-length article in the field to take up sounding voice as its primary object of inquiry. 
In this article, Comstock and Hocks take a step back from voice’s long metaphorical history and 
work to stake a claim for a distinct new terrain of voice as a “tangible” element of multimedia 
composing (“Voices in Soundscapes”). Laying out their pedagogical approach to activities such 
as voice-over narration and soundtrack development, these authors call for a model of “sonic 
literacy,” which they define as “a critical process of listening to and creating embodied 
knowledge, of understanding our soundscapes as cultural artifacts, of achieving resonance with 
particular audiences, and of developing the technological literacies involved in recording, 
amplifying, layering, and mixing sound” (“Introduction”). 
This project is particularly noteworthy for its effort to take up the embodied human 
production of voice alongside—and in paradoxical relationship to—its technologically mediated 
materiality. While Comstock and Hocks go great lengths to emphasize voice’s “vibration[al]” 
character as an embodied production of the human vocal chords (“Voices in Soundscapes”), they 
also work to complicate any neat configuration of voice-speaker-body by expressly interrogating 
the role of technology in vocal recording and reproduction. Challenging popular assumptions of 
                                                
61 Shankar’s discovery here prompts what is, in my opinion, the most viscerally embodied description of 
voice to come out of rhetoric and composition scholarship on the topic to-date: “Our voice apparatus 
consists of moist, warm air compressed in malleable sacks that are crushed upward and in by the force of 
muscle and bone. On its way out of the body, the air passes through membranes that vibrate regularly and 
irregularly and into cavities with different resonant frequencies. What we hear is the product of physical 
mechanisms: sizes and shapes of fleshy cavities and bone, the protrusion of the lips, position of the 
tongue, elasticity and tension of the flesh and muscle.” (387).  
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authenticity, these authors suggest that, “[a]s with any digital media,” recorded voice can only 
ever be “an illusion of realism.”62 And, most importantly, they draw attention to the ways in 
which the “new tools” of digital audio technologies open up possibilities for the “framing, 
editing, and sculpting” of this illusion through alternative compositional practices 
(“Technological Literacies”). 
Despite this promising conceptual framework, from a pedagogical perspective, Comstock 
and Hocks’s approach falls short of accounting for the many complex compositional possibilities 
opened up by this shift in the technological landscape. Notably, and similarly to Shankar’s 
proposal for “spriting,” all of the concrete pedagogical applications offered by these authors 
engage students in performing, recording, and reflecting on their own voices and primarily as 
instruments for the delivery of linear narrative compositions—with the documentary voiceover 
standing as their most highly privileged genre. Laying out their experience teaching with voice-
based assignments, Comstock and Hocks write:  
As our students have discovered, listening to recordings of oneself inspires a self-
conscious perspective (a form of analytical listening) on what's being said, how it's being 
said, who is saying it, and to whom. Along with this self-consciousness comes the 
impetus to revise and revise again in order to achieve resonance (or dissonance) with an 
audience. They learn to write (script) for a particular voice or rather, their sense of their 
own voice, which requires that they slow down, be deliberate, articulate, practice, and at 
the same time, experiment and revise, then re-record. (“Voices in Soundscapes”) 
                                                
62 In The Audible Past, sound studies scholar Jonathan Sterne goes further to suggest that there is no 
authentic “original” in sound reproduction in the first place—that “[b]oth copy and original are products 
of the process of reproducibility. The original requires as much artifice as the copy” (241). This is a 
concept on which I will build in the next chapter. 
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We see in this reflection a familiar set of pedagogical objectives—critical inquiry, self-
reflexivity, style, and revision—as well as a familiar model of composition, one which assumes 
an individual rhetorical agent speaking in her own voice to produce and transmit meaning.  
By funneling vocal practice through traditional modes of speech-based narrative 
performance, Comstock and Hocks are reproducing some of the traditional conventions of live 
oratory, which once again presume a neat connection between voice, speaker, and body. And by 
focusing only on the composer’s own voice as the privileged composing material, they are 
effectively conflating voice with authorship in ways that hearken back to its longstanding 
metaphorical legacy. In this context, material voice becomes “personal” or “cultural,” evoking 
familiar debates between expressivist and social constructionist pedagogies, and confining 
ethical engagement to the question of “what voices are heard and amplified and what voices 
aren’t” (“Social Conscience”). Indeed, as Comstock and Hocks push to broaden their discussion 
from the practicalities of “technological literacies” to larger questions of critical and ethical 
practice, voice, as an embodied vibration and a mediated composing material, quickly slips 
beneath the shadow of ‘voice,’ as a function of language, style, agency, and identity. 
While these representational aims and activities are certainly valuable as cornerstones of 
our practice in the field, I would like to suggest this: that they by no means represent the only 
way to engage voice as a compositional material. Indeed, as Comstock and Hocks themselves 
allow, “modern digital sound tools” enable alternative practices of “splicing, mixing, and 
layering,” which far exceed the conventions and limitations of linear, monovocal composing 
(“Technological Literacies”). Furthermore, given that digital distribution networks have the 
capacity to “[transform] listeners into DJs or soundscape artists” (“Voices in the Soundscape”), 
there is also no reason that composers need speak only in their own voices—or even seek only to 
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“create meaning” in the first place. Thus, while Comstock and Hocks, like Shankar, offer vital 
openings to the question of material voice, I would argue that neither of these approaches goes 
very far toward making sense of the complex range of emergent compositional possibilities that 
this material opens up.  
2.4 TOWARD A COMPOSITION-IN-THE-MAKING 
In this chapter, I have sought to “recompose” the landscape of voice in composition studies in 
order to account for the needs and realities of our most recent “paradigm”—that of digital and 
multimodal composing. Admittedly, in my initial approach to this project, I imagined this 
“landscape” as a neat, binary division—even a teleological movement—between the silent past 
of a textual metaphor and the sounding future of a compositional material. However, looking 
back at this review of the literature, it becomes apparent that, in fact, there exists no such easy 
split or progressive evolution. Instead, it seems that metaphorical and material approaches to 
voice in composition have coexisted side-by-side for at least four decades, in both symbiotic and 
contradictory ways. Indeed, rather than standing in opposition to ‘voice’s’ metaphorical legacy, 
we have seen how these three approaches to sounding voice have carried it forward into their 
own vocal imaginations—and, I would argue, in ways that dramatically influence their abilities 
to engage with this emergent composing material. 
As we have seen, the method-based approach to sounding voice is notable for its efforts 
to reclaim the value of speech in relation to written discourse. By drawing upon the spontaneous 
and intonational characteristics of audible speech, “talk-write” and “oral composing” pedagogies 
offer a promising first step toward imagining voice’s role in rhetorical invention. However, by 
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foregrounding voice’s practical function as a carrier of spoken language, and by presuming 
alphabetic text as the exclusive end product of the composing process, these methodologies serve 
to instrumentalize sounding voice as a mere means to an end of written discourse, ultimately 
imagining language—as opposed to voice—as the core material of their practice.  
In contrast, the modal approach to voice moves this conversation explicitly to the 
auditory realm, exploring the role of voice-as-sound in multimedia texts. As part of a larger 
disciplinary move to recover delivery for digital rhetoric, this trend highlights voice’s 
performative capacities in relation to the sensory experience of a listening audience. However, 
by approaching digital voice through a somewhat nostalgic return to classical orality/aurality, 
this strand of practice has tended to tie the voice to the live, speaking body of the rational 
speaking subject and thus to reinforce the conventions of representational, rational, discursive 
transmission. Voice, here is reduced to a mere medium or mode through which external 
meanings are delivered; it matters not as a material in its own right, but rather for that which lies 
behind it, in its performance of representational discourse.  
In the final category of work on sounding voice in the field, though, we find promising 
efforts to approach voice as a material in its own right. Here, voice appears both as an audible 
vibration, which is produced by the body but which also “matters” beyond the body, and as a 
“malleable” material with the potential to participate in the construction of new compositional 
forms. As an explicit response to the rise of digital audio technologies—technologies that make 
accessible not only the recording and reproduction of voice, but also its editing and 
recomposition—this approach is significant in offering first steps toward grappling with the 
complexities of digital voice’s mediated materiality. However, at the level of concrete practice, it 
might ultimately fall short of accounting for the full range of new compositional possibilities 
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available in the present technological context. Falling prey to many of the same assumptions as 
its methodological and modal counterparts, in the end, the existing material approaches to 
sounding voice continue to confine their engagement with this material to familiar textual 
conventions of linearity, singular authorship, and representational ethics. 
Of course, there is no question that all of these approaches—to the method, the mode, and 
the material—represent welcome contributions to the disciplinary discourse, working to recover 
voice from its long silence as textual metaphor and beginning to imagine how we, as a field, 
might take up voice, as a peculiar category of sound, in the context of digital composing. 
However, I would also argue that the existing scholarship in the field seems to be concerned 
largely with identifying the new opportunities sounding voice offers to carry out the work of a 
composition-already-defined as opposed to a composition-in-the-making. In other words, by 
taking as our starting point the linguistic, metaphorical, and oratorical attachments of voice in 
our disciplinary history, in the end, we appear unable to move beyond the present structuring 
logics of composition as we know it.  
Taking this dilemma as a point of departure, I would like to pose the question: What 
would happen if we were to reverse our process here and start not from the disciplinary 
conventions of composition, but rather from the materiality of voice itself? How might a more 
robust exploration of voice as a sounding material help us to expand our notion of what it means, 
how it sounds, and why it matters to compose? In other words, how might voice—if taken 
seriously on its own terms and in its complex relations—enable us to recompose composition 
itself? If we believe, as Jack Selzer suggests, that “language is not the only medium or material 
that speaks” (8), then, perhaps we need to do more to understand the complex materiality of 
voice beyond language. Thus, in order to transcend the limitations of the existing literature in the 
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field, perhaps it is time that we look beyond our own disciplinary boundaries for ways in which 
we might productively reimagine our relationship to voice—and, more specifically digital 
voice—as a core material of compositional practice. As we have seen in the work of composition 
scholars like Heidi McKee, Tara Rosenberger Shankar, Michelle Comstock, and Mary Hocks,63 
we are already beginning to move in this direction, but we still have a long way to go. 
Stepping back for a moment, we might ask ourselves: What is at stake in this project? 
After all of these years, why continue to attend to the question of voice in composition? At a 
basic level, I believe that it is precisely because of our field’s longstanding disciplinary 
attachments to voice—or, more aptly ‘voice’—that we are coming up against these questions and 
provocations in the first place. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the extent to which our 
long traditions of textual metaphor and classical oratory continue to inform our approach to 
sounding voice in contemporary composition practice is truly remarkable. And while these 
frameworks certainly go a long way toward helping us to account for the performative, stylistic, 
and expressive possibilities of vocal sound, they do not exhaust the compositional possibilities 
for voice in digital composing environments—neither the kinds of voices that we can take up, 
nor the ways in which we might use and reuse those voices for rhetorical, aesthetic, and even 
political ends. As Collin Brooke has argued in his aptly titled Lingua Fracta, “[T]here are many 
new media ‘texts’ that do not ‘mean’ in the same way that we might argue that a particular poem 
or essay means something” (18). If we take this reality seriously, then perhaps we need to 
consider not only how voice might be mobilized to transmit semantic content or perform the tone 
or emotion of a pre-given text, but also how it might be edited, manipulated, re-composed, and 
                                                
63 Other notable scholars working in this area—those working more broadly on the question of sound but 
attending to the question of voice in the process—include Jeff Rice (“Making of Ka-Knowledge: Digital 
Aurality”) and Jody Shipka (“Sound Engineering: Toward a Theory of Multimodal Soundness”). 
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recombined in ways that push beyond the intentionality and agency of the original speaker and 
even disrupt the possibility of meaning as we know it.  
It is here that the question of voice becomes a question of ethics. Whether we like it or 
not, with the rise of digital audio, it seems that our technological capacities for composing with 
voice—and, more specifically, for composing with the voices of others—have begun to radically 
outstrip our ability to make sense of their ethical implications. In this context, we are left with a 
difficult decision: either to banish particular forms of engagement with digital voice from our 
repertoire altogether or to interrogate some of our most deeply held assumptions about voice—
rooted in fundamentally rational, representational, and proprietary value systems—and consider 
how we might imagine them otherwise. If it is true, as Anne Wysocki has argued, that we can no 
longer take “persuasion” as a purely rational concern, then we must also attend to the many 
“means of shaping behavior and identity that are non-linguistic and that appeal, usually quietly 
and without direct address, to bodies and feelings rather than articulated logics” (“Unfitting 
Beauties” 94). As I imagine it, digital voice is one among many of these affective means of 
“persuasion,” broadly conceived, with great potential, in Wysocki’s words, to “impel us toward 
particular sensuous engagements with the world and each other” (94). This ethical “prospect”64 
serves as the primary catalyst for my engagement with digital voice in the chapters that follow. 
                                                
64 In his “An Attempt at a Compositionist Manifesto,” Bruno Latour proposes the notion of “prospects”—
or “the shape of things to come”—as a generative alternative to our cultural obsession with “the future,” 
which, he argues, is ultimately only an act of “fleeing [our] past in terror” while looking backward (486). 
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3.0  A RESONANT MATERIAL VOCALITY FOR DIGITAL COMPOSITION 
The fundamental paradoxes of voice—embodied and moving between bodies, 
sonorous and signifying—have become even more complex as voice, 
always/already culturally (and politically) mediated, is remediated and remixed in 
networked and digital culture. 
— Norie Neumark, “The Paradox of Voice” 
 
In Chapter Two, I suggested that much of the attention paid to sounding voice in contemporary 
theories and practices of multimodal composition has been either: (1) centered on the voice of 
the writer herself as a performative extension of traditional authorial practice or (2) folded into 
larger frameworks of sonic composing in general. This dual approach to voice has made great 
strides toward reopening the field to the embodied possibilities of human speech as a lasting 
means of rhetorical delivery, while harnessing the technical affordances of digital audio as a 
novel form of textual production. However, by splitting our attention in this way—between our 
classical roots in orality (speech) and our digital futures in aurality65 (sound)—we risk losing 
touch with vocality (voice), as a peculiar category of sound that attends speech but also exceeds 
                                                
65 Media theorist Frances Dyson makes the point that the term “aurality” tends to obscure the role of 
technology in mediating and transducing sound and calls for an alternative framework of “audio.” 
However, because “aurality”—and not “audio”—has been the term of choice among compositionists 
interested in sonic modalities, I have chosen to maintain this terminology in my discussion here. 
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it, and as a mediated material that pushes the boundaries of human embodiment and agency. 
Certainly, in the present technological environment, voice no longer implies the “presence” of a 
live speaking subject (if it ever really did), but neither is it reducible to the status of merely one 
sound among many. In this sense, it may be the case that our disciplinary attachments to 
linguistic, metaphorical, and oratorical voice have, in many ways, allowed us to talk around the 
question of voice itself, as a contemporary composing material. 
As a response to this dilemma, in this chapter, I would like to move to explore the 
idiosyncrasies of vocality—and, more specifically, the mediated vocality of digital audio 
technologies—seeking to elucidate both the paradoxes and possibilities that it poses for digital 
composing practice. Taking as a starting point Anne Frances Wysocki’s call “to define ‘new 
media texts’ in terms of their materialities” (“Opening New Media” 3), I propose that we might 
go one step further to first define and understand the materiality itself. To this end, my analysis 
draws together a range of perspectives on voice from fields such as philosophy, physiology, film 
studies, and digital aesthetics in order to take up the questions: What is vocality? Why does it 
matter? And what can it contribute to the practice of composition, broadly defined? I begin my 
discussion by working through a diverse body of theory on vocal ontology, phenomenology, and 
mediation, working to shift the conversation beyond familiar disciplinary conventions that have 
constrained our relationship to voice, as well as its relationship to language, bodies, and 
technologies. After that, I bring these interdisciplinary insights to bear on contemporary debates 
in the field, proposing a series of openings through which digital vocality—if taken seriously on 
its own terms and in its complex relations—might enable us to reimagine the embodied, 
performative, and collaborative possibilities of composition practice.  
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3.1 VOICE AND LANGUAGE 
In order to answer the question “what is voice?”66 we must start by first recognizing voice as 
something audible and material in the first place. On the surface, this move may seem so obvious 
as to be pedestrian. Despite a long tradition of silencing voice as a textual metaphor—both 
within the field of composition and beyond—if we stop and think about it, the fact that voice is 
sound is common sense. However, if we dig more deeply into the question of voice, both within 
the context of western thought more generally and within our contemporary culture of writing, 
we find that voice’s sounding capacity has, in many ways, been placed in the service of language 
as an instrumental means to an end of rational speech and linguistic meaning. But why do we so 
readily confuse voice with language? What is voice other than meaningful speech? And what is 
at stake in this conflation?  
The relationship between voice and logos is a highly contentious one in contemporary 
philosophical debates. Jacques Derrida has famously argued that the logocentrism of western 
metaphysics goes hand-in-hand with a form of phonocentrism, which romanticizes notions of 
“presence” and assumes voice’s ability to provide a form of direct, unmediated access to the 
essence of signifiers. Countering the essentialist belief in the primacy of speech over writing, 
Derrida has suggested that both speaking and writing are ultimately traces and nothing more, and 
thus that the sounds of speech are always already signs in themselves. Recently, however, we 
have seen a philosophical backlash against the so-called “phonophobia” (Schlichter 38) implicit 
in Derrida’s critique of voice. Notably, Adriana Cavarero has charged Derrida with reducing 
                                                
66 See Peter Elbow’s “What Do We Mean When We Talk about Voice in Texts?” and Carl Leggo’s 
“Questions I Need to Ask Before I Advise My Students to Write in Their Own Voices” for prominent 
examples of this project. 
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voice to the status of “an acoustic signifier” (35), wherein we lose a sense of “what is proper to 
the voice” (10) and are left only with its service to linguistic meaning. In order to combat this 
pitfall, philosopher Mladen Dolar suggests that we shift our understanding of voice as a “mere 
means” toward the end of language and embrace it instead as “a cast-off of sense” (16), as “the 
material element [of speech] recalcitrant to meaning” (15). Under this framework, voice is no 
longer a medium for conveying or transmitting language, but rather, in the words of Paul 
Zumthor, “an unutterability suited to clothing itself in language” (5)—and there is always a 
material excess. 
Voice’s inability to be reduced to language is evident, at least in part, in its inability to be 
captured or expressed in language. Dolar points out the radically impoverished vocabulary we 
have to speak of and describe voice, arguing that “words fail us when we are faced with the 
infinite shades of the voice, which infinitely exceed meaning,” that, ultimately, “faced with the 
voice, words structurally fail” (13). Indeed, many elements of vocal sound—accent, intonation, 
timbre—escape our fundamental desire to signify and thus to capture, categorize, and control 
(20). Research in voice science, particularly in the area of forensics and voice identification, has 
worked to overcome this descriptive dilemma and derive a language for accurately and 
comprehensively capturing voice quality in linguistic terms. In the end, however, such efforts 
have been forced to treat the voice “as if it can be decomposed into a set of specific features or 
elements, whose presence or absence characterize a speaker’s voice” (Kreiman and Van Lancker 
Sidtis 11), ultimately failing to express the unique and nuanced assemblage of sounds that make 
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up a particular voice.67 In this sense, it seems fair to say—as Dolar suggests—that “if we speak 
in order to say something, then the voice is precisely that which cannot be said” (15). 
Of course, the question arises: To what extent is this descriptive dilemma unique to voice 
and to what extent is it merely a feature of sound in general? We might argue that this linguistic 
paucity is due, at least in part, to the visual bias of western thought, which shapes our linguistic 
structures and imaginations. Certainly, we have far more words to describe visual phenomena 
than we do to describe sound and the extent to which our metaphors for thought and experience 
(perspective, view, lens, etc.) are visualist is noteworthy. Furthermore, there is also a 
fundamental complexity to sound that resists our attempts to break it down into its component 
parts. For film studies scholar Rick Altman, this “material heterogeneity” is a fundamental 
feature of all sonic events (“Material Heterogeneity” 19), which must be understood as complex, 
composite, and contextual and which thus elude simple analytical description. However, it also 
seems to me that there might be some features of voice that would make it particularly resistant 
to linguistic capture: namely its unique and relational character—a topic I will address later in 
this chapter.  
Another obvious way in which voice resists language lies in its many potential (and 
actual) uses beyond verbal and even willful forms of vocalization. Because of our bias toward 
the linguistic, we may not often even consider nonverbal utterances—such as the cry, the cough, 
or the laugh—to fall under the purview of human voicing. Responding to this omission, 
philosophers like David Appelbaum have worked to reassert the value of nonverbal voice, 
suggesting that, in fact, these disruptive forces have been systematically excluded from the 
                                                
67 As Jody Kreiman and Diana Van Lancker Sidtis point out, because of the challenge that the voice 
presents to linguistics, such descriptive systems have remained more or less the same since the time of 
classical Greek oratory (11). 
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sphere of voice by the abstract, disembodying forces of the western philosophical tradition. 
Asking whether or not the cough might be legitimately considered voice, Appelbaum reflects:  
The explosive noise has no less voice than the group of consonants known as voiceless. 
[…] To the oscilloscope, the cough is as reliable a mark of individuality as any 
voiceprint. The coughs of a man’s life may be as numbered as his days and words, but are 
they similarly recorded? Some philosopher’s prejudice is at work (2). 
For Appelbaum, the value of these nonverbal voicings lies in their ability to disrupt the steady 
flow of language and cognition and to draw attention to the erasure of “incarnate experience” 
from philosophical inquiry (19). Indeed, the extent to which “[i]ntense emotions arouse voice, 
though rarely language” (Zumthor 6)—and the extent to which such utterances are said to 
represent “voice out of control” (Neumark “Paradox” xxvi)—suggests voice’s basic resistance to 
some of our deepest investments in the rational speaking subject.  
Of course, the other side of this phenomenon of nonverbal voicing is that of intentional 
performance and play. Noting the voice’s capacity to imitate both human and nonhuman 
sounds—for example, to “mimic the giggle of a baby and the approach of a steam engine” 
(362)—Philip Brophy emphasizes the extent to which “the voice can reach far beyond itself, and 
hence beyond the limiting definitions of being human” (362)—definitions that are, at least in 
part, rooted in linguistic values. Sound poetry stands as a fascinating example of an artistic 
tradition that has explored vocal performance at the limits of language, “believing in the power 
of the body and the thrust of word play to fully escape the constraints of linguistic meaning” 
(LaBelle “Raw Orality” 152). Sound poet and scholar Steve McCafferty discusses the evolution 
of the genre as a steady progression away from language, beginning with early approaches to 
word-as-material and moving toward technologically-mediated approaches that shirk off verbal 
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orality in favor of “the shit of speech” (159)—or voice as the castoff of and antithesis to 
language.68 In setting up this dichotomy between language and the body, such efforts bring up 
questions as to whether it is actually possible to strip voice of meaning. 
In the end, it may be the case that any such attempt to rescue voice from language 
wholesale and move into a space of pure sonority is futile. From the perspective of human 
perception, it seems reasonable to suggest that, when we hear a voice speaking language, it is the 
language we hear first. At least this is what Don Ihde has suggested in Listening and Voice: A 
Phenomenology of Sound. Contrasting the experience of speech with the experience of music, 
Ihde suggests that voice in everyday speech “does not draw attention to itself as sound” (158); 
rather, “the sounding withdraws as the context and setting in which what is said emerges as 
foreground” (157). Of course, it is ultimately Ihde’s project to disrupt this inevitability and to 
develop a framework through which we might take seriously our experience of the world as a 
sonic phenomenon. But I would also go further to suggest that this argument—that language is 
what we hear first—might ultimately hinge upon what we mean by “hearing.” If we approach 
hearing, as Derrida does,69 as an analogue for “understanding,” then there is no question that 
language is primary. However, if we step back from the authority of the linguistic turn and 
consider our lived experience from a more material or affective angle, vocal phenomenology 
emerges as something else entirely. If it is true, as Brian Massumi suggests, that “the skin is 
                                                
68 Perhaps the most extreme example of this so-called “Raw Orality” is reflected by the work of seminal 
sound poet, Henri Chopin, who used techniques of “microphonics” (LaBelle 135) to produce 
compositions made up of nonverbal, and typically inaudible vocality—the sounds of the mouth that 
usually go unheard in everyday speech. 
69 Throughout his critique of phonocentrism in Of Grammatology, Derrida repeatedly conflates “hearing” 
with “understanding” as one in the same. For example he describes the system of auto-affective voicing 
as “[t]he system of ‘hearing (understanding)-oneself-speak’ through the phonic substance” (7). Because 
Derrida’s primary interest is with the status of language, this is not surprising, but it is also certainly not 
the only way to define hearing. 
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faster than the word” (86), then perhaps we might argue that it is voice’s sound, as a vibrational 
intensity, that hits us first.  
Regardless of which is primary, however, it is safe to say that—despite bold efforts to the 
contrary—“one does not leave behind signification simply by speaking nonsense, or by turning 
the mouth into a noise machine” (LaBelle “Raw Orality” 152). In fact, it is possible that such 
efforts might even exacerbate and emphasize the core impossibility of voicing without meaning. 
For Mladen Dolar, these “presymbolic uses of the voice”—forms of voicing that work explicitly 
against the goals of signification—risk drawing attention to the process and structures of 
signification itself (29). In other words, even the most radical attempts to mobilize voice in an 
attack against language might ultimately serve to reinscribe the primacy of language by 
continuing to define voice in linguistic terms, even if in a relationship of opposition or lack. In 
this sense, whether or not voice is actually directed toward semantic meaning, we may be unable 
to escape our expectation of meaning’s potential. As both Dolar and Cavarero have argued, it is 
not the fact that voice always signifies, but the fact that we expect it to that makes it stand out as 
unique among all other sounds. In the words of Dolar, “The voice is something which points 
toward meaning, it is as if there is an arrow in it which raises the expectation of meaning, the 
voice is an opening toward meaning” (14). 
In order to move beyond this impasse, we must ultimately reject binary understandings 
that position voice in relation to language either as an expressive handmaiden, on one hand, or an 
embodied adversary, on the other. Certainly, to reduce voice to a function of language would be 
to overlook many forms and features of voice that exceed semantic transmission—to overlook 
the extent to which “[v]oice speaks itself at the very moment it speaks” (Zumthor 6). At the same 
time, to place voice in opposition to language is clearly not a suitable alternative. As we have 
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seen, such a move risks either reinforcing the dominance of the linguistic ideal or falling back 
onto essentialized notions of metaphysical presence. In this context, perhaps it is the case, in the 
words of Brian Massumi, that “[t]he trick is to get comfortable with productive paradox” (99). 
And Dolar provides us with an opening into this possibility: By locating voice at the intersection 
between language and the body, as precisely “[w]hat language and the body have in common,” 
he ultimately maintains that “the voice does not belong to either” (73). Not at home in linguistics 
nor in the body, voice emerges as a fundamental paradox. And it is the other side of this 
paradox—the uncomfortable relationship between voice and body—to which I will turn next.  
3.2 VOICE(S) AND BODY/IES 
Apart from its “opening toward meaning” (Dolar 14), one of the key features that sets voice apart 
in the sonic landscape is the fact of its source: its unique status as a sound produced by and 
emitted from the human body. Inevitably, when we hear a voice, we hear a body: “Listen, says a 
voice: some being is giving voice” (Connor 4). In other words, it is our sense of the voice’s 
origin in embodied human activity that places it at the top of our so-called “hierarchy of 
perception” (Chion 5).70 And, as is the case with any sound,71 but perhaps more urgently in the 
case of voice, we as listeners find ourselves working “to localize and if possible identify the 
voice” (Chion 5)—to determine from whence and from whom it came. On the surface, then, to 
                                                
70 Crucially, what Michel Chion calls the “vococentrist” quality of human listening (6) applies not only to 
verbal voicing, but to voice in general, as a sound we experience as recognizably, quintessentially human. 
71 In “Moving Lips: Cinema as Ventriloquism,” Rick Altman describes how it is the nature of sound, 
phenomenologically speaking, to cause the auditor to ask the question: what is the source? Sound’s 
diffuse nature and indeterminacy prompts us to want to identify it source, whether human or otherwise.  
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define the voice as an embodied phenomenon, to determine its origin in and relationship to the 
human corpus, appears to be a fairly straightforward endeavor. But, as it turns out, this is 
anything but the case. 
Even in the field of voice science, we find hotly contested debates around the simple 
question: What is the voice as an organic bodily process? According to Jody Kreiman and Diana 
Van Lancker Sidtis, there exist at least two distinct definitions of voice among mainstream voice 
scientists: On one hand, a narrow physiological definition, which localizes voice in what is 
popularly known as the “voice box” as “sound produced by vibration in the vocal folds” (5) and, 
on the other hand, a broader framework, which takes into account “the acoustic results of the 
coordinated action of the respiratory system, tongue, jaw, lips, and soft palate” (6). While this 
distinction may seem pedantic, importantly, each of these definitions sets out a radically different 
relationship between voice and speech: the first distinguishing between voice and speech by 
confining voice to a process of vibration, and the second, effectively equating voice with speech 
by following it through to the act of articulation (6). In this sense, we might say that to define 
voice, even as a concrete physiological process, is a deeply consequential act.72   
That being said, it is also possible that this impulse to localize the voice in a particular 
part of the body is problematic from the outset—that even the purportedly “broad” definition of 
vocal production does not adequately capture the physiological processes at play. For example, 
clinical voice specialist Robert Sataloff emphasizes the extent to which, despite our tendency to 
privilege the role of the larynx, in actual fact, “[p]ractically all body systems affect the voice” 
(53). Indeed, the function and sound of the voice is highly dependent upon the full 
                                                
72 Kreiman and Van Lancker Sidtis emphasize that whether one’s interest in the voice is physiological, 
acoustic, or forensic will influence one’s attention to the source, the product, or the perception, 
respectively and, indeed, will determine the kinds of questions one asks of voice (7). 
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musculoskeletal system (posture, muscle tension, etc.) and, of course, on the psychological state 
and “gray matter” of the brain. Beginning as an impulse in the motor cortex, vocalization draws 
upon “[c]omplex interactions among the centers for speech, musical, and artistic expression” 
(79), which exceed the capacity for language alone, and bring together interconnected parts of 
the body into a relational assemblage. In this sense, voice offers a useful site at which we might 
challenge the artificial distinctions between rational and creative mental processes (the left vs. 
right brain), as well as the Cartesian mind/body split more generally.73  
Looking beyond this privileged moment of vocal production, we must also consider what 
happens to the voice after it emerges from this complex set of physiological processes. Because, 
while the voice undoubtedly comes from the human body,74 it also inevitably leaves that body 
behind—or, as Steven Connor puts it, “What I say goes” (7). This fact, in itself, raises important 
questions about our relationships to our own voices—relationships we tend to approach as a 
question of property, either as the rightful possession of a unique human body or as the authentic 
expression of a unique human subject. By insisting on the voice’s necessary departure from its 
body of origin, Connor invites us to unsettle these assumptions of ownership and identity. For 
Connor, “[M]y voice is not something that I merely have, or even something that I, if only in 
part, am. Rather, it is something that I do. A voice is not a condition, nor yet an attribute, but an 
event. It is less something that exists than something which occurs” (4). By extending the body 
                                                
73 It is important to remember that this voice-body relationship is not a stable, biological given. As the 
body changes over time—as well as with varying states of physical and psychological health—so does the 
voice. And this process also works in reverse, as the body itself is altered through specific forms of vocal 
practice, from professional voice training to spiritual chanting. Thus, in a very concrete sense, it is not 
simply the case that the body produces the voice, but also that the voice works to produce the body. 
74 Of course, the boundaries around what constitutes voice might also be drawn more widely to take into 
account digitally synthesized voice, which does not emerge from the organic processes of the human 
body. Indeed, such voices stand as a provocative challenge to the many humanist values we attach to the 
voice and raises fascinating ethical questions about the boundaries of personhood, more generally.  
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beyond itself in this way, such a reorientation toward the voice event encourages us to move 
beyond stable, bounded notions of body and self to imagine more fluid and permeable modes of 
being.  
Popular metaphysical understandings of voice as “presence” have emphasized voice’s 
role as “a special sensory key to interiority” (Ong 117). As Walter Ong points out, when we hear 
an object sounding (e.g. a hollow log being struck by a stick) what we are hearing is the 
resonance of its insides, its “interiors as manifesting themselves” to the external world (117). It is 
easy to imagine how, especially in the context of religious or spiritual philosophy, one might 
draw connections between sound and soul and position the voice as a window into essential 
personhood. However, to insist, as Ong does, that voice simply “moves from interior to interior” 
(125) is to overlook the extent to which voice interacts with other bodies and spaces in the larger 
material world. As Connor reminds us, the voice’s movement from the body is one that both 
takes place within space and, in fact, appropriates the space it requires (12). And this reciprocal 
process of voicing space and spatializing voice is responsible for shaping the ways that we 
experience space itself. Thus, by “marking out the relations of interior to exterior”—and by 
suggesting that these relations are perhaps much more fluid than we might typically imagine 
them to be75—“voice […] announces and verifies the co-operation of bodies and the 
environments in which they have their being” (6).  
Of course voice’s movement from a human body into space, more often than not, implies 
a movement toward another human body or bodies. For philosopher Adriana Cavarero, this 
                                                
75 Dolar goes so far as to describe this phenomenon as “the voice problem,” suggesting that the voice 
presents us with the dilemma of “how to establish a distance at all, to draw the dividing line between ‘the 
interior’ and the external world” (79). Here, voice challenges our tendency to divide our experience into 
“me” as an inside and “the world” as an outside, providing a crucial inroad into reimagining our 
relationship to the nonhuman world.  
 85 
relationality stands as one of the core functions and values of speech itself. Challenging the 
logocentric emphasis on the what of voice—or, as she calls it, “the said”—Cavarero proposes an 
alternative to autonomous, rational subjectivity of western political philosophy: a fundamentally 
embodied “politics of saying” (200), wherein voice, in its most material sense, provides the basis 
for ethical engagement with others. Crucially, within this framework, it matters (in every sense) 
from what particular body a given voice emerges. Because, ultimately, we always hear in the 
voice, as Cavarero emphasizes, not just anybody but a particular somebody—a body which we 
may not identify as familiar but which we always recognize as “unique” and “unrepeatable” 
(9).76 Voice, in this sense, serves a dual purpose: it is both that which unites us and that which 
sets us apart. In other words, at the same time as it is shareable, it also resists the abstract 
universals of western philosophy. Because “a voice is never a voice in general: it is always a 
voice of a particular kind” (Rée 2)—and because it is this “incarnate singularity” (Cavarero 7) 
that we experience in relational acts of voicing—voice provides us with the immediate capacity 
to recognize and engage others as “human beings in flesh and bone, with mouths and ears” 
(175)—in other words, as bodies-like-me-but-not-me. 
On the surface, it may seem that Cavarero’s emphasis on “a vocal phenomenology of 
uniqueness” (7), by focusing on the voice’s expression of a singular human being,77 is akin to the 
metaphysical essentialism that poststructuralism has so heavily critiqued. However, it is 
important to distinguish here between essence and event. While it is true that “[d]istinctive vocal 
                                                
76 For Cavarero, “The voice is always unique, and the ear recognizes it as such. Indeed, the ear perceives 
the voice’s uniqueness even when, never having heard it before, it cannot ‘recognize’ this voice” (177). In 
this sense, voice’s uniqueness comes at the level of immediate sense perception, not cognition or abstract 
assimilation. This distinction seems crucial to Cavarero’s effort to unsettle the abstraction of western 
philosophy in favor of a fleshier, more lived form of politics.  
77 This focus on vocal uniqueness does not account for the many ways in which we experience voice as a 
multiplicity, such as choral voices or the voice of the crowd. This is a topic that requires further study.  
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styles can identify people as sharply as their bodies or their faces” (Rée 2)—and that the 
“voiceprint” is as reliable a measure as the fingerprint for establishing “identity,” in the most 
bureaucratic sense of the term (Appelbaum 2)—to make the jump from identifiability to identity 
emerges as problematic and ultimately unwarranted.78 In this context, it seems useful to 
distinguish between the notion of the “individual” and the “personal.” In his famous reflection on 
“The Grain of the Voice,” Roland Barthes argues that “[t]he voice is not personal: it expresses 
nothing of the cantor, of his soul; it is not original […] and at the same time it is individual: it has 
us hear a body which has no civil identity, no ‘personality,’ but which is nevertheless a separate 
body” (182).  In a sense, then, we have a strange potential, through the voice, for a kind intimacy 
with the Other that is visceral and vibrational but, at the same time, paradoxically impersonal.  
Stepping back to consider voice within the context of sound-in-general, composer and 
musicologist Pierre Schaeffer offers a useful framework for approaching this paradox of 
identifiability without identity. His principle of acousmatic sound—and, for our purposes, 
acousmatic voice79—insists that we take up sounds not as secondary properties of their sources 
but as objects in themselves, which can be perceived and experienced independently of their 
sources. Drawing on Schaeffer’s work, Christoph Cox explains that, unlike properties of visual 
objects,80 “[W]e can experience a sound without experiencing its source, and the source without 
the sound. So while sources generate or cause sounds, sounds are not bound to their sources as 
properties” (156). In contrast to Cavarero’s phenomenological approach to the “uniqueness” of 
                                                
78 Darsie Bowden raises this distinction in “The Rise of a Metaphor: ‘Voice’ in Composition Pedagogy.” 
79 Michel Chion’s work draws heavily upon Schaeffer’s concept of “acousmatics” and applies it explicitly 
to the voice, examining the mysterious power of voices without visible sources in cinematic narratives. 
80 Cox uses the example of a door that is painted red as an explanatory tool, suggesting that, while “[t]he 
redness of the door does not survive its repainting,” the sounds a door makes “are not bound to their 
sources as properties” (156). For this reason, it seems reasonable to consider sound as an independent 
object vs. a property of its source. 
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the person behind the voice, this more radically materialist perspective suggests that we can 
experience the uniqueness of a voice as something apart from the person who speaks it. 
Certainly, this break from the incessant question of who produced a voice has the potential to 
offer a productive alternative to limiting textual frameworks of representation, which, as Cox 
argues, are fundamentally “inadequate” to the task of theorizing the sonic arts (146).  
But the question arises: To what extent does this shift away from the sonic source disrupt 
the exceptionalism of the voice in the first place? If sound is independent from its source, why 
should we approach voice as distinct from sound-in-general? It is here that I find the notion of 
“effects” to be incredibly productive. To consider voices as “properties” is to subordinate them 
to their bodies of origin. Alternatively, to reconsider voices as “effects” allows us to account for 
their causal relationship to the bodies that speak them, while also allowing them a valid existence 
beyond those bodies, and even as bodies in themselves.81 Under this framework, we can embrace 
“the impossibility of a perfect identity between sound and source” (Stanyek and Piekut 19), 
while at the same time understanding that voice is “necessarily pursued by the shadow of source 
and cause” (Kane 215).82 Of course, the practical implications of this shift may appear negligible 
so long as we remain in the realm of live voice—for example, the rational speaking subject of 
classical oratory—where voice and body give the illusion of co-presence. However, in the 
context of recorded and reproduced voice, of voice that extends beyond the time and place of its 
body of origin, the notion of voice-as-effect becomes essential, radically expanding our abilities 
                                                
81 Steven Connor proposes the notion of “autonomous voice-bodies,” which are “a projection of a new 
way of having or being a body, formed and sustained out of the autonomous operations of the voice” (35). 
Because of our need to attach sourceless voices to visible bodies, they have the capacity to become the 
bodies we project onto them.  
82 Stanyek and Piekut offer a useful concept of “corpaurality,” or “the imbrication of sounds with fleshy 
bodies” (19). Here, not only does the voice emerge from a resonant body, but the body resonates in and 
through the voice. 
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to imagine what it means not merely to speak in voice but also to compose with it as a malleable 
material. It is this topic—the question of voice and technology—that I would now like to discuss. 
3.3 VOICE AND TECHNOLOGY 
In any reflection on voice and technology, it is important first to distinguish between the primary 
forms of technological mediation available to us:83 (1) technologies of amplification (e.g. 
microphones, acoustic design),84 which serve to project the sound of the voice into the immediate 
space in which it is uttered; (2) technologies of transmission (e.g. telephone, radio), which 
transport the voice as signals across broader geographical expanses; (3) and technologies of 
reproduction (e.g. phonograph, magnetic tape, digital audio), which produce an inscription of the 
voice’s sound waves for recreation across time. Because my primary goal is to explore the 
function of voice as a compositional material, I am most interested in the last of these categories: 
that which allows for the translation of voice into a material that may be edited and manipulated 
and worked into something new. However, because sound reproduction necessarily builds on 
processes of amplification and transmission, I will begin by briefly discussing these other two 
forms of mediation and their influence on our relationship to voice as an embodied phenomenon. 
                                                
83 It is important to remember that these divisions are not static and unassailable, but rather socially and 
culturally constituted over time. As Jonathan Sterne reminds us, the lines between these technologies—at 
least between the processes of “sound-recording” and “live-transmission media”—have not always been 
“so clearly defined” (197).  
84 While, today, we tend to associate amplification with the relatively recent development of electric 
microphones and sound systems, Christopher Johnstone reminds us that such technologies have, in fact, 
been in use at least as far back as classical oratory, wherein spaces and structures for public speaking 
were designed with their acoustic properties in mind. See Johnstone’s article, “Communicating in 
Classical Contexts: The Centrality of Delivery,” for an in-depth discussion of the role of architecture and 
acoustics in classical oratory.   
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Our first category of vocal technology—that of amplification—appears on the surface to 
be fairly straightforward, extending the voice across a defined acoustical space such that it can be 
more easily heard by a listening audience. But to say that amplification merely extends the voice, 
as is, beyond the limits of the live speaking body overlooks the fact that the voice—and thus also 
the body—may also be changed as a result of its encounter with this technology. According to 
Brandon LaBelle, amplification technologies shape the voice to the extent that they “multiply the 
body,” “displacing it, throwing it beyond the here and now, toward other centers” (Background 
Noise 135). In other words, we might say that microphones work to distribute the apparently 
singular voice across space such that it can be heard both by many bodies and as many bodies at 
once. Furthermore, as Steven Connor proposes, amplification technologies also have the capacity 
to bring us closer to the body in the voice,85 “mak[ing] audible and expressive a whole range of 
organic vocal sounds which are edited out in ordinary listening” (38). Beyond simply allowing 
for an intimate experience of the body of another,86 however, Connor believes that “the 
imaginary closeness of [amplified] voices suggests to us that they could be our own” (38).  
If technologies of amplification are notable for promoting visceral forms of identification 
with the other through voice, then technologies of transmission are notable for promoting 
identification of the other as voice. Because of its capacity to produce a specter of voice-as-
signal that transcends geographical distance, early telephony was widely associated with occult 
                                                
85 Connor’s discussion of the role of these in making audible “the liquidity of the saliva, the hissings and 
tiny shudders of the breath, the clicking of the tongue and teeth, the popping of the lips” (38) is evocative 
of Barthes’s characterization of the operatic voice in “The Grain of the Voice.” While Barthes does not 
explicitly discuss technology, it seems reasonable to suggest that his sense of hearing “the cantor’s body, 
brought to your ears in one and the same movement from deep down in the cavities, the muscles, the 
membranes, the cartilages” (182) might be in some way a function of acoustics and amplification. 
86 That being said, intimacy is not always the outcome of amplified voice. For example, miked musicals 
often have the effect of distancing the actors on stage, while making their song and speech easier to hear. 
Thus, we might usefully distinguish between the intimacy of amplified acousmatic voices vs. the distance 
of amplified visible voicing bodies.  
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ideas about telepathy and the ether, particularly the notion that the presence of the speaking 
person was directly transported through the wires of a telephonic conversation (Dyson 19). And 
radio, for its part, further contributed to contradictory ideas about vocal “presence” (of body or 
self) through the mass phenomenon of broadcasting (31). In other words, at the same time as 
sound transmission technologies worked to radically dissociate the voice from the body that 
speaks it, as a cultural phenomenon, they also served to reinforce the myth of metaphysical 
presence, in which “a person’s […] voice came to speak for their whole being” (9).  
According to N. Katherine Hayles, we can attribute this persistent belief in mediated 
presence to the fact of sound transmission’s “simultaneity” (76), or what has come to be known 
more popularly as liveness.87 Of course, the very concept of the “live” speaking voice only 
becomes thinkable as a counterpoint to the possibility of the dead speaking voice of sound 
reproduction. Notably, sound studies scholar Jonathan Sterne highlights the role of “the voices of 
the dead” in the public reception of the phonograph, suggesting that, “for its early users, death 
somehow explained and shaped the cultural power of sound recording” (290). As Sterne 
explains, alongside the development of sound reproduction technology in the Victorian era 
emerged a belief in the ability of the human voice to “be preserved indefinitely on record” 
(290)—to be “embalmed” much in the same way that the human body could be embalmed 
through chemical processes.88 Thus, rather than moving beyond the notion of embodied presence, 
the “canned” voice of sound reproduction comes to take on a decidedly eerier form of presence: 
what Sterne refers to as “a resonant tomb” or “the exteriority of the voice with none of its interior 
                                                
87 While the notion of “liveness” has over time become naturalized, Frances Dyson suggests we should 
consider live transmission not as actually “live” but rather as producing a “live effect”—something which 
“affects belief and knowledge” about how we encounter mediated sound and voice in the world (102).  
88 Sterne situates this phenomenon as “an extension of a larger, emergent culture of preservation” (292) in 
the context of the Victorian ear’s obsession with technological practices of canning and embalming. 
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self-awareness” (290). Thus, we have the notion that, while the voices of the dead cannot speak 
to us with conscious intention, they can in fact speak to us as a visceral human presence from 
across the threshold of death.  
Of course, while the voices of the dead certainly “demanded commentary” a century ago 
(Sterne 289), so prevalent are such voices in our media-saturated lives that the phenomenon now 
appears as entirely unextraordinary. In recent years, however, new composing practices have 
begun to blur the boundaries between the living and the dead and once again raise questions 
about “presence” in voice recordings. In a provocative example, musicologists Jason Stanyek 
and Benjamin Piekut explore the phenomenon of the “posthumous duet,” using a case study of 
the 1991 production of “Unforgettable”—a collaboration between Natalie Cole and her father, 
Nat “King” Cole, nearly 25 years after his death. And Stanyek and Piekut’s principle aim in this 
project is to demonstrate that this duet is, in actual fact, a collaboration—an act of mutually 
agential “co-labor,” in which one of the key participants simply happens to be dead.89 Drawing 
on the agential realism of Karen Barad, they arrive at this strange possibility by rethinking 
agency itself, no longer as present intentionality, but as future “effectivity” (18). Thus emerges 
the possibility for a radically new form of ethical composing practice: one that does not confine 
so-called “embalmed” voices within the limits of representation and “human exceptionalism” 
(18), but rather invites them to enter into “intermundane collaboration” (17) as material, agential 
participants in themselves.  
While the posthumous duet is perhaps an idiosyncratic context, in many ways, what 
                                                
89 In many ways, it is because “the voices of the dead no longer emanate from bodies that serve as 
containers for self-awareness” (Sterne 290) that they appear to us as among the most vulnerable to 
exploitation and thus the most deserving of our protectoral impulses under representational ethics. 
However, Stanyek and Piekut suggest that our desire to “[defend] the memory of the dead” may in fact 
have negative and paternalistic implications, serving to restrict agency to living humans and strip the dead 
of their own potential to effect (34). 
 92 
Stanyek and Piekut are doing here is re-imagining is the act of sound reproduction itself. Rather 
than viewing the voices of the dead as closed and sacred objects of our protection, they challenge 
us to consider the possibility that “the only guarantee that sound recording offers” may in fact be 
this: the assurance of “being enrolled in futures (and pasts) that one cannot wholly predict nor 
control” (18). What is significant here, for our purposes, is a decisive shift away from the 
nineteenth-century culture of “preservation” and toward a contemporary “culture of the splice”—
or what Stanyek and Piekut refer to as the “recombinatorial imperative” (17). In other words, 
more than simply capturing and preserving voices as inert relics of the past, today, we may be 
more concerned with the possibility of remixing and rearticulating them into new assemblages.  
At the core of this shift in the cultural imagination is a shift in technologies of sound 
reproduction themselves. Hayles locates the “crucial difference” between the age of the 
phonograph and that of magnetic tape in the newfound capacity for “erasure and rewriting” (76). 
While the phonograph had permitted a certain fantasy of permanence,90 with the tape recorder 
came a contradictory new possibility that we might call impermanent permanence—as Hayles 
puts it, “a mode of voice inscription at once permanent and mutable, repeating past moments 
exactly yet also permitting interventions in the present that radically altered its form and 
meaning” (77, emphasis added). By allowing people not only to hear their voices played back to 
them beyond their bodies, but also to manipulate and recompose their voices within the machine, 
tape recording enabled new configurations of subjectivity and embodiment,91 which challenge 
                                                
90 Sterne notes a sense of disconnect between the initial public enthusiasm for the phonograph as an 
archival medium and the actual ability for early sound recording to produce anything resembling a 
“permanent” record (288). This dream of vocal immorality through sound reproduction continues to 
drive—and elude—our approach to digital audio today to the extent that we might say that voice’s 
temporality has been extended more than overcome. 
91 As I will discuss further in Chapter Four, Frances Dyson argues that the concept of “embodiment” is no 
longer an adequate framework for understanding our contemporary cultures of technology. Instead, she 
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our conventional relationships to our voices and to what it means to be human. 
Of course, if it was the advent of magnetic tape recording that first made possible this 
“recombinatorial” dream, then the capacity for cutting, splicing, mixing, and reassembling voice 
has only become increasingly potent and widely accessible with the emergence of digital audio 
technologies. In place of razor blades and bulky reel-to-reel tape, we now have digital editing 
software that enables incredibly powerful feats of vocal manipulation with the simple click of a 
mouse. Reflecting on the phenomenon of digital voice in this context, media artist and theorist 
Norie Neumark describes a fundamental tension between increased “fidelity,” on one hand, and 
increased “flexibility,” on the other (95). In other words, at the same time as a digitally 
reproduced voice may sound more like the “original” voice of the person speaking, it can also 
quite easily be made to sound in ways that defy that speaker’s original intention. Under a 
framework of representational ethics—which figures voice as a forensic matter of maintaining 
property and establishing identity—this tension presents an obvious liability. But if we look 
beyond questions of representation, as Neumark suggests, toward questions of performance, we 
also find in digital voice a certain promise and potential. Rather than focusing on what voice 
means, she encourages us to focus on what voice does. For Neumark, whether or not the voice is 
actually representative of some “authentic” human presence is beside the point. Instead, she 
proposes that we approach digital voice as an “authenticity effect”—a relational, vibrational 
performance of “intimacy and intensity” that we, as listeners, can’t help but feel (95). Under this 
framework, digital voice becomes not simply a hazard, but rather a resource: a malleable 
compositional material with potential to act and to affect in its own right. 
                                                                                                                                                       
proposes the notion of “atmosphere” as a means to understand the ways in which the material of human 
bodies is necessarily porous and connected to other materialities in the world—including those of 
technology—in a fluid interchange (16).  
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But what kind of material is digital voice in the first place? What do we make of the 
relationship between a voice spoken and a voice recorded? Certainly, at the root of sound 
reproduction technology is a deeply held cultural belief in the possibility of reproduction itself—
the capacity of a technology to produce a faithful copy of an “original” sonic event. In recent 
years, however, sound studies scholars have challenged the very idea that what is created in the 
process of sound reproduction is a “reproduction” at all—at least not in the sense that we have 
come to believe. Film scholar Rick Altman emphasizes the contextual specificity of audio 
recording conditions—from the acoustical space to the microphones employed—arguing that 
“[w]hen we listen to recorded sound we are […] always listening to a particular account of a 
specific event” (16). In this sense, what we hear in digital voice is not a reproduction of the voice 
itself, in any intrinsic sense, but rather a representation of a voice-event. Taking this one step 
further, Jonathan Sterne asks us to consider the fundamental artifice of the recording scenario, in 
which the very notion of an “original” can only ever be a product of its own reproducibility 
(221).92 As Sterne puts it, “Sound fidelity is a story that we tell ourselves to staple separate 
pieces of sonic reality together” (219), and thus what we experience as the “aura” in digital voice 
is ultimately a part of this fiction.  
If this is the case, would it be fair to suggest that to compose in digital voice may be less 
akin to cutting up, say, the Mona Lisa itself (let alone the woman who posed for the portrait) and 
rearranging its pieces than it would be to cutting up one of those little postcards of the Mona Lisa 
that you can buy in the gift shop at the Louvre? This is a tricky question. Based on my own 
experience composing with voice, it certainly feels like the stakes are higher, that a two-dollar 
                                                
92 Sterne is, of course, drawing from Walter Benjamin’s thinking in “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction,” where he argues that, in Sterne’s words, “the very nature of originality and 
authenticity is transformed in the context of reproducibility” (220). 
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postcard isn’t quite a fair measure of the ethics at play. At the same time, it also seems as if we in 
composition have tended to place voice on a pedestal—to assume a strangely defensive role in 
relation to it—in ways that may be out of step with the realities of its digital reproducibility and 
in ways that may ultimately be constraining our ability to harness its potential as a material for 
composing the new. Thus, rather than persisting in our tired models of voice as self or as speech, 
perhaps it is time that we imagine a new framework for approaching voice in the digital age. 
3.4 OPENING VOICE TO DIGITAL COMPOSING 
 
Looking back at the preceding discussion of interdisciplinary theories of voice—in relation to 
language, to bodies, and to technologies—it seems that what we are left with is little more than a 
series of irresolvable contradictions: that voice is not language but is not entirely separate from 
language either, that voice comes from the body but always leaves the body behind, that digital 
voice is caught between fidelity and flexibility, and that fidelity is only a fiction in the first place. 
In this context, what can we fairly say about voice except that it is, at its core, a paradox? How 
should we, as compositionists, approach voice in this context? What does voice have to offer our 
practice? While I do not aspire to offer an exhaustive vision for the future of voice in the field of 
composition and rhetoric, I would like to conclude by proposing a series of tentative 
“openings,”93 which might give us a place from which to begin. 
                                                
93 Here, I am working in the spirit of Anne Frances Wysocki’s “Opening New Media to Writing,” which 
seeks to offer “some ranges of active possibilities that allow and encourage us to shift what we do in our 
thinking and classes so that we do not forget, so that we make actively present in our practices, how 
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3.4.1 Opening #1: Bridging Body-Language 
In recent years, the field of composition and rhetoric has seen a rising interest in questions of 
embodiment, with increasing attention to the body’s role not only in the perception of diverse 
sensory modalities, but also as an active compositional agent through practices like gesture and 
movement. One of the key challenges running through this trend in scholarship is the question of 
how to reconcile the relationship between the field’s traditional roots in language and emerging 
theories of the body. On one side of this debate, we have radical approaches that seek to place 
the body in direct opposition to language and enter into a realm of pure affect, raising the 
question of why our field—with its disciplinary grounding in language—has any business 
claiming expertise in this space. And on the other side, we have more conservative approaches 
that seek to make the body legible and writable as language,94 reducing it to a system of 
linguistic coding such that it may be picked apart and reassembled in the manner of alphabetic 
text. Unfortunately, neither of these approaches does justice to either language or the body, and, 
more importantly, it seems that neither side can speak to the other in any productive sense. 
Instead of either alienating the body from language on one hand or appropriating the body as 
language on the other, it seems to me that the field would do well to find a space in which each 
one can stand on its own while working in support of the other. And voice, I believe, provides us 
with a powerful opportunity to imagine how this new space might look—and sound.  
As we have seen in the preceding discussion, voice plays a special role in relation to 
                                                                                                                                                       
writing is a continually changing material activity that shapes just who we can be and what we can do” 
(2-3). 
94 Theo van Lleuwen’s “A Semiotics of Voice” is an example of a recent attempt in this direction, which 
seeks to propose a physiologically and culturally coded typology of vocal expression. While I understand 
the impulse behind such projects, they ultimately risk collapsing the embodied effectivity of voice into an 
overly neat framework of signification.   
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these two spheres of linguistics and embodiment. As Mladen Dolar has argued, “[I]t is precisely 
the voice that holds bodies and languages together. It is like their missing link, what they have in 
common” (60). At the same time, however, Dolar has also emphasized that voice is in no way 
reducible to either bodies or languages, but rather stands in a relation of radical excess (73). In 
this sense, I wonder if voice might provide us with a promising means to find a common ground 
between the field’s longstanding investments in language and our emerging investments in 
embodiment—while at the same time respecting the unique value and autonomy of each.  
Of course, in order to pave the way for this move, it is crucial that we first distinguish 
between voice and speech—concepts that are too readily confused in the context of a field so 
deeply rooted in discursivity, and, as Adriana Cavarero has argued, in the context of western 
philosophy more generally, with its emphasis on the rational speaking subject. While the rise of 
writing has, over the centuries, made language increasingly silent, to simply map voice back onto 
language is ultimately to erase voice as something more than language—as that which language 
cannot say. And if we, as a field, can open our minds to voice’s fundamental paradox—as an 
embodiment not opposed to language but always in excess of it—then the potential implications 
for our practice may be wide-reaching and profound. By exploring possibilities for composing 
with voice as opposed to merely with words, our field might begin to bridge some of the deep 
Cartesian fissures—between mind and body, word and skin, cognition and affect—which have 
abstracted our practice (and western philosophy more broadly) from the fleshy immediacy and 
visceral substance of primary lived experience. 
3.4.2 Opening #2: Performing and Disrupting Identity 
Voice has played a key role at the center of one of the most iconic debates in contemporary 
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composition, as a metaphorical symbol in the struggle over the question of identity.95 Whether 
composition pedagogy should encourage writers to find their “authentic” ‘voices’ (and thus 
identities) through personal writing or should teach writers that their so-called ‘voices’ (as stand-
ins for identities) are only ever social constructions was, for a time, one of the most pressing 
questions in the meta-discourse of our field. However, we have seen outlined here a number of 
arguments against the presumed marriage between human voice and human identity in the first 
place—arguments that push us to reimagine voice not as a personal attribute, but as a relational 
event. In this context, voice is no longer safely confined within the individual body, as the 
unquestioned possession or expression of an autonomous speaking subject. Instead, it must 
always, and by its very nature, reach beyond itself toward other bodies, speaking itself at the 
same time as it speaks language. And as we move voice into the realm of digital audio, with its 
high potential for manipulability, the necessary link between sounding voice and intentional 
speech (and thus identity) becomes increasingly tenuous. Thus, while metaphorical ‘voice’ has 
largely gone out of fashion in mainstream composition practice, we find in mediated, material 
voice an invaluable opportunity to rethink our approach to identity—and even to complicate the 
very possibility of identity itself.  
As I have argued, one of the key limitations in our field’s approach to sounding voice has 
been its continued investment in models of classical oratory, which necessarily tether the voice 
to the live speaking body and to the service of rational discourse. When we imagine voice in this 
way, we ultimately limit ourselves to a single compositional possibility: to take up voice as a 
direct representation of intentional speech. Even in the realm of digital composition, pedagogical 
                                                
95 I’m referring here to an ideological struggle that has come to be metonymically represented as “The 
Bartholomae/Elbow Debates.” See the 1995 CCC articles “Writing with Teachers: A Conversation with 
Peter Elbow” and “Responses to Bartholomae and Elbow” for a summary of this conversation. 
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innovations like documentary voiceover and the audio essay—while they attend to the value of 
embodied, vibrational sound—have ultimately continued to confine voice’s potential within the 
familiar conventions of linear (if layered), speech-based discourse, wherein the voice of the 
speaker and the voice of the composer are typically one and the same. But if we step back and 
take up voice on its own terms—as something always already beyond the individual body, as 
something that challenges the boundaries between self and other, as an effect rather than an 
essence—then I think we, as a field, might discover a range of new compositional opportunities: 
for experimentation, for disruption, and for play. 
In order to embrace these opportunities, we must first open our minds to voice’s potential 
to not only represent as communicative content, but also to perform and enact as a vibrational 
material. It is here that Norie Neumark’s work becomes particularly productive. By focusing on 
the fundamental performativity of digital voice, Neumark works to divest the voice of its stifling 
obligations to identity, while at the same time recognizing the human tendency to hear in digital 
voice something that might feel like an authentic presence. In this sense, we might say that 
digital voice possesses the unique potential both to evoke our deepest desires for identity and 
then to disrupt their very possibility. As Neumark puts it, “I consider it still useful to approach 
voice as gesture and event—and to point to what voices do, how they create and disturb 
meaning and ‘identity’ rather than just conveying or expressing it” (96). It is in this context, I 
believe, that our field’s longstanding attachments to voice-as-identity come to take on new 
significance—no longer a metaphysical liability but rather a material resource. Indeed, I wonder 
if digital voice, taken up as a malleable compositional material, might help us to perform the 
impossibility of representation itself.  
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3.4.3 Opening #3: A Material “Ethics of Effects” 
Amidst the recent turn toward digital and multimodal composing, we have seen the field 
embrace an expanding range of media and materials as the new building blocks of composition 
practice. And, as part of this shift we have seen a parallel opening to alternative compositional 
forms, ranging from soundscapes, to collage art, to video remix—forms which radically upend 
the linear, expository conventions of the academic essay. But while popular music, photo 
archives, and online videos have arisen as uncontested fodder for such “recombinatorial” 
compositions, vast archives of digital voices—which circulate widely through the prosumptive 
networks of the social web—have remained a largely untapped resource. To “compose with 
voice” in the field of composition has been, for the most part, restricted to the practice of 
recording and editing one’s own voice for linear replay. More experimental and disruptive 
approaches to voice-as-material may appear dangerous and out of bounds. 
Considering our field’s longstanding approach to voice as identity and language, it seems 
safe to suggest that this de facto proscription against interfering with the voices of others might 
be due, at least in part, to the constraints of representational ethics. In other words, when we are 
driven solely by the need to accurately reflect the person behind the voice, on one hand, or to 
accurately express the act of intentional speech on the other, recordings of other people’s voices 
will always remain inert and sacred objects of conservation, closed off to the imaginative 
manipulation, recombination, and repurposing that digital audio affords. Thus, while there is no 
question that voice suggests a rich and vibrant source of material for composition in the digital 
age, in order to fully embrace voice as material, perhaps we must begin to imagine new ethical 
frameworks that start from the material itself.  
As we have seen, one of the vital steps in moving away from a representational approach 
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to voice is to reimagine the relationship between a voice and its source. On one hand, to 
completely abandon the relationship between voice and its human source—and thus to collapse 
voice into a framework of aurality (when “live”) or audio (when mediated)—would be to deny 
the extent to which voice is phenomenologically set apart from all other sounds in our “hierarchy 
of perception” (Chion 5). On the other hand, to hold on too tightly to the idea that a voice is a 
possession or attribute of its human source would be to overlook both the extent to which voice 
always moves beyond the body from the moment it is recognized as voice (Connor 4) and the 
extent to which “we can experience a sound without experiencing its source” (Cox 156). In this 
sense, as I have argued, it may be fruitful for the field of composition and rhetoric to imagine the 
voice as an effect. This framework allows us to simultaneously acknowledge a voice’s causal 
relationship to the human being who uttered it, while also affording it an independent existence 
as a “sonorous body” (Schaeffer 79) or “autonomous voice bod[y]” (Connor 35) with the 
vibrational potential to act and to affect in its own right.  
It is here that Stanyek and Piekut’s provocative proposal for a material “ethics of effects” 
(34) becomes particularly promising. By re-imagining voice as effect and effect as agency, these 
authors provide us with an unprecedented opening to interact with—and indeed to collaborate 
with—not only the voices of others, but even the voices of the dead. As I see it, this possibility 
has radical implications for the future of composition practice, opening up the vast archives of 
digital voice to innovative practices of compositional invention and intervention and encouraging 
us to approach these materials with a newfound appreciation for their role—indeed, their shared 
agency—in producing the effects of our work. Of course, it is important to emphasize that this 
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“mutual effectivity” does not imply a “mutual responsibility”96 (34), and thus in no way divests 
the living, human participant in an “intermundane” collaboration of the obligation to approach 
vocalic composing with a critical sensibility. What it does do, however, is encourage us to move 
beyond the familiar knee-jerk reaction to vocal-manipulation-as-exploitation, making the way for 
exciting new practices of mindful experimentation and play. I believe it is in this sense, more 
than any other, that digital voice has the potential to recompose composition: by forcing us to 
reimagine our relationship to the materials of our practice more broadly—even going so far as to 
break down the boundaries we have erected between fiction and nonfiction, self and other, living 
and dead, body and machine.  
In what follows, I will build on these openings by putting them into practice in two 
practice-based experiments in critical media production: In Chapter Four, an installation piece 
comprised of three two-channel videos, which employ a technique of reverse remix to digitally 
“coerce” confessions from the bodies of unwitting actors. And, in Chapter Five, an experimental 
radio drama, which mobilizes the recorded voices of deceased individuals from oral history 
archives as “actors”—and collaborators—in an imaginative work of dramatic storytelling. These 
two projects are designed to work together to cover broad conceptual and compositional ground, 
theorizing digital vocality in relation to questions of agency, performativity, and ethics across 
diverse source materials and media platforms. In the following two chapters, I will begin by 
describing the compositional methods and materials that went into the production of each 
project. Then, I will lay out the theoretical underpinnings beneath its conception, situating it in 
                                                
96 While Stanyek and Piekut do not completely disavow the possibility for a move toward shared 
responsibility between human and nonhuman actors in so-called “intermundane” collaborations, this 
opening remains for them “the impossible question” at the root of their work: “What kinds of co-
responsibility do the disparate yet mutually effective worlds of humans and nonhumans, material and 
immaterial entities, and the living, dead, and not-yet-born have for one another?” (34). I will consider 
these ideas further in the conclusion of this dissertation. 
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the context of related works and practices and considering the ways in which it builds upon and 
extends existing compositional engagement with digital voice across broad spheres of creative 
production. Ultimately, by engaging with digital voice in these divergent contexts, I hope to 
generate a rich and varied conversation that might contribute to theory and practice alike across a 
wide range of creative fields—those which already employ voice as core material of their 
practice and those which might productively take it up if catalyzed to do so.  
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4.0  COERCED CONFESSIONS: PERFORMANCE, EDITING, MANIPULATION 
One loses control of the voice because it no longer disappears. From bone to air to 
writing, permanence outside the subject invites greater mutability, where the 
primacy and purity of the voice are subjected to the machinations and 
imaginations of culture and politics. 
— Douglas Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat: A History of Sound in the Arts 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss Coerced Confessions, an installation-based video series, which 
employs a method I call reverse remix to digitally “coerce” confessional performances from 
actors’ bodies, against their will. As an experiment in compositional method, the videos in this 
series are produced as follows: First, by rearranging textual source material from real-life public 
confessions (letters, political speeches, YouTube videos) into scripted fictional monologues; 
second, by filming actors performing the monologues in live dramaturgical readings with no 
knowledge of the original confession from which they were produced; and, third, by reverse-
engineering the resulting performances—word-by-word and syllable-by-syllable—back into the 
original confessional texts. What emerges out of this process is a set of two distinct 
performances: The first, a traditional dramaturgical utterance driven by speakerly intention, and 
the second, a digital rearticulation of that utterance driven by technological manipulation. 
Together, these two performances form a two-channel video designed for simultaneous, looping 
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playback on adjacent monitors in an installation environment. This configuration encourages 
viewers to experience the two channels both individually and in relation, elucidating the method 
of their production and ruminating on the startling relationships between word and voice, 
meaning and material, intention and intonation that their relationship provokes.  
The left channel of each video features the actor’s voice and body in synchronous audio 
and visual tracks, manipulated with rapid and precise edits—at the level of the word and in many 
cases the syllable97—such that s/he appears to be uttering the confessional text. However, 
because of the radical nature of the editing—with cuts ranging from a few seconds for breaths 
and pauses, down to only a few frames—the performance of this utterance appears anything but 
“natural.” The visual track is framed as a close-up of the actor’s face and torso, shot from just 
below the eyes, seeking to focus the viewer’s attention on the movements and expressions of the 
face—and, in particular, the mouth—while partially (though not completely) occluding the 
actor’s identity. In combination with the awkward spurts and mumbles of the vocal delivery (a 
phenomenon I will discuss further later in this chapter), the jarring visual effect/affect of the 
body’s twitches and contortions works to exaggerate—as oppose to smooth over—the disjointed 
nature of the performance and thus draws attention to the manipulative or “coercive” nature of its 
production. Finally, deliberately timed breaths and pauses function to steady the pace of the 
delivery and match the timing of the second video channel, while also contributing to the 
affective charge and dramatic emphasis of the confessional performance. 
Conversely, the right channel of each video features the unedited audio track of the 
                                                
97 The concept for this project (and its radical, word-level editing) was inspired, early on, by examples of 
experimental video art, such as Omer Fast’s CNN Concatenated (2002), which compiles discrete words 
spoken by different CNN newscasters into a cohesive 18-minute “monologue” posing questions about 
media authenticity, and Lenka Clayton’s Qaeda, Quality, Question, Quickly, Quickly, Quiet (2001), 
which rearranges all of the words in George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address (the “Axis of 
Evil” speech) into alphabetical order. 
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actor’s original dramatic performance of the fictional monologue, overlaid with a visual track 
that reflects the form and medium of the confessional source material. For example, in the case 
of a written document, fragments of alphabetic text gradually appear on the screen, one-by-one, 
as each word is spoken in the fictional monologue, such that, at the end of the performance, they 
reveal the complete text of the original confession. And in the case of a televised speech, the 
visual footage of the original confession is manipulated with the same process of precise editing, 
such that the confessor appears to be mouthing or lip synching—again, in a manifestly unnatural 
performance—along with the actor’s monologue. When placed in juxtaposition to the left video 
channel, the audio track in this channel presents itself as a strikingly fluid performance, drawing 
attention to the jarring intonation of the “coerced confession,” while creating moments of 
resonance, which reveal their common source in a singular human performance. The visual track, 
for its part, further supports the point of connection between the two channels, dramatizing the 
process through which the source materials have been remixed.  
One of the crucial components of this project, beyond that which is immediately visible 
in the installation environment, is the voluntary but ultimately unwitting participation of the 
actors involved. In recruiting actors for the project, I was careful to inform them of the project’s 
larger aims and methods—namely that I would be appropriating their performances toward 
alternative ends—while requiring that they remain ignorant of the precise ends toward which 
their performances will be re-orchestrated until after the filming was complete. They were 
provided only with the script for their performance of the fictional monologue, made up almost 
exclusively of the words and syllables found in the original confession but radically rearranged 
to disguise its identity, context, and meaning. In preparation for the filming, I insisted that the 
actors’ performance be guided by the script alone and provided them with no additional coaching 
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on the emotional context or conflict in which their character was embedded. I invited them to 
select their own wardrobe and to direct their performance based solely on their empathic reading 
of the character and the situation that the script suggested, and asked only that they speak slowly 
and enunciate each word to enable greater flexibility in the editing process. In the end, I revealed 
the “coerced confession” to the actors, either by providing them with a copy of the original 
confessional text following the filming or by showing them the video of their “coerced 
confession” after the editing was complete. This element of mystery—and the surrender of 
control that it entailed—was an integral part of the ethical experiment at hand. 
The source materials behind each of the three videos in the Coerced Confessions series 
reflect a variety of confessional sub-genres, figures, contexts, and media.98 In selecting these 
materials, I sought to create opportunities for experimentation with a wide range of affective 
states, viewer identifications, and ethical stakes, such that each video would offer a vastly 
different expression or enactment of a common compositional method.  
The first video, titled “Susan” (6 minutes, 25 seconds), is based on Susan Smith’s 1994 
letter confessing to drowning her two young children. In this letter, Smith describes in detail both 
her actions and her emotional state on the day she murdered her sons, situating her behavior as, 
in part, a desperate response to unrequited love. As the confession of a private citizen thrust into 
the public eye by the severity of her crime, Smith’s letter resonates with the raw and 
contradictory emotions—grief and guilt, tenderness and callousness, self-loathing and self-
justification—of a young mother struggling to make sense of her own senseless act, perhaps for 
herself as much as anyone else. At the heart of Smith’s confession is an almost unbearable 
                                                
98 In determining what source texts constitute confessions, this project follows Dave Tell’s broad, 
reception-based definition of the confession as “any text that has been called a confession” (5), keeping in 
mind that, as Tell argues, “to call a text a confession or to deny the same is always a political act” (2). 
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vulnerability: the physical vulnerability of two sleeping children strapped into the backseat of a 
car as it rolls into a lake and the emotional vulnerability that drove their mother to push it in.  
 
 
Figure 1. Susan (Erin Anderson, 2011); 6 min. 25 sec. video with sound (channel 1 of 2) 
Video still of actress Jamie “Skye” Bianco and link to video. 
 
 
Figure 2. Susan (Erin Anderson, 2011); 6 min. 25 sec. video with sound (channel 2 of 2) 
Video still of reconstituted source text by Susan Smith and link to video. 
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The second video, titled “Bill” (5 minutes, 30 seconds), works with then-President Bill 
Clinton’s 1998 speech confessing to his affair with White House intern, Monica Lewinsky, 
immediately following his testimony before the Office of Independent Council and the grand 
jury. In this live network television broadcast, popularly known as “The Map Room Speech,” 
Clinton expresses regret and takes responsibility for his actions, while emphasizing the legal 
accuracy of his previous statements on the matter and calling for an end to the “spectacle” that 
has surrounded it. As a highly public figure driven by his position (and by the controversial 
Kenneth Starr investigation) to divulge the details of his private life, Clinton offers a vastly 
divergent emotional and rhetorical context for the confessional act. Stiff, pragmatic, and coldly 
defiant, in this speech, he appears less invested in the confession itself than he is in protesting the 
conditions that called for it. His is a resentful, bureaucratic performance that knows itself as 
such. Defensiveness—not vulnerability—is its prevailing affect.99  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
99 Tell describes “The Map Room Speech,” delivered on August 17, 1998, as “defiant and poorly 
received” for its lack of contrition. This speech stands in contrast to the considerably more apologetic, 
religious, and well-received “Prayer Breakfast Speech,” which Clinton delivered to a group of clergy 
three weeks later (148). For more on these confessions and the public reception that they were met with, 
see Tell’s chapter “Confession and Democracy: Clinton, Starr, and the Witch-Hunt Tradition of American 
Confession.” 
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Figure 3. Bill (Erin Anderson, 2013); 5 min. 30 sec. video with sound (channel 1 of 2) 
Video still of actor Ken Bolden and link to video. 
 
 
Figure 4. Bill (Erin Anderson, 2013); 5 min. 30 sec. video with sound (channel 2 of 2) 
Video still of reconstituted source text by Bill Clinton (Courtesy, William J. Clinton Presidential Library)  
and link to video. 
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The third video, titled “Chris” (4 minutes, 15 seconds), takes as its source material a 2009 
YouTube confession by R&B artist Chris Brown, in which he publicly admits to and apologizes 
for beating then-girlfriend, pop star Rihanna. In this video, following at long public silence about 
the incident, Brown makes an intimate address to his viewers as disappointed fans. Speaking 
directly into the camera, he implores viewers to “forgive me, please” and expresses hope that 
others learn from his mistakes. As an artifact of celebrity confession in the age of social media, 
Brown’s video was originally circulated through his MySpace page and his personal website, but 
it has since been reproduced and reposted across the Web, accompanied by running commentary 
from viewers expressing their approval or disdain. In this confession, Brown accepts personal 
responsibility for his actions, while at the same time framing them within a social context of 
domestic violence as a learned behavior. Here, the lines between perpetrator and victim become 
blurred through a narrative of regret and redemption. 
 
  
Figure 5. Chris (Erin Anderson, 2013); 4 min. 15 sec. video with sound (channel 1 of 2) 
Video still of actor Harry J. Hawkins IV and link to video. 
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Figure 6. Chris (Erin Anderson, 2013); 4 min. 15 sec. video with sound (channel 2 of 2) 
Video still of reconstituted source text by Chris Brown and link to video. 
 
Each of these three confessions formed the basis for an alphabetic remix, resulting in the 
production of an original fictional monologue. In setting the parameters for the project, I decided 
that I would aim to remix the confession such that the resulting script would be comprised 
exclusively of the words and syllables of the original, and, with few exceptions100, I was able to 
hold myself to this rule. While, in theory, I had complete authorial control over both the order in 
which the language was rearranged and the extent to which individual words were split and 
recombined, in practice, I was forced to share my agency in the compositional process with the 
text itself. Because of my desire to create a rigid one-to-one relationship between the two texts—
as well as the added requirement that the resulting remix form a coherent monologue for an 
                                                
100 Beyond a few small modifications of the existing words (e.g. one instance of the two instances of 
“ramp” in the Susan Smith confession became “tramp” in the remix), the only deliberate departure from 
this rule was made to compensate for the absence of sufficient pronouns necessary for the grammatically 
and semantically sound reconstruction of the text. In “Susan,” additional instances of the pronoun “you” 
were included in the alphabetic remix; in “Bill,” there were additional instances of “your”; and, in 
“Chris,” there were additional instances of they. 
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imaginable character without giving away the identity or context of the original confessor—the 
available options for recombination were, in actual fact, highly limited, and the process of 
arriving at those options became a part of the discovery.  
When faced with the overwhelming task of making a given utterance of several hundred 
words reinvent itself as a meaningful, but unrecognizable recomposition of every one of those 
words and syllables and, as much as possible, only those words and syllables, I found it 
necessary to first determine a starting point—a hook out of which the remainder of the text could 
emerge. In other words, the biggest obstacle to the composition process at the outset was the 
sense of seemingly endless possibilities for recombinatorial invention, with no clear idea of 
where to begin. In order to address this challenge, I determined that the most difficult words to 
transfer from one text to another without giving away their origin would be the proper nouns—
the names of the people and places involved. It was in this way that “John D. Long” (the name of 
the lake where Susan Smith drowned her children) became “Dear John”; “Lewinsky” (the 
surname of Clinton’s notorious intern) became “in lieu of”; and “Chris” (singer Chris Brown’s 
first name) became “Christians” when combined with the second syllable of the word 
“questions.”  
Of course, it’s important to note that, in producing the remix, I had to keep in mind that 
the ultimate destination of these words would be in vocal performance, as opposed to the printed 
page. In this sense, it was the sounds of the words and not their meaning that needed to translate. 
In some cases, this element of the compositional process afforded increased flexibility—for 
example, when an instance of the word “there” could become “their” or “they’re” at will. In 
other cases, however, it presented a challenge, wherein unanticipated variations in pronunciation 
could easily thwart decontextualized reuses of the linguistic material—for example, an instance 
 114 
of the word “live,” as in “the concert was live” could not stand in for the word “live,” as in “I 
live there.” Thus, in setting out to produce a textual remix for vocal re-performance, I was forced 
to encounter language as a fundamentally material phenomenon, to recognize the bias inherent to 
my primarily visualist approach to language-as-text, and to imagine its multiple possibilities as 
voice and sound. Because my method for managing the remix process—which involved online 
text analysis tools, custom spreadsheets, and a lot of patience—was, by necessity, based in visual 
representations of language, I sometimes learned the hard way how easy it was to forget the 
specificity of language-as-sound. 
Ultimately, after days of trial-and-error experimentation and meticulous play, what 
emerged out of this process of recomposition was a set of three distinct utterances: Susan 
Smith’s confession to drowning her children became a bitter if nostalgic “Dear John” letter 
reflecting on the end of a relationship with a former lover (“Susan”); Bill Clinton’s recalcitrant 
public address on his relationship with a white house intern became a smugly resentful legal 
notice from an insurance executive denying someone’s claim (“Bill”); and Chris Brown’s 
pleading apology for the violent physical assault on his celebrity girlfriend became a frustrated 
minister’s prayer for the ability to forgive those who perpetrate domestic abuse (“Chris”). While 
the content of these fictional monologues departs markedly from the original confessions (which 
is, of course, the objective of the remix process), in the end, each of these utterances is situated—
as utterances always are101—in a recognizable genre of everyday speech that somehow seems to 
evoke the emotions and intentions driving the original piece. In other words, despite the fact that 
the intonation of individual words and phrases is noticeably aberrant, there is an extent to which 
the underlying affect of the original confession is translated from (con)text to (con)text, genre to 
                                                
101 Later on in this chapter, I will discuss this project in relation to Bakhtin’s theory of speech genres and 
their relationship to what he calls “expressive intonation” (“Speech Genres” 85). 
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genre, performance to performance. I am fascinated by this phenomenon—an unexpected 
outcome of the compositional experiment—and I will return to it in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
4.1 CONVERSATION 
The initial concept for the Confessions videos emerged out of my fascination with media artist 
and theorist Norie Neumark’s work on digital voice and performativity. As I discussed in 
Chapter Three, Neumark’s work speaks back to a fundamental paradox of digitally mediated 
voice: namely the relationship between its heightened “fidelity” (or perceived “authenticity”) on 
one hand, and its heightened “flexibility” (or “manipulability”) on the other (95). As Neumark 
points out, at the same time as digital audio affords higher sound quality, suggesting a more 
faithful representation of the “authentic” voice of the speaker, it also enables a radical departure 
from the identity and intentionality of that speaker through the affordances of digital editing. In 
other words, the more we, as listeners, experience a recorded voice as “sounding like” the person 
who spoke it, the less it must actually conform to the constraints of the speaker’s intentionality 
and agency. Taking this paradox as my point of departure, in the Confessions videos, I am 
interested in experimenting with this performative potential—in playing with digital voice at the 
limits of its material manipulability, and in using the practice itself as a means of thinking 
through the ethics at play.  
At the root of this practice is an effort to imagine the generative potential of vocal remix: 
of taking a given voice recording, slicing it into its component parts, and remixing them into a 
new configuration of speech-that-never-was. Indeed, this practice has a long history in the 
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creative and literary arts, stretching back at least as far as William S. Burroughs’s “tape recorder 
experiments” and magnetic tape “cut-ups” of the late-1950s to late-1970s (Hayles 90). Building 
upon and extending the print-based “cut-up” method that he took from poet Brion Gysin, 
Burroughs’s experiments with magnetic tape102 included, on one hand, techniques of layered or 
interrupted recording, which used the tape recorder to overdub new sounds over existing voice 
recordings at random intervals, and, on the other hand, literal “cut-ups,” which employed the 
systematic slicing and reassembling of a strip of magnetic tape itself. As an analog precursor to 
contemporary digital sampling, these experiments revel in the joy of spontaneity and emergence, 
driven more than anything by a desire to discover “what would happen if?”—which is, in many 
ways, the same sense of curiosity that inspired my work in the Coerced Confessions project. 
In an interview with Daniel Odier, Burroughs describes in detail a particular experiment 
in which: 
…I took a short passage of my recorded voice and cut it into intervals of one twenty-
fourth of a second movie tape […] and rearranged the order of the 24th second intervals 
of recorded speech. The original words are quite unintelligible but new words emerge. 
The voice is still there and you can immediately recognise the speaker. Also the tone of 
the voice remains. If the tone is friendly, hostile, sexual, poetic, sarcastic, lifeless, 
despairing, this will be apparent in the altered sequence (qtd. in Odier 178). 
Situating this technique in historical context, Burroughs goes on to discuss the experiment in 
terms of its connection to speech scrambling devices used in wartime radio and telephone 
communications—devices whose primary purpose was “to make the message unintelligible 
                                                
102 In his experimental novel, The Ticket that Exploded (the first in The Nova Trilogy), Burroughs 
outlines, in detail, the many possibilities for these experiments, marveling, in what becomes a repeated 
mantra, at the fact that “It’s all done with the tape recorder…” (160). 
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without scrambling the code” (178).103 While the method Burroughs describes here is quite 
different from the one I employ in the Coerced Confessions project, particularly in its 
willingness to embrace the “unintelligib[ility]” of the resulting composition, there are 
provocative moments of resonance in Burroughs’s discussion of the project, which are worth 
considering further.  
First is Burroughs’s discovery that the identity of the speaker remains recognizable in the 
remixed composition despite even the most radical scrambling of the recorded voice. 
Comparatively, the Confessions videos take a much more literal, linguistically oriented approach 
to vocal scrambling, making cuts at the boundaries of words and syllables rather than at 
arbitrary, predetermined intervals. This method ensures that parallel vocal utterances will emerge 
and bounce off of one another in the space between the juxtaposed video channels, suggesting to 
the audience not only that it is the same person speaking in both channels, but also that each 
channel is in fact constructed from the same vocal material. Despite the fact that the visual track 
of the second video channel (which provides the audio of the original dramatic monologue 
spoken by the actor) does not reveal the physical likeness of the speaker, it is crucial to the 
ethical stakes of the project that this function of identity recognition be present, demonstrating 
that the “confession” in the first channel is a deliberate manipulation of a single person’s voice. 
Reading Burroughs’s reflection on this experiment, I am intrigued by the proposition that this 
recognition need not be grounded only in the pronunciation and accentuation but rather that they 
might be inherent in the quality or timbre of the voice itself, regardless of linguistic content or 
meaning. 
                                                
103 While I had never considered my practice in the Coerced Confessions project in these terms, it is 
interesting to consider the extent to which the process of alphabetic remix through which I produce the 
script for the actor’s performance, might be thought of as a process of encoding, carried out with the 
express goal of later unscrambling the coded message through digital editing into the desired confession. 
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Of course, there is another key difference between the experiment Burroughs describes 
here and my work in the Confessions project—specifically surrounding the question of whose 
voice is being manipulated. It matters, from an ethical perspective, that Burroughs is using a 
recording of his own voice as the basis for his manipulation—and, indeed, for many (though not 
all) of his magnetic tape experiments. In N. Katherine Hayles’s discussion of Burroughs’s The 
Ticket That Exploded, she describes his experiments as efforts to imagine possibilities for “tape-
recorder-as-body” and “body-as-tape-recorder,” and thus for an alternative subjectivity that is 
situated at the collapsing boundary between human and machine (85). Under this framework, it 
is one’s ability to manipulate one’s own voice (and thus “presence”) within the machine—and, 
eventually, to give over one’s subjectivity entirely to the machine—that is important. The ethics 
at stake are a question of human-machine relations and flexible subjectivities, with no attention 
to the potential for intervention by other human agents—or, indeed, for a notion of voice as 
something apart from subjectivity in the first place.  
In contrast, in the Confessions project, I am making a deliberate intervention into the 
prevailing ethical standards surrounding the use of other people’s recorded voices in 
compositional practice—standards that mandate a strict representational adherence to speakerly 
intention. In this sense, it is my own intervention, as an external human agent with no apparent 
claim to “ownership” over the voice in question, that is at the heart of the ethical provocation at 
hand. Certainly, both experiments are playing upon a shared fear—namely, that our voices might 
be “stolen” and made to speak beyond our control. However, the Confessions project represents 
an attempt to move the conversation away from the essentializing, metaphysical frameworks of 
vocal “subjectivity” and “presence,” which Hayles is mobilizing here and to reimagine the 
recorded voice as something closer to what Jonathan Sterne has called “a resonant tomb, offering 
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the exteriority of the voice with none of its interior self-awareness” (290). Indeed, by flagrantly 
interfering with the voices of the actors involved, and by dramatizing this interference through 
the juxtaposition of the two video channels, I am seeking to challenge the very notion of 
“interference” itself and to reclaim the manipulability of digital voice as a constructive capacity 
for invention and performative play. 
This leads us to the second key discovery that Burroughs notes in his discussion of this 
magnetic tape cut-up: the transference of “tone” from the original vocal recording to the 
scrambled sequence. Based on his use of the word “tone” in the singular, as well as the available 
tones he references—“friendly, hostile, sexual, poetic, sarcastic, lifeless, despairing” (Odier 
178)—it seems that he is referring here to a phenomenon not unlike what I previously referred to 
as the “underlying affect” of the overall utterance, as opposed to the intonational accents of the 
individual words, which necessarily become new words and non-words in his voice-scrambling 
experiment. Interestingly, this affective transference was something that I noted in my own 
compositional process, both in the alphabetic remix, moving from the original confession to the 
production of the scripted fictional monologue, and in the video remix, moving from the 
performed monologue to the “coerced confession.” While the latter shift suggests a commonality 
with Burroughs’s experiment, functioning at the level of vocalic material, the former, emerging 
as it does out of a purely alphabetic process, must necessarily be functioning at a level of 
linguistic material. This distinction presents an interesting opportunity to reflect on the 
relationship between language and voice that the Coerced Confessions project provokes.   
Unlike Burroughs, who embraced “unintelligible” speech as a viable outcome of his cut-
up process (Odier 178), in scripting the fictional monologues for the Confessions videos, I was 
committed to remixing the confessional source text not simply into intelligible words and 
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sentences, but, furthermore, into a believable monologue for an imaginable character that might 
be enacted and performed by the participating actor. Drawing on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, 
you might say that what I was aiming for in the alphabetic remix process was the production of a 
“concrete utterance” (63) structured by a recognizable “speech genre” (“Speech Genres” 72)—in 
this case, a Dear John letter, a formal business address, and a prayer of petition—as opposed to 
simply a string of linguistically or grammatically sound sentences. After all, as Bakhtin argues, 
“The sentence as a unit of language, like the word, has no author. Like the word, it belongs to 
nobody, and only by functioning as a whole utterance does it become an expression of the 
position of someone speaking individually in a concrete situation of speech communication” (83-
84). What the utterance provides, then, is a socially imaginable configuration of speaker, listener, 
and topic or “hero,” which forms the basis for the actor’s dramatic interpretation. Because, as 
Bakhtin puts it, “[e]xpressive intonation is a constitutive marker of the utterance” (85), each of 
the resulting scripts necessarily suggests an overall tone, which may be something similar to 
what Burroughs describes in his discovery that “the tone of voice remains” (Odier 178). What is 
interesting (and perplexing) is the fact that this tone, while produced in the context of one speech 
genre in the fictional utterance, appears so appropriate to the vastly divergent genre of the 
correlating “coerced confession” when it is transferred to this new context in the audio remix. 
While it is difficult to say exactly what it happening here, I wonder if it might be a response to 
the limited combinations that are possible using only the constrained set of words and syllables 
available in the original text, particularly with the requirement that the resulting text form a 
believable utterance. In this sense, the project provides a fascinating window into the possible 
role of individual words and syllables as the linguistic building blocks of the utterance. 
Taking Burroughs’s discovery one step further, however, we might also consider how 
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tone functions at the level of individual words and syllables. Central to Bakhtin’s work is an 
emphasis on the fundamentally appropriative nature of language as it is used, in which, “[t]he 
word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes ‘one’s own’ only when the speaker 
populates it with is own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to 
his own semantic and expressive intention” (“Discourse” 293). In many ways, the Coerced 
Confessions project—as an appropriation of the speech of another for alternative intentions and 
ends—stands as an ethically charged dramatization of the same kind of appropriation, which 
Bakhtin suggests happens as a matter of course in everyday communication contexts. There is, 
however, one key difference: Unlike the appropriative “revoicing” that occurs in everyday 
speech—which necessarily implies a shift in the “expressive intonation” (85)—in the context of 
the digital appropriation that I am carrying out here, the precise intonation of every word and 
syllable remains stubbornly intact as it is trafficked from one context to another. Indeed, this may 
be one of the key distinctions between composing-in-words and composing-in-voices: That, 
despite the radical manipulability of digital voice that Neumark points to, there is an extent to 
which “the unsaid” always speaks itself beyond our control.  
There is definitely a certain surrendering of control—to the technology, to the method—
inherent in Burroughs’s magnetic tape experiment, one which ultimately results in the muddling 
of the intelligibility and meaning of words. Conversely, because the Coerced Confessions project 
is built around a requirement for intelligibility and meaning, we might say that this surrender of 
control happens at the level of intonation, wherein the language continues to “make sense” but 
the intonational delivery of that language is jarring and detached from the norms of everyday 
speech. Juxtaposed against the fluid intonation of the original scripted delivery, what we see and 
hear in the confessional remix is the disjunction of a voice acting beyond its allegiance to the 
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rational speaking subject, but at the same time in full allegiance to speech itself. In this sense, we 
might argue that what is being dramatized in this project is simultaneously the material 
vulnerability of voice to the digital “coercion” we have been promised and its fundamentally 
social, intonational resistance.104   
This surrender to intonational disruption is one of the key elements of the Confessions 
project, which sets it apart from other prominent examples of vocal remix to emerge out of 
literary, artistic, and popular contexts in the years following Burroughs’s cut-ups. One such work 
worth discussing is media artist and scholar Douglas Kahn’s 1980 experimental audio collage, 
“Reagan Speaks for Himself.” Working with the reel-to-reel audio from a Bill Moyers interview 
with Ronald Reagan when he was a candidate for president, Kahn used a razor blade to slice up 
and rearrange Reagan’s voice into an entirely new utterance composed entirely of words and 
phrases from the interview. As a work of “media ventriloquism” (Nelson), the resulting audio 
presents Reagan’s voice stuttering out a series of awkward and absurd proclamations, punctuated 
by a flood of nonverbal utterances—uhhs and oohs and guffaws—which become more 
pronounced in their repetition. Opening with: “For the first time in Man’s history, I uhhhh, I’m 
president!”105 (Kahn), the piece goes on to feature humorous musings about “cans of poisoned 
meat” and a taskforce that works to break men’s arms—and “the backbone of America”—over a 
car window. While these statements were, of course, never actually made by the former 
                                                
104 In his book Uncreative Writing: Managing Language in the Digital Age, conceptual poet Kenneth 
Goldsmith suggests that “emphasizing [language’s] materiality disrupts normative flows of 
communication” (35). I would suggest that this project demonstrates that the reverse is perhaps equally 
true: That precisely by performing a disruption in our “normative flows of communication”—in this case, 
through the intonational dissonance produced by the reverse remix process—we might also emphasize the 
materiality of language. 
105 The first version of the piece, which was released before Reagan won the presidency, opened with the 
phrase, “I want to say I’m President. I want to live in the White House!” The opening was revised in a 
second version of the piece, which was re-released after the election (Nelson). 
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President, at least not in the contexts and configurations in which they appear, in Kahn’s remix, 
they sound as if they feasibly could have been. 
Certainly, the success of this piece might rest heavily upon the particularities of Reagan’s 
speaking style, which, as Brian Massumi points out, brings together the highly recognizable and 
affectively charged “timbre of his voice, that beautiful vibratory voice” (41) with a general 
tendency toward “verbal fumbling,” “incoherence,” (40) and “discontinuities” (41). In this sense, 
a certain degree of verbal and tonal disjunction might actually add to the illusion that Reagan is, 
in fact, “Speak[ing] for Himself”—which is, of course, the punchline at the heart of the piece. 
But however this illusion is achieved, what is notable is the extent to which the goal is, in fact, an 
intonational realism: a work of vocal appropriation that to some degree works to disguise itself 
as conscious, rational speech (however irrational it may be). 
In a similar vein, and in keeping with the presidential theme, Dan Warren’s 2011 vocal 
remix Son of Strelka, Son of God goes even further to create the illusion of natural speech—in 
this case, taking the audiobook version of Barack Obama’s memoir Dreams From My Father 
and reworking it into an epic, 32-minute “audio fable” (Weigel). The story opens with Obama’s 
smooth, measured voice, ruminating on a creation story: “I’m left mostly with images that appear 
and die off in my mind like distant sounds. Sacred stories. Stories of genesis and the tree where 
man was born. Starting with my father…” (Warren). In the nine chapters that follow, Obama’s 
voice—acting as “Stanley,” the dog-like son of a human woman and a “demigod […] born from 
a fruit tree”—goes on to narrate a mythical journey through “armies of singing children” and 
“apocalypses of falling buildings and burnings skies” (Weigel). Against a richly layered 
soundtrack of music and effects, he describes encounters with such mythical beings as “the 
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tortoise of Hindu legend that floated in space” and “the great bronze Buddha at Kamakura,”106 
which, when extracted from their original context in storybooks and vacations in Japan, become 
sentient, speaking creatures that provide philosophical and spiritual guidance for Stanley on his 
journey. But if the content of Son of Strelka is a fantastical and absurd, the delivery is just as 
fluid and rhythmic and unbroken as even the most well rehearsed Presidential address. Even 
more than in Kahn’s work with Reagan, we hear the illusion of Obama—apparently but at the 
same time obviously not—“speaking for himself.” 
In describing his process to Slate Magazine, Warren locates the inspiration for the project 
in the language of Obama’s memoir:  
Obama had this habit of doing very grandiose, epic language, for day-to-day struggles or 
minor things that happened in his childhood […] And I realized: This is the language of 
an epic story, even though it's not an epic story. There really is enough of that language to 
tell another story altogether (Weigel). 
But if it was the “epic” quality of Obama’s language that sparked the concept, it was most 
certainly the particular quality of Obama’s voice that led to the project’s success. In fact, Warren 
explains that, following the completion of Son of Strelka, he set out to do a similar project with 
Sarah Palin’s autobiography Going Rogue, but that: “I just couldn’t get anything useful out of it 
[…] The way she speaks, it's almost impossible to pull apart. There are non-natural points that 
you can't do anything with” (Weigel). Clearly, then, at the heart of Warren’s approach—to a 
greater extent than Kahn’s and with wildly different results—is an investment in using 
intonational verity to create an imaginable (if ultimately unbelievable) illusion of conscious, 
                                                
106 Whereas, in Obama’s memoir, the trip to see the “great bronze Buddha” was followed by green tea ice 
cream and a ferry ride, in Son of Strelka, the story proceeds very differently: “He was very gracious. He 
wore a blue, double-breasted suit and a large gold cross against his scarlet tie…” 
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willing speech.  
Certainly, the broader approach used in these two Presidential remixes have much in 
common with my own compositional practice in the Coerced Confessions project. Like Kahn 
and Warren, I was interested in capitalizing upon the manipulability of recorded audio in order to 
appropriate the voices of others and to make them speak in ways that disrupt their original 
intentions. Like Kahn and Warren, I drew upon the speech of well-known figures (or, in the case 
of Susan Smith, a person brought into the public eye by her act of confession), with my use of 
former President Bill Clinton’s confession standing as the most obvious parallel. Despite these 
parallels, however, there are also some key points of departure in the method I developed, which 
are worth teasing out further.  
One of these points relates to the role of vocal intonation in the remix process. As I’ve 
pointed out in the previous discussion, both Kahn and Warren (and particularly Warren) appear 
to be invested in disguising—to whatever extent possible given the materials at hand—their 
intervention in the vocal recordings that form the material basis for their work. Taking as their 
starting point the sound and rhythm and intonation of the voice itself, these artists work to 
disassemble and recombine linguistic fragments of that recording in such a way as to mimic (if 
also exaggerate) the natural speaking style of each President. Conversely, in the Coerced 
Confessions project, you might say that I start not from the sound of the voice but from an act of 
speech. Driven by the requirement that I construct a precise, predefined configuration of words, 
as determined by the confessional source text, my editing process functions to force the vocal 
materials into that configuration, regardless of their intonational realism—and, as I have noted, 
with jarring and disruptive results. In some ways, then, the method of “reverse remix” that I have 
devised might be considered less a technique of vocal remix than it is a technique of linguistic 
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remix, wherein the voice simply performs its material excess—what Mladen Dolar calls “an 
excess of sounds over sense” (146)—as a consequence or a corollary, which plays out beyond 
my control.   
In his book Background Noise, sound artist and scholar Brandon LaBelle makes a useful 
distinction between works that “[use] the voice in performance, as in traditional theater or 
spoken-word poetry” and works that actually “perform the voice” (134). While we might say that 
the former delivers language in voice, the latter, in LaBelle’s words, “plunders language to 
reinvent the voice” (134). I find this notion of “performing the voice” to be an incredibly 
productive framework for articulating the larger aims behind my experimentation in the Coerced 
Confessions project—and perhaps behind my creative-critical practice in this dissertation more 
broadly. Indeed, one of the key objectives behind the method I have devised is to make a space 
for voice to perform itself, both its excessive relationship to language and its malleable potential 
as a digital material. At the same time, it is also the case that this project could not, in fact, 
“perform the voice” without also “using the voice in performance”—that, in the method I have 
developed, the two are deeply intertwined.  
This brings us to another important distinction between my project and these 
predecessors: the role of performance in the remix process. Unlike traditional works of vocal 
remix, which take as their materials existing vocal recordings already circulating in the public 
sphere, in the Coerced Confessions project, I chose to create the materials that I would later 
remix—specifically, by recruiting actors to perform scripted monologues. Of course, because 
these monologues are alphabetic remixes of real-life confessional texts—texts, which I then 
work to re-perform through the “coercive” capacities of digital editing—there is a way in which 
the method itself simply requires this element of performance in order to function. At the same 
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time, it’s important to remember that there is nothing intrinsic to this method that requires the 
original performance to survive the remix process and to sit next to the so-called “coerced 
confession” in the final installation. So how, then, do we understand the role that it plays?  
Here, I find it useful to turn to philosopher Don Ihde’s discussion of “dramaturgical 
voice”—the heightened voice of drama, ritual, and recited poetry. As Ihde argues, dramaturgical 
voice is distinctive to that extent that it “amplifies the musical ‘effect’ of speech” (167). In other 
words, in contrast to everyday conversation, which “gives way to a trivial transparency that hides 
its sounded significance,” the voice of dramatic performance draws a certain degree of attention 
to itself as voice, while at the same time refusing to lose itself in the pure “enchantment” of song 
(167). If we understand the role of the dramatic monologues in the Coerced Confessions project 
under this framework, then we might argue that the dramaturgical character of the actors’ voices 
gives extra emphasis, or heightened accentuation, to the language being delivered—crucially, an 
accentuation which cannot help but “stick” to the words and syllables as they are trafficked into a 
new context in the confessional remix. In this sense, the use of dramaturgical voice might only 
add to the jarring sense of dissonance in the “coerced confession” by exaggerating the 
intonational variation of the utterance.  
On one hand, it could be argued that the vocal materials used by Kahn and Warren are in 
some ways equally “dramaturgical,” emerging, as they do, from highly theatrical context of the 
political stage—for Reagan, a network television interview and, for Obama, an audiobook 
version of his best-selling memoir. On the other hand, what is distinctive about the performances 
that I have orchestrated in the Coerced Confessions project is the extent to which they require the 
speaker to imagine, empathize with, and inhabit the experience—and perhaps the “voice”—of 
another. Unlike Kahn and Warren, who appropriate Reagan and Obama’s voices speaking (at 
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least ostensibly) as themselves, in the Confessions videos, the voices I am appropriating are those 
of actors speaking not simply as others, but as imagined others, whose characters emerge out of 
the utterance produced in the alphabetic remix process. As Ihde describes it, the actor’s voice, as 
a unique subcategory of dramaturgical voice, posits a dialectical relationship between self and 
other, wherein “[t]he actor speaks in a role, and the voice he speaks may in some sense be the 
voice of another” (171).107 If we follow Ihde, it could be argued that the ethical stakes of the 
vocal appropriation I am practicing might be dampened by this turn toward drama, toward 
fiction, toward the other—and thus a muddying of the dilemma around vocal ownership. (In 
other words: Whose voice is it to steal?) At the same time, however, Ihde reminds us that “[t]he 
actor’s voice does not obliterate the self.” Instead, he argues, “There is a style to his voice which 
remains his own even while the other emerges into the foreground” (171). This notion of voice 
as a flexible multiplicity goes great lengths to unsettle the very basis for the ethical claim to 
vocal ownership in the first place, suggesting that, in fact, the “authentic” or singular voice of 
metaphysics is always already a myth. 
Of course, this sense of connection and continuity between the voice-as-material and the 
actor-as-person may be only further reinforced by the physical, visible presence of the actor’s 
body on the screen. In other words, the decision to record and edit these performances as works 
of audio-visual composition (as opposed to audio-only) was by no means an arbitrary one—and 
neither was the decision to frame the shot of the actor’s body from just below the eyes, serving to 
                                                
107 Going one step further, Spalding Gray, of the experimental theater company The Wooster Group, 
suggests that, in the end, “everyone is playing themselves” (Savran 63). Rather than look outside 
themselves for a sense of how to portray “those crazy characters,” Gray suggests that “they simply look 
in, or they don’t look in and they just do it. It’s just an intuitive thing—this is the right voice, this is what 
comes—like a child playing. It’s no different from a child playing” (63). This understanding of the 
relationship between acting and identity goes even further to support the notion that it is, in fact, the voice 
of the actor—both physical and metaphorical—that I am appropriating in the Confessions project. 
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emphasize the movements of the speaking mouth.108 In his article, “Moving Lips: Cinema as 
Ventriloquism,” film sound theorist Rick Altman argues for the central role played by the visible 
body—and, more specifically, the synchronously moving mouth—in “divert[ing] attention from 
the sound’s true source” in the theater’s loudspeaker and locating it, instead, in the world of the 
film’s diegesis (75). As both Altman and fellow film theorist Michel Chion have argued, sounds, 
by their very nature, urge people to actively seek out their source. It is because of this that we are 
more than happy, upon seeing the moving mouth, to suspend disbelief and imagine that the 
sound is coming from the person (in actual fact, a rapid succession of light-as-images) who 
appears to be producing it. As Chion explains it, while we can’t see the deeper, more visceral 
mechanisms of vocal production, which take place between lungs and larynx, “[w]e take this 
temporal co-incidence of words and lips as a sort of guarantee that we’re in the real world, where 
hearing a sound usually coincides with seeing its source” (129). 
In this sense, we might understand the visual component of the Confessions videos as a 
means of emphasizing the illusion that what we are seeing and hearing is a speaking person, as 
opposed to a representation of that person’s voice and body produced through a process of digital 
transduction. While we tend to imagine audio-only voice recordings as stand-ins for the whole 
body (and thus being) of the person behind the voice, Chion suggests that “[r]eal embodiment 
comes only with the simultaneous presentation of the visible body with the audible voice, a way 
                                                
108 While it was not an immediate influence on my decision to frame the shot in this way (I only learned 
of it after filming the first video), Samuel Beckett’s dramatic monologue Not I (1972) stands as a notable 
precursor to my visual emphasis on the mouth. Beckett’s monologue is staged in a darkened theater, with 
the actress’s body entirely obscured save a spotlight illuminating her mouth as she enacts what 
performance theorist Herbert Blau describes as: a “tormented susurrus or superfetation of words, that 
‘sudden urge…to tell,’ get it all out, if not a confessional, ‘nearest lavatory…start pouring it out…steady 
stream…mad stuff…half the vowels wrong…no one could follow’ (Not I 222)” (187). The connection 
between the bubbling “urge” to confess and the mouth-as-threshold between inside and outside, private 
and public, presents a provocative point of connection to my work in the Coerced Confessions project. 
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for the body to swear ‘this is my voice’ and for the voice to swear ‘this is my body’” (144). Thus, 
by presenting an audio-visual illusion of “real embodiment,” perhaps what the Coerced 
Confessions project offers is a heightened experience of the ethical stakes surrounding the 
practice of vocal appropriation, creating the illusion that it is, in fact, a person—as opposed to 
simply a voice—that is being “coerced” to speak beyond his or her conscious intention and 
control.109  
At the same time, if it is true, as Altman argues, that “pointing the camera at the speaker 
[…] dissembl[es] the work of production and technology” (“Moving Lips” 69), then what 
happens when we then radically fragment and re-edit the footage of that speaker’s body, as I 
have done in this project? It seems reasonable to suggest that the reverse might be true—that, in 
fact, by presenting to the viewer the jerking, contorted body of an impossible speaker in this 
project, I am ultimately exposing, even flaunting “the work of production and technology,” 
which brought it into being. Whereas audio-only works of vocal remix, like Kahn’s Reagan 
Speaks for Himself and Warren’s Son of Strelka, Son of God, are able to accomplish a certain 
illusion of realism precisely because of the body’s visible absence from the scene, in contrast, the 
Coerced Confessions videos—as videos—present an illusion that announces itself as such. In 
other words, far from committing an act of trickery, what I am seeking to accomplish in this 
project is precisely the opposite: Namely, to draw attention to the very real potential for the 
                                                
109 In “Videotaped Confessions and the Genre of Documentary,” Jessica M. Silbey discusses a trend in 
the American criminal justice system to require the filming of custodial interrogations—a phenomenon 
grounded in “the belief that filmed confessions uncontroversially demonstrate the circumstances of the 
confession and therefore the truth of the guilt or innocence of the accused” (791). Tying this trend to a 
parallel rise in the popularity of documentary film, Silbey suggests that this evidentiary approach to the 
filmed confession is based on “a basic heuristic of the relationship between knowing and seeing” (797). 
While the details of this phenomenon are beyond the scope of my present research, it is interesting to 
consider how my project might speak back to these broader social questions around the truth-value of the 
visible, speaking body. 
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sounds that we imagine to be “our voices”—when recorded and transduced into digital data—to 
speak beyond us, in spite of us, and against our conscious intentions. Indeed, we might say that, 
in contrast to the (albeit ironic) dissemblance represented by a title like Reagan Speaks for 
Himself, the Coerced Confessions project is titled in such as way as to draw attention to the 
manipulation or “coercion” at its heart.  
But then the question arises: Who—or what—is it that is being coerced? By drawing 
attention to the technological artifice behind the composition of the so-called “coerced 
confession,” this project is working to complicate our preconceived notions of vocal 
authenticity,110 to dramatize the radical manipulability of voice as a digital material, and, 
ultimately, to reimagine the ethics of this manipulation itself, framing it not simply as a 
destructive means of deception or “coercion,” but also as a constructive means of performance 
and invention. In her argument for digital voice’s “authenticity effect” (95), Norie Neumark has 
proposed that we might productively approach digital vocality as something that, while perhaps 
evocative of a certain feeling of personhood and presence, is ultimately capable of operating 
independently from the body and intentionality of the speaker that produced it. This project is, at 
its core, an effort to imagine the practical, compositional implications of this conceptual move, to 
make a space for voice to be taken up not only as an embodied means of communication but also 
as an independently vibrational medium of performance practice. 
Crucially, central to this shift is an effort to complicate our commonplace understanding 
of performance itself. As Neumark points out, “Theoretical approaches to performativity have 
focused not on voice but more on the spoken word and its effects: they have thought about how 
                                                
110 It is interesting to note that the confession itself, as a highly-charged speech genre, is also inextricably 
intertwined with the cultural politics of authenticity in much the same way as the human voice. As Dave 
Tell argues, “the simple act of labeling a text as a confession can either endow a text with an aura of 
authenticity or divest a text of authenticity” (13). 
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to do things with words” (96).111 Here, Neumark is implicitly (though by no means subtly)112 
mobilizing J. L. Austin’s speech act theory—in particular, his notion of “the performative,” in 
which an act of speaking is also already an act of doing. Taken up under this framework, the 
confession, as an everyday speech genre, emerges as a prime example of Austin’s 
“performative”—and, indeed, it is perhaps for this reason that the “coerced confession” strikes us 
as such a frightening possibility.113 After all, to coerce a confession is to force a person not 
simply to speak words, but to actually commit an act against her will. That being said, what I am 
seeking to emphasize through my work in this project is precisely the ethical distance between 
the actual coerced confession, which involves the psychological manipulation of a rational 
speaking subject, and the performative “coerced confession” that I am practicing in these videos, 
which involves only the material manipulation of the digital recording. Ultimately, by disrupting 
the easy relationship between voice and the body, on one hand, and voice and subjectivity, on the 
other, the Coerced Confessions project points to the insufficiency of existing frameworks for 
approaching the complexity of performance in the digital age.  
One of the key interventions here is my effort to rethink the potential agents of 
compositional performance. While Austin is adamant that “[a]ctions can only be performed by 
persons, and obviously in our cases the utterer must be the performer” (60), the Coerced 
Confessions project seeks to challenge this assumption, moving away from frameworks of 
human exceptionalism and imagining the performative agency located in digital vocality itself. 
                                                
111 Reflecting upon this oversight in her article “Do Voices Matter? Vocality, Materiality, Gender 
Performativity,” Annette Schlichter argues that, in fact, “[s]peech act theory used within a discourse that 
theorizes matter seems to demand attention to forms of vocalization” (41). 
112 Austin’s seminal work on the topic is titled, not incidentally, How To Do Things With Words. 
113 Furthermore, more so than many other genres of everyday speech, the confession evokes expectations 
of “authenticity,” for a deeply felt expression of responsibility—and thus agency—wherein the voice 
moves from interior to exterior as a making-public of the often painfully personal. In this sense, it offers 
the project heightened ethical stakes, which provide the conceptual provocation of the project. 
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Rather than hearing in the manipulated performance of the “coerced confession” simply the 
performance of “some pregiven essential body”—or, for that matter, identity—of the actor 
involved in the original monologue, this project invites us to listen for a new form of 
embodiment altogether: as Norie Neumark puts it, “an embodiment that the voice brings forth in 
the making” (114). In this sense, rather than approaching digital voice as neatly “disembodied,” 
making a hard-and-fast distinction between the human body and the technology that mediates its 
vibration, this move to imagine digital voice as a performative agent in itself suggests the 
possibility for an alternative, emergent form of embodiment that takes place in the space where 
the human and nonhuman intertwine. 
This possibility lies at the core of art historian Anna Munster’s work in Materializing 
New Media: Embodiment in Information Aesthetics. Here, Munster argues that our current 
configurations of new media technologies—with their binary divisions of mind vs. body and 
natural vs. artificial—do not exhaust the full potentialities of digital media. She suggests that we 
should consider, instead, the possibilities for alternative, hybrid forms of “digital embodiment,” 
wherein human bodies and technical materialities interact in mutually constitutive ways. As 
Munster explains it: 
Digital embodiment entails the capacity for us to conceive of and experience bodies as 
something other than inert, weighty masses distended in space and out of sync with the 
absolute speed of an unremitting technological tempo. Digital bodies engage 
incorporeally with the informatic universe precisely because digital machines can 
replicate, amplify and split us form the immediacy of our sensory capacities (18). 
By distancing us from the “immediacy” of the voice as a direct route to human agency, perhaps 
the disruptive performance of the Coerced Confessions project might give us a point of entry into 
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this so-called “digital embodiment” at the level of sensory experience.  
Imagined slightly differently, however, it is also reasonable to suggest that what we are 
hearing here, in the performativity of digital voice, is not, in fact, an “embodiment” at all, but 
rather, something closer to what media artist Frances Dyson refers to as “resonance”—a 
framework which privileges neither the body nor technology as the anchor for our experience of 
audio and new media phenomena, but instead situates them in a groundless “atmosphere” (179). 
For Dyson: 
[T]he atmospheric suggests a relationship not only with the body in its immediate space 
 but with a permeable body integrated within, and subject to, a global system: one that  
 combines the air we breathe, the weather we feel, the pulses and waves of the   
 electromagnetic spectrum that subtends and enables technologies, old and new, and  
 circulates […] in the excitable tissues of the heart (16). 
Thus, rather than persist in our binary thinking, which places the body on one end of the 
spectrum and technology on the other, perhaps we might begin to imagine a more porous, 
“permeable” sense of what it is to be human, taking seriously the interpenetration between 
human bodies and other materialities—including digital technologies—as a necessary condition 
of our compositional practice. Regardless of what we decide to call this liminal space, and 
whether or not we insist on departing from the body entirely, the ethical implications are notable. 
Rather than approach media technologies in instrumental terms, as simply the latest “tools” we 
can use to carry out our bidding, this project suggests how composers and creative practitioners 
might forge new relationships with the core media and materials of our practice, even going so 
far as to imagine them as mutual participants. These questions of agency, performance, and 
participation are pivotal to the discussion at hand, and I will return to them in the next chapter. 
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5.0  OUR TIME IS UP: ARCHIVES, CO-LABOR, AND IMAGINATION 
Oral history pivots on mortality; it hovers on the edge of death, reaches for the 
disappearing. More than fixing a life in place or saving a story from being 
forgotten, oral history profoundly honors ephemerality and loss by acknowledging 
its slipping away. 
— Gretchen A. Case, “Tic(k): A Performance of Time and Memory” 
 
In this chapter, I discuss Our Time is Up, an experimental audio drama composed from 
recordings of oral history interviews with people who have died. In this project, I have sourced 
and selected audio clips from disparate oral history archives and then attempted to remix them—
alongside my own voice and other recorded sounds—into a seamless dramatic narrative. Each 
voice included in this project has been given the space to “act” or perform as a unique character 
in the drama—a character who does not purport to represent the intentions or objective 
experiences of the original narrator,114 but rather who is enacted by the material effects of the 
narrator’s recorded voice. The story that emerges, then, is one that is constrained, both in content 
and intensity, by the finite nature of the interview materials, at the same time as it is enabled by 
their malleable, connectible, recombinatorial potential. 
                                                
114 I use the term “narrator” here, and throughout, as an alternative to the more passive “interviewee” or 
“subject” of an oral history interview. This term has been widely adopted in the field of oral history in 
recent years, in the interest of affording the individual more power and agency in the interview context. 
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Figure 7. Our Time is Up (2014); 45 min. 45 sec. archival audio collage and performance  
Produced by Erin Anderson; posthumous performances by C. Juanita Bowman and Josiah Patton; 
screenshot of Adobe Audition multitrack session (Scene 1 dialogue, detail) and link to audio .wav file.  
 
I began the project by casting a wide net for potential “actors,” sourcing and downloading 
as many oral history recordings as I could find across a diverse array of online collections 
covering broad historical, geographic, and thematic territory. With the exception of my 
grandfather’s interview—which I had recorded myself as part of a family history project in 
2006—I did not own the copyrights to the recordings that I used, and neither did I request 
explicit permission from any of the archives or sponsoring institutions involved. Instead, after 
consulting with a couple of oral historians for guidance, I opted to proceed under the protections 
of the Fair Use Doctrine, with the assumption that (1) the materials were publicly available for 
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download on the web and (2) I would be altering and repurposing them in ways that would be 
sufficiently radical (and sufficiently noncommercial) to mitigate the risk of copyright 
infringement. This decision was motivated, in part, by my suspicion that I would very likely find 
few archivists sympathetic to the unconventional methods and ethics at the root of my project 
and, in part, by my desire to challenge the unfounded exceptionalism that we tend to ascribe to 
such culturally privileged materials—materials which, in practical terms, are just as open to 
intervention and reframing as any music video or home movie on YouTube. Indeed, while oral 
historians have lauded the so-called “digital revolution” for “democratizing” access to the core 
audio-visual materials of oral interviews (Frisch 111), the field is just beginning to confront the 
inevitable contradiction that arises when these ideals of radical openness come into contact with 
its persistent dependence on the proprietary restrictions of copyright law. In this sense, I imagine 
my project as a deliberate intervention into emerging debates around the question of “Who Owns 
Oral History?” in the digital age.115  
Central to this project, conceptually, was the requirement that the people whose voices 
would be featured in the audio drama were no longer living—and thus no longer capable of 
“acting” in the sense that we conventionally understand it, as “live” intentional performance. The 
fact that the actors would be capable neither of consenting nor of “speaking back” to their 
participation in the project was key to the heightened ethical provocation that I was after, and for 
providing an opening to grapple with questions of agency and co-labor, which I will discuss in 
detail in the section that follows. For this reason, the first major criterion that I used to vet 
                                                
115 I am alluding here to a recent article by oral historians Jack Dougherty and Candace Simpson, which 
calls for the field to adopt alternative practices of Creative Commons licensing in order to account for the 
many future uses and reuses of digital materials. While this move holds great promise for opening oral 
history to broader creative and compositional practices in the future, at present, most oral history 
collections continue to use traditional Deed of Gift forms, which ask narrators to sign over the copyrights 
to their interviews to researchers and sponsoring institutions. 
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potential voice recordings for the project was a purely conceptual one: the death of the narrator, 
which I either confirmed by cross-referencing the narrator’s name and birthdate with local 
obituary records or safely presumed based on the age of the narrator at the time the interview 
was conducted. Of course, this requirement meant that many of the recordings I considered were 
not, in fact, born digital, but rather produced in analog formats (reel-to-reel or cassette tape) and 
only more recently converted to digital formats for preservation and presentation online.  
This fact relates to the second key criterion that I used in my selection process: the 
technical question of audio quality. Inevitably, due to the technological limitations of analog 
recording equipment, the deterioration of the storage medium, and haphazard or amateur 
recording practices,116 many of the interviews I sourced had either been rendered nearly (or in 
some cases completely) unintelligible or were too aurally grating to listen to for any length of 
time. For conceptual reasons, which I will discuss further in the following section, I could not 
afford to simply disregard all of the recordings that did not measure up to the standards of 
present-day digital production values. (Never mind the fact that, had I done this, I would have 
had little left to work with.) But also from a practical standpoint, because this particular project 
has an explicitly narrative component (and because I needed to be able to spend significant time 
listening to these voices and expected my audience to do the same), I made the decision to 
discard some of the recordings that fell on the most extreme end of this spectrum and could not 
be salvaged with some careful work in digital audio software.  
After narrowing down the pool of recordings based on these basic conceptual and 
technical requirements, I proceeded to listen to the remaining voices once through somewhat 
                                                
116 Because of the longstanding methodological emphasis of oral history on the alphabetic transcription, 
many of the recordings were likely produced as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves. I will 
discuss this issue further in the following section.  
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passively, not yet knowing what I was listening for, but attuning myself to the grains, rhythms, 
and cadences that they contained—and to the distinctive personalities and range of emotions that 
they expressed. At this stage, you might say that I was listening at the level of what Norie 
Neumark calls “an aesthetics of intimacy and intensity” (95), soaking in the experience of voices 
performing themselves. If I found a particular voice compelling, even if I could not pin down 
precisely what it was that compelled me, I would put it on a short list to return to later. In some 
ways, this part of the process was not unlike a casting call for a theatrical production. However, 
unlike a traditional casting director, who would typically audition and select suitable actors to fit 
predetermined roles, I took precisely the opposite approach, searching for vocal performances 
out of which characters and stories might emerge.  
Of course, as I listened—even at this stage—I could not help but also hear the stories that 
these voices told and the memories and experiences that they recounted. Because the recordings 
were drawn from such a wide range of archives, these experiences varied widely—from a 
Russian garment worker discussing her role as an organizer in the labor movement, to a Mexican 
war veteran recounting the violence of la Revolución, to a Belgian-American man describing the 
traditional ice fishing practices of his father in rural Wisconsin. However, rather than latch on to 
any one of these stories as a template for the drama I would develop, what I listened for in the 
content of these interviews were moments of multiplicity or rupture—moments when a phrase 
uttered or a word spoken might be taken, out of context, in new and even contradictory 
directions. And, as I listened across interviews, I listened for patterns—moments of repetition or 
convergence, where grammatical or thematic content from one recording might overlap with 
another in ways that suggested a potential conversation. Ultimately, at this stage of the process, 
the possibilities remained radically open, but it was here that I began to form a mental list of 
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possible scenarios and characters, which might provide the starting point for a dramatic 
narrative.  
It was also at this stage in the process that I began to consider the constraints of oral 
history as a distinctive genre of archival voice recording, which I soon realized might not lend 
itself easily to rearticulation as audio drama. (I will discuss my decision to use oral history 
interviews as source material further in the following section.) As radio dramatist Tim Crook 
describes it, audio drama is built primarily around the language of “theatrical speech,” featuring 
characters that act and speak in the present and through dialogue with one another (82). 
Capitalizing on the immersive quality of sound to create a sense of dramatic immediacy, the 
genre tends to employ “textual speech” or narration only secondarily—usually to “protect the 
credibility of characters while providing the visual landscape to enable the listener to perceive 
the environment in the imaginative spectacle” (82). Of course, these generic conventions stand in 
striking contrast to those of the oral history interview. As an unstructured interview and a form 
of co-constructed storytelling, oral history is necessarily characterized by a certain degree of 
dialogue or exchange. However, it is also a peculiar, one-sided exchange—one in which the 
primary speaker (known as the “narrator”) answers questions, but seldom asks them; speaks as 
much to an imagined listener in the future as to a concrete “you” in the present; and speaks 
largely of lived memories and thus almost exclusively in the past tense.  
As I realized this, I became concerned about my ability to repurpose these voices as 
materials for dramatic action in the present. However, the more I listened, the more I began to 
realize: that there were notable digressions from these rules. For example, on a rudimentary 
grammatical level, while the typical narrator only rarely used a direct pronoun to engage the 
interviewer in conversation (e.g. “Let me tell you what happened.”), many used “you” 
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considerably more frequently as an indefinite or generic pronoun (e.g. “Sometimes you just get 
so angry,” where “you” stands in for “one”) in ways that could be readily repurposed as a direct 
address to a specific “you.” Beyond that, however, the most fruitful source of present tense, 
conversational speech in these interviews was contained in the many instances of reported 
speech, wherein, in the course of recounting past events, the narrator would in a sense reenact 
either her own speech or that of another as if it were happening in the moment (e.g. “And then 
she said, ‘I don’t know who you think you are coming in here like you own the place!’”). As 
Mikhail Bakhtin suggests, in fact, “[t]he transmission and assessment of the speech of others, the 
discourse of another, is one of the most widespread and fundamental topics of human speech” 
(“Discourse in the Novel” 337)—and oral history, as a secondary speech genre, is no exception 
to this rule. 
Ultimately, one of the key “actors” that I selected for the final piece—Clella Juanita 
Bowman (“Juanita”)—I selected, in part, for her extreme tendencies toward reported speech, 
both her own speech and the speech of others. While I found that Bakhtin’s suggestion that “of 
all words uttered in everyday life, no less than half belong to someone else” (339) did not appear 
to apply in the case of most of the oral history interviews I listened to, in Juanita’s case this may 
have been an underestimate. Drawn from the “Rosie the Riveter Revisited” collection in the 
California State University Long Beach’s Virtual Oral/Aural History Archive (VOAHA), 
Juanita’s interview was conducted across four sessions in July and August of 1980, in her home 
in Long Beach. According to the VOAHA online record, Juanita was 79 years old at the time of 
the recording, and she would go on to live another twenty years following the interview, dying in 
January of 2000 (Cleary). In the approximately seven hours of audio—recorded on magnetic 
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tape117 and later digitized for the online archive—Juanita speaks of her childhood in rural 
Indiana; her children and family life; her varied career in teaching, farming, real estate, 
healthcare, and wartime factory labor; and (at length) her tumultuous relationship with her 
husband, Roy. Throughout the interview, Juanita delivers long, richly detailed accounts of these 
events, often with little to no prompting and, in the process, frequently acts out both her own role 
and the roles of others involved in the dialogues that surrounded them. While Juanita’s VOAHA 
record notes that “[h]er propensity to deliver long monologues made it difficult, at times, for the 
interviewer to follow the details and provide direction” (Cleary), ironically, it was this same 
“propensity”—that so frustrated the information-gathering objectives of the oral history 
process—which ultimately made Juanita’s performance (and I will discuss it further as a 
performance in the following section) such a strong candidate for reactivation in the form of 
audio drama.  
Alongside Juanita, I cast the voice of my paternal step-grandfather, Josiah Burrell Patton 
(1919-2009), which I recorded in an oral history interview as part of a personal project in family 
history in 2006. Conducted in a two-and-a-half-hour session, the interview was recorded using 
amateur digital recording equipment (an iPod with a cheap dictation microphone) in the dining 
room of his home in Covington, Washington. Eighty-seven years old at the time of the interview, 
my grandfather discusses—with immense nostalgia—his childhood in Nevada, his time in an 
elite military academy in California, his extensive travels in the merchant marines, his career in 
computer services management, and his family life, including the premature deaths of his parents 
and his first wife, his difficult relationship with his step-mother, and his second marriage to my 
                                                
117 While the VOAHA record does not provide explicit technical information indicating the equipment 
used to record the interview, because of the interview date (1980) and notes indicating the “end of tape” 
in approximately 30-minute intervals in the interview annotations, I presume that the interview was 
recorded on audio cassettes. 
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grandmother, Olive. The emotional tone of his interview varies widely throughout, ranging from 
playfulness and humor to notable moments of confusion, frustration, and emotional vulnerability. 
Because of the familiarity of our relationship, throughout the interview, my grandfather interacts 
with me in a highly conversational manner and, at times, enlists my grandmother to verify or 
elaborate upon his memories. Combined with his generally lively and expressive self-
performance, these dialogic qualities offered rich opportunities for dramatic reanimation. At the 
same time, this familiarity presented an additional challenge, pushing me, in a sense, to remove 
my grandfather from his life story—a phenomenon to which I will return in more detail later on.  
Of course, I selected these two voices not only for their individual performative qualities, 
but also for their connective potential to interact in provocative and mutually inter-animating 
ways. Already quite familiar with my grandfather’s recording, as I listened to Juanita’s 
interview, I was struck both by the similarities in their performative personae and by the 
potential clashes of character that these similarities presented. Presenting themselves as proud, 
feisty, no-nonsense exteriors, both speakers also betrayed sensitive emotional underbellies, 
which could be easily hurt. Simply imagining these two voices as characters in a room together 
was a source of amusement (and mild concern), and when I went one step further to imagine 
them as husband and wife, I saw the seeds of a compelling dramatic conflict.  
Building on this initial idea, I constructed the final drama around a series of couples’ 
counseling sessions, in which “Jake” (performed by Josiah’s voice recording from 2006) and 
“Helen”118 (performed by Juanita’s voice recording from 1980) seek help from their therapist 
(whose voice I performed in the present) with their marital problems. My decision to pursue this 
concept was based on a number of factors, which would allow me to address both the 
                                                
118 The characters’ names were drawn from names spoken by Josiah and Juanita in each of their 
interviews, which were repurposed as modes of address in the audio drama. 
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potentialities and the challenges of the materials at hand. At the most basic level, the therapeutic 
setting presented ample opportunity for the conflict of character, which had initially drawn me to 
the two voices to be played out in a concrete and imaginable context. Furthermore, the 
idiosyncrasies of the therapeutic genre—which encourages parallel accounts of past experience 
to a specified third party, while also allowing for moments of responsive (and conflictual) 
interaction between two closely related individuals—helped me to address some of the practical 
problems of adapting the past-tense, one-sided, self-centered speech of the oral history interview 
to the requirements of a present-tense dramatic utterance. Finally, at a conceptual level, I was 
intrigued by the possibility to build on the miscommunication that necessarily characterizes the 
marital therapy process, such that the drama would feature a performance of two voices talking 
to, but more often than not past each other, while at the same time being about this very inability 
to connect and be understood. This thematic focus went great lengths toward helping to account 
for the fact that Jake and Helen frequently appear not to be listening to one another—since, in 
actual fact, they are not—and toward mitigating the inherent limitations in constructing a natural 
conversation out of fragments of two unrelated utterances.   
At the level of narrative content, the life experiences recounted in these two interview 
recordings had few obvious points of overlap. Rather than take this as a drawback, however, I 
took it as a challenge and a source of invention, ensuring that I would be forced to listen beyond 
the stories-already-told in these voice recordings, as they corresponded with the subjectively 
narrated pasts of each of the speakers, to reimagine the recordings instead as materials for new 
stories-in-the-making. At times, to accomplish this, I took up an actual experience recounted by 
one of the narrators—for example, Juanita’s suspicions about her husband’s infidelity—and then 
manipulated unrelated segments of the other narrator’s voice to create an imaginable response to 
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this scenario. In other cases I took advantage of the potential for multiplicity and rupture that the 
language itself presented and repurposed words and phrases for radically different contexts and 
meanings. For example, drawing on a linguistic pattern, in which both narrators repeatedly used 
the word “see”/“sea”—figuratively, for Juanita, as an expression of her inability to understand 
something (e.g. “I just can’t see it”) and literally, for Josiah, in an account of his time in the 
merchant marines (e.g. “That’s when I went back to sea”)—I used this language to construct a 
subplot about the couple’s account of dealing with Helen’s experience of “going blind” (another 
phrase that happens to appear in Juanita’s interview, though not in reference to her own 
experience).  
While audio drama, as a form, is largely grounded in dialogue, it is important that the 
dialogue also evoke a visual scene in the imagination of the listener. As Tim Crook notes, audio 
drama “is auditory in the physical dimension but equally powerful as a visual force in the 
psychological dimension” (8). That is to say, the lack of visual stimulation inherent to the 
medium encourages an “imaginative spectacle” in which listeners visualize their own “individual 
filmic narrative and experience” based on the auditory cues at hand (66). Keeping this in mind as 
I constructed the drama, wherever possible, I made efforts to evoke the particularities of the 
setting and the actions and movements of the characters. To this end, alongside of the three 
characters’ voices, I made use of additional atmospheric sounds and effects—using, for example, 
footsteps, a slamming door, and the simple sound of a ticking clock (the ever-present clock in the 
therapist’s office ticking away the 45-minute session) in order to tie the voices together into a 
shared space. In addition, I made efforts to construct lines of dialogue that would refer not only 
to a time and place outside of the immediate scene (for example, through Jake and Helen’s 
accounts of the history of their relationship), but also to the present scene of three bodies 
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interacting in the space of the therapist’s office. For example, extending the subplot of Helen’s 
blindness, I constructed a moment of dramatic action in which Jake taunts his wife with the 
sound of an object he knows she cannot see and then—drawing from Josiah’s discussion of a 
house he once lived in that “looked right out over the [Puget] Sound”—says to the therapist, 
“Look at that, huh? / She / looked right out over the sound.”119  
The final audio drama is structured around a series of weekly therapy sessions, opening 
with the couple’s entrance to the therapist’s office on their initial visit (wherein they arrive late 
and bicker over whose fault it was that they did so) and ending with the conclusion of their final 
session (wherein they decide, after considerable disagreement, to dissolve the marriage). Over 
the course of the drama, the audience is invited to experience the evolution—and eventual 
devolution—of the Jake and Helen’s relationship over a period of weeks, as they struggle to sort 
through challenges ranging from petty disagreements to traumatic life events, including Jake’s 
infidelity and Helen’s degenerative blindness. Each of the scenes provides a brief fragment 
(between one and eight minutes) of a given therapy session, which offers the audience a window 
into the conflict and context, but also invites them to participate in the narrative by filling in the 
gaps with their own inferences and imaginations.120 
The decision to construct the drama as a series of fragments over this extended timeframe 
                                                
119 I am using “/” here to indicate the seams in the original audio recording, where I stitched together 
three different audio clips (with consistent intonations) to create this single line of dialogue. 
120 In the initial iteration of this project, I designed Our Time is Up as a traditional audio drama, which 
would encourage a private listening experience of a linear narrative from start to finish, via mp3 
download or streaming audio. However, I would also like to consider alternative formats for presenting 
the piece—most notably, as an audio installation piece, which would invite the audience to enter into an 
empty therapist’s office (with a minimal setting including a couch and a chair facing one another across a 
coffee table with a clock on the wall) and inhabit the aural perspective of the characters, with each voice 
isolated on a separate audio channel and emitted from a directional speaker located in his or her seat. 
While such a format would render the narrative arc less central to the piece, I am ultimately interested in 
its potential to highlight the conceptual dimension of the project, playing with the associations of absence 
that the figure of the “voices of the dead” evokes. 
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was ultimately a practical necessity, given the constraints of the source materials at hand.121 In 
many ways, this structure enabled me to develop a fuller more satisfying narrative arc with 
unexpected twists and divergences. However, it also had the unfortunate consequence of 
removing the audience from the immersive experience of the drama as it plays out in real time. 
In order to combat this potentially disengaging effect, I decided to add an additional layer of 
immediacy to the drama by presenting the session fragments as a continuous tape recording 
being played back in real-time by an anonymous listener—presumably, but not necessarily122 the 
therapist herself. Thus, before the opening of the first session, we hear a cassette tape being 
removed from its case, placed in a tape recorder, and played. Then, each of the session fragments 
is introduced by the therapist’s voice (e.g. “March 26th, Jake and Helen McCleary”) in order to 
signal the transition from week to week and scene to scene, with the addition of a tape hum and 
the ticking clock serving to further distinguish between past and present, immediate and 
mediated action. Partway through the drama, we listen as the tape suddenly stops and the listener 
turns it over and presses play to begin again. At the end of the final session, we hear Jake speak 
the words, “Well, then, I guess our time is—,” before the tape stops and rewinds to the 
beginning. This line is an explicit reference to the title of the drama, Our Time is Up. It suggests, 
most obviously, the stereotypical words of a therapist signaling the end of a session, but also 
potentially the end of the marriage and the end of life, tying together the narrative and conceptual 
elements of the project. Then, in the last—and shortest—scene, we hear the as-of-yet unheard 
                                                
121 I had initially considered building the drama around a single therapy session, which would provide a 
snapshot of the couple’s relationship at a pivotal moment in time, while holding the audience in the real-
time drama. Ultimately, however, I found it prohibitively difficult to make convincing shifts in the tone 
and direction of the conversation and to stitch together the disparate elements of the story into a single, 
fluid scene within this condensed timeframe.  
122 This ambiguity is deliberate. Is it the therapist? Is it Helen? Or Jake? Is it an unintended listener who 
happened upon the discarded tape? Or is it the actual listener herself, in an act of discomfiting complicity?   
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beginning of the tape, in which the therapists asks Jake and Helen to state their name for the tape 
and requests permission to record their sessions. Again, building on the project’s conceptual 
framework, this explicit return to the beginning offers commentary on sound reproduction’s 
capacity to allow us to rewind, to replay, and also, implicitly, to rewrite lived experience—and in 
ways that complicate our notions of “liveness” and “the lived” in every sense of the term. It is 
precisely this conceptual framework to which I will now turn in the discussion that follows.  
5.1 CONVERSATION 
Our Time is Up emerged as a compositional intervention into prevailing cultural attitudes toward 
archival voice recordings and, more specifically, toward the voices of the dead. Expanding upon 
my exploration of vocal performativity and manipulation in the Coerced Confessions videos, this 
project seeks to shift the attention away from the realm of live dramaturgical performance—
“live” in every sense of the term—and toward the classically preservational and representational 
sphere of the posthumous vocal archive. Whereas, in the Confessions videos, I started with the 
materials of an apparently fictional dramatic performance and reconfigured them as a 
performative reenactment of an actual historical event, in this experiment I seek to do precisely 
the opposite: to begin with the purportedly “nonfictional” voices of oral history recordings and to 
reimagine them as actors in a collaborative, fictional performance. And whereas, previously, my 
editing process sought to draw attention to itself as edited, manipulated, and thus “coerced,” in 
the present project, I seek to edit the vocal materials in such a way as to create an illusion of 
seamless, simultaneous, “live” performance. At its core, through this compositional experiment, I 
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am interested in exploring material applications of “polyphonic” poetics123 and the collaborative 
possibilities for composing with the dead. 
While this project might well have been carried out with any variety of archival 
recordings, my particular interest in vocal archives of deceased people stems, most immediately, 
from the work of Jonathan Sterne, which I introduced in Chapter Three. Notably, in tracing the 
history of sound reproduction, Sterne finds a compelling convergence between an emergent 
Victorian culture of “embalming” and an attendant cultural fascination with “the voices of the 
dead” (294)—a phenomenon made imaginable, and purportedly preservable, by the invention of 
the phonograph. It was in this context that the voice recording first emerged as the quintessential 
subject of sound reproduction, celebrated not for its own sake as a living intensity in the present, 
but rather for the future it promised as a protection against “the seemingly inevitable decay” of 
human embodiment (311). While this promise would ultimately remain unfulfilled, as the 
phonographic voice failed to overcome the ephemerality of its medium (287), the preservational 
dream of early sound reproduction and its consequent “trope of the voices of the dead” (293) 
have had a lasting—and, as I will argue, limiting—effect on the dominant cultural imagination of 
the vocal archive. While it may be true that, in the twenty-first century, “[we] now dwell without 
comment among these voices of the dead” (Sterne 289), it is also true that we continue to afford 
such voices a special status in the hierarchy of our vocal archives, as objects of posterity 
deserving our stewardship and protection.  
This is the case perhaps nowhere as much as the field of oral history, which emerges, in 
the context of the present project, as an ideal site within which to examine and ultimately 
intervene in the established ethics of the vocal archive. As both “a field of study” and “a method 
                                                
123 Here, I am implicitly referring to Mikhail Bakhtin’s reflections on the “polyphony” intrinsic to Fyodor 
Dostoevsky’s novels—a topic to which I will return in what follows.   
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of gathering, preserving, and interpreting the voices and memories of people, communities, and 
participants in past events” (“Oral History: Defined”), oral history is unique to the extent that it 
holds deep-seated investments in both metaphorical and material voice alike. On one hand, in 
keeping with what Rebecca Sharpless refers to as the “democratic impulses” of the larger social 
history movement (14), ideals of “giving voice to the voiceless” and “enabling silenced voices to 
speak for themselves” have emerged as widespread rhetorical commonplaces across the field, 
particularly in the stories that oral history tells about itself.124 On the other hand, since it first 
emerged as an established research practice in postwar America, oral history has exploded into 
an international movement profoundly concerned with its role as the guardian of the material 
“voice of the people” in the form of archives and repositories of oral interview recordings. 
Of course, it is important to recall here that, as Sterne argues, neither “[t]he very idea of 
making recordings for listeners in a distant and unknown future” (310), nor “[t]he desire to hear 
these voices” in the first place were ever “a given.” Instead, they “had to be learned” (294). And, 
indeed, the field of oral history is by no means an exception to this rule. While audio recording 
has long been “a standard part of the definition of oral history in the U.S.” (Sharpless 15),125 it is 
important to acknowledge that, for much of the history of oral history, it was the alphabetic 
transcription and not the audio recording itself, which was seen as the primary text produced by 
the interview process. In fact, in the earliest stages of the field’s evolution, some prominent oral 
history programs (for example, the Truman Library and Columbia University) “did not believe in 
                                                
124 Mobilizations of the ‘voice’ metaphor in oral history began as early as 1978, with the release of Paul 
Thompson’s seminal book The Voice of the Past: Oral History. Today, a keyword search for the term 
‘voice’ in the Oral History Review will turn up more than 500 records. 
125 Rebecca Sharpless has noted the extent to which oral history, as a distinct research practice, arose 
alongside and in response to the development of magnetic tape recording in the late 1940s (12), 
“expand[ing] dramatically” in the 1960s with the availability of portable cassette recorders (14). In this 
sense, the history of oral history is intertwined with the history of sound reproduction technologies. 
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saving the tapes” from recorded interviews and would simply discard them after the transcription 
was produced (Sharpless 15). And it is only recently, as digital technologies and online 
repositories have provided improved access to audio archives, that the field has seen widespread 
interest in the material artifact of the voice recording itself.  
This technological shift toward digital recording and networked distribution has been 
lauded as a “revolution” in the field (Frisch), serving to overcome the “inevitably flatten[ing]” 
effects of transcription and “help[ing] us get closer to the real human interaction at the heart of 
oral history” (Eynon 22). As a “corrective” to the field’s tendency toward abstract, disembodied, 
or literary analysis, these newly accessible elements of vocal performance—“the silences” as 
much as the “intonation, pitch, and style of delivery”—have been taken up by oral historians as 
“an opportunity for more complex exploration of how people construct their narratives,” with the 
potential to “add an entirely new dimension to the sense we make of people’s stories” (Gluck 8). 
While a distinct orientation toward performance126 is central to this discussion, such that it is not 
simply what the narrator says, but also how she says it that matters (Williams 47), with few 
exceptions,127 oral historians have tended to mobilize vocal performativity not for its own sake, 
but rather as a practical tool for uncovering the hidden meanings of oral utterances.  
This fact should perhaps not come as a surprise, considering the extent to which oral 
                                                
126 In a 2001 article on the topic, Rhonda Y. Williams sets forth an alternative notion of big-V “Voice” as 
a framework for examining the “articulation” and “performance” of oral life narratives (44). While I have 
yet to see anyone pick up on this term, it is interesting to consider how the popularity of the ‘voice’ 
metaphor in the field may have necessitated a special designation for references to the material, sonic 
elements of vocal performance. 
127 Notably, in his Roundtable comments at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the Oral History Association, 
Bret Eynon points to the potential for the experience of listening—as opposed to reading—oral history to 
“[connect] us to the speaker both affectively and cognitively, facilitating empathy and deepening our 
understanding” (22). This attention to affect has begun to surface in the dominant disciplinary discourse 
only recently, for example, with the publication of Siobhan McHugh’s 2012 article, “The Affective Power 
of Sound: Oral History on Radio,” in the Oral History Review. 
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history, as a research methodology, is embedded in the interpretive enterprise of historical study 
more broadly. And, indeed, it is in this context that the question of representational ethics—the 
question of how to accurately and ethically represent the voices128 of others—has emerged as 
one of the most pressing methodological quandaries facing oral history. Responding to this 
dilemma, over the past two decades, critical and feminist129 oral historians have worked to call 
attention to questions of power, agency, and authority in the research/narrator relationship and to 
propose more mindful and equitable approaches to collecting, transcribing, editing, and 
interpreting oral narratives. These methodological interventions—ranging from simple acts of 
transparency to full-scale “collaborations” that engage narrators (often marginalized groups) at 
every stage of the process130—were formative influences on my own introduction to the field, as 
a Masters student working on participatory and community-based oral history methods,131 and 
they would go on to inform my thinking in “The Olive Project: An Oral History Composition in 
Multiple Modes” (Anderson), which (as I discussed in Chapter One132) I now recognize as my 
first attempt to confront the ethical dilemma of composing texts in the recorded voices of others.  
But the question arises: is there anything inherent to the materials of oral history that 
requires this orientation? What would it meant to take up those materials as materials, 
                                                
128 It seems reasonable to suggest that “voice” here refers less to the sounding, mediated materials of 
vocal recordings than it does to familiar metaphorical notions of speech, experience, and agency. 
129 See Women’s Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History, edited by Sherna Berger Gluck and 
Daphne Patai for a prominent example of this scholarship. 
130 See Alicia J. Rouverol’s “Collaborative Oral History in a Correctional Setting: Promises and Pitfalls” 
and Daniel Kerr’s “‘We Know What the Problem is’: Using Oral History to Develop a Collaborative 
Analysis of Homelessness from the Bottom Up” for two prominent examples of the latter approach. 
131 My Masters thesis, “‘Change Starts Here’: Participatory Oral History for Community Development,” 
discussed my work as the founder and facilitator of a community-based initiative, which engaged a group 
of low-income youth and adults in designing and producing an oral history project in their neighborhood 
and theorized the role of oral storytelling as a tool for community engagement and social action. 
132 See Chapter One for a detailed discussion of “The Olive Project” and the representational ethics that 
drove my conceptual and compositional practice. 
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independently of the disciplinary conventions that surround their creation? And, most 
importantly, what could we make if we did? Following my work on “The Olive Project,” I began 
to struggle with these questions through further compositional experiments with archival voice—
most notably, in a project called Converse: Conversations Between My Grandparents. Following 
my grandparents’ deaths in 2009 and 2010, I found myself increasingly drawn to the sounds of 
their recorded voices and to the intensity of the feelings they evoked in me as I listened to them. I 
began to wonder what it would be like not only to hear these voices speak, but to hear them 
speak to one another beyond the lives of the bodies from which they were uttered. Following this 
impulse, I revisited my grandmother’s oral history and brought it together with a parallel 
interview I had conducted with my grandfather three years earlier, setting out to create a series of 
imagined “conversations” between their recorded voices. As an experiment in compositional 
method, these conversations were composed entirely of words actually spoken by my 
grandparents—and, crucially, words spoken in their own voices. However, for the purposes of 
this project, I set out to extract those words and voices from the original context of their 
articulation and to remix them into something new. Drawing on the innate performativity of 
digital voice, what I sought to create was a series of impossible conversations—conversations 
that never really happened, but that I would invite my audience to experience as if they had.  
When I first took up my grandparents’ voices in the Converse project, like a good oral 
historian, my initial impulse was to trace their narrative connections to construct a collective 
story of the past. In the first “conversation” I composed, titled “Her Husband’s Wife’s Pancreas,” 
my grandparents’ recorded voices work together to tell a story of their fifty-year relationship—as 
neighbors, as friends, and as husband and wife. After a brief textual introduction, which situates 
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the conversation in context,133 the story unfolds as a layered dialogue between my grandparents’ 
recorded voices, which provide distinct and sometimes-competing accounts of shared life events. 
While the content of the piece is grounded in my grandparents’ actual lived experience, and 
while none of the core facts involved have been deliberately altered, in piecing this conversation 
together, I took liberties with the way that the voice recordings responded to and bounced off of 
one another, taking fragments of speech out of context and rearranging them into new 
combinations to create an illusion of dialogue between the two voices.134 In other words, while 
the particular exchanges that unfolded in this piece never took place in a “real life” conversation 
between my grandparents, they felt to me—both in tone and attitude toward the subject matter—
as if they could have. In this sense, what I sought to create in this project was not only an 
effective narrative, but also an affective performance, which could be felt and experienced as 
much as it was understood.  
Of course, I’m not the first to propose an alternative future for the materials of oral 
history—a future that stretches beyond the traditional conventions of scholarly inquiry toward 
something that may sound more like “art” than “history.” In her introduction to Remembering: 
Oral History Performance, Della Pollack outlines an emerging trend toward mobilizing oral 
history—which is already, as Pollack argues, “itself a performance” (3)—as a material for 
creating new performances through “the staged re-iteration of stories” in live theatrical contexts 
                                                
133 This text reads as follows: “In 1953 Jay [Josiah] and Olive moved to Maplewood drive, three days and 
two houses between them. / They were neighbors. Jay’s wife, Helen, was Olive’s friend. / Helen died in 
1957. Cancer of the pancreas. / In 1960, Jay and Olive moved to Boulevard Park, four kids and a dog 
between them. / They were married. Jay’s wife, Olive, was my grandmother. / Olive died in 2010. Cancer 
of the pancreas.” 
134 For example, in describing his relationship with his first wife, my grandfather explains, “It wasn’t a 
happy marriage. Because of her health, she drank a lot.” And, in the conversation as I have composed it, 
my grandmother’s voice responds by saying, “Yeah, yeah, yeah!” (My grandfather: “What?”) “Actually. 
Every day. Every day without fail, Helen would come up and we’d sit and have coffee.” 
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(1). Framing such work as a “unique integration of theory and practice, research and poetics” (2), 
Pollack suggests that oral history-based performance is not simply an aesthetic practice but also 
an ethical one, with possibilities ranging from a simple “expression of devoted reception” to a 
deeply consequential “way of practicing the interdependence of human selves and of seeing 
through the past into an as-yet unspoken (much less written) future” (4). Crucially, then, rather 
than locating the value of oral history in its representation of past lives and events, Pollack 
suggests that oral history-based performance opens up opportunities for enacting and 
experiencing possible ethical futures (7). 
In a prominent example of oral history performance, at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the 
Oral History Association, I attended a live theatrical production of May 4th Voices, in which a 
cast of current Kent State students (and others) re-perform the words and stories from oral 
history interviews with anonymous students, guardsman, and community members involved in 
and affected by the 1970 Kent State shooting. Not unlike my work in the Converse project, this 
piece is constructed around interconnected fragments from individual narratives, which are 
woven together into a kind of “conversation” between discrete monologues to create a collective 
narrative performance of a shared event. However, unlike my project, May 4th Voices—like most 
documented examples of oral history-based performance—mobilizes “voices” only 
metaphorically, not audibly, taking up the alphabetic transcripts from the May 4th Oral History 
Project as its primary compositional material. In this sense, we might say that the fundamental 
“performativity” upon which most oral history-based performance is based is largely linguistic 
and narrative, taking up the voice as a powerful instrument for re-performing stories, but not as a 
performative material in itself. 
In a counterexample to this trend, Australian oral historian Siobhan McHugh draws 
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attention to “The Affective Power of Sound” in oral history recordings, arguing for the value of 
radio as an alternative platform for producing and disseminating oral history. Here, McHugh 
describes her work in Marrying Out, a 2009 “oral history-based radio series” on themes of 
mixed-religion marriage and sectarian conflict in Australia. While the series appears, in many 
ways, to be a fairly traditional example of the audio documentary genre, the compositional 
process that McHugh describes is notable in that it accounts for not simply the stories and 
memories recounted by the voices of oral history, but also the emotions and effects that they 
produce in their listeners. Reflecting a keen appreciation of performance, McHugh emphasizes 
the importance of selecting recordings not only on the basis of the content of the narrators’ 
speech, but also the affective quality of their voices (198), and describes her decision to integrate 
dramatic reenactments and short performed scenes into the narrative (204). However, while 
McHugh certainly makes great strides toward opening the field to the performative effect/affect 
of archival voice—even going so far as to acknowledge that “the infinite modulations of the 
voice and the expressiveness of the spoken word may also elicit an emotional response distinct 
from the meaning of the words themselves” (192)—she ultimately remains committed to 
traditional documentary values tied to “accurate representation of the topic” (198) at hand. 
Similarly, in his article, “Painting in Sound: Aural History and Audio Art,” American 
historian Charles Hardy III recounts his practice crafting oral history-based radio programs in 
Philadelphia in the early 1980s. Unlike McHugh, however, Hardy recalls finding himself 
“increasingly imprisoned by the standard radio documentary formula that alternated continuity 
(narration) and actuality (recorded events), transitioned by music and sound effects” (151). 
Delighted by the sounds of people’s recorded voices and seeking an alternative to the traditional 
documentary form, Hardy describes his experience applying artistic practices of “paint[ing]” or 
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“sculpt[ing]” (153) to the materials of oral history. Framing his project as a response to 
conventional documentary values, which take up oral history interviews only “for the 
information contained within them,” Hardy calls for a reorientation toward the “physical 
properties—both psycho-acoustic and electroacoustic” and the “aesthetic qualities” of archival 
voices (159). In making this move, Hardy is working to shift the conversation in oral history 
away from an exclusive focus on meaning and toward emerging questions of materiality—a shift 
reinforced by his use of the term “aural history” in place of the more traditional “oral.” And 
while his approach to voice is often more celebratory than overtly critical, Hardy productively 
positions the voice itself—as opposed to the stories it speaks—as “living history, a historical 
artifact, a vessel of culture” with value in its own right (151).135  
At the same time, rather than take this status as requirement that we close off archival 
voices to creative intervention, Hardy does precisely the opposite, encouraging readers to listen 
to oral history “with an ear toward what you might create as the universe speaks to you in 
response to your own purposes” (155). Describing his own experience producing oral history-
based audio art, Hardy uses as an example his 1986 archival audio project, “Mordecai Mordant’s 
Celebrated Audio Ephemera.” In this series, Hardy worked under the auspices of his “alter ego” 
(Mordant) to draw together “fragments of voices and instruments and sounds fossilized on 
ceramic discs in the early 1900s” and, using “analog open reel electrical-acoustic technologies” 
(155), interweaves them into a series of five-minute audio montages or “past pastiches” (153). 
For example, Hardy describes how, in one of the pieces, titled “It’s Just Like Anything Else”: 
I combined a septagenarian’s recollection his own rite of passage when he had crossed 
the threshold from childhood to maturity by leaving his house – by the back door – for 
                                                
135 Hardy even goes so far as to pose the question: “What might it sound like if the aural historian […] 
treated sound artifacts as ends in themselves?” (153). 
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the first time in a pair of long pants with an octogenarian’s still empowering account of 
having the local barber cut off her long, beautiful hair in the early 1920s against the 
wishes of her father, and three octogenarians laughing recollections of their first rule-
bending applications of lipstick and rouge. 
Layered with atmospheric recordings and music from the period (for example, a clip from the 
1920s jazz classic “Masculine Women! Feminine Men!”), these archival voices work together 
with the intention to, in Hardy’s words, “reanimate the lost worlds” contained within them (153).  
As Hardy recounts it, the biggest obstacle to his practice in the “Mordecai Mordant” 
series was poor sound quality, wherein “the limited dynamic range and noise of archival 
recordings restricted our ability to layer sounds” (157). While the most obvious and immediate 
solution to this challenge was to separate out the recordings into two stereo channels, so that the 
listener might more easily distinguish them,136 with a subsequent project, titled “This Car to the 
Ballpark” (1986), Hardy pushed the boundaries further to create an 18-minute “quadraphonic 
audio arcade” (157). This installation-based audio montage brings together four distinct voices 
produced by four very different individuals137—people who had never met and would likely 
never have an occasion to meet outside of the world Hardy and his collaborator have created for 
them. Layered together with “archival recordings, contemporary music, and sound manipulations 
created on a digital sampler” (157), each of these four voices sounds from a designated speaker 
                                                
136 Taking a cue from Hardy’s experience in my own work on Our Time is Up, I opted to separate Jake 
and Helen’s voices—which are less-than-broadcast-quality, to say the least—onto two discrete stereo 
channels, with the therapist’s voice evenly balanced between the two. 
137 According to Hardy, these voices included: “100-year-old William Robinson’s account of how a white 
landlord threatened to put him on a chain gang for stealing three peaches in the 1880s, ninety-five-year-
old Louise Smith’s account of resisting peer pressure to become a prostitute and her own desire to kill her 
philandering husband in the 1920s; seventy-eight-year-old George Baker’s reminiscence of fire engine 
horses in the 1910s, and eighty-year-old Virginia Bartow’s recollections of the tragic life of her Princeton 
educated husband (class of 1922), who ‘never learned to dance’” (157). 
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located in each corner of the room, recounting memories of poignant yet apparently unrelated 
life events. At the core of this montage is a 1930s “novelty recording” of a street car conductor 
announcing stops en route to “the ballpark” (158), which serves as the glue that holds these 
disparate voices and stories together, such that, as Hardy explains it, “the featured pivotal 
memories of each person’s life become stops on an imaginary trolley ride” (158).  
What is most interesting about Hardy’s work in these projects, for our purposes, is the 
extent to which it privileges the affective immediacy of the listener’s experience in the present 
over the accurate representation of the speaker’s experience of the past. Like my work in the 
Converse project, there appears to be no deliberate departure from or subversion of the core 
context of the speakers’ experiences. However, there is also no explicit effort to foreground 
context as a primary concern. For the most part—and, in this case, in contrast to my work in 
Converse—the identities of the speakers who produced the voices featured in these works are 
never made explicit, and neither are their narratives situated with any contextual framing or 
scripted narration. Ultimately, the only context we receive is that which emerges out of the 
juxtaposition of the voices themselves—in conversation with one another and against additional 
layers of music and archival sounds. In this sense, we might say that the time and place and 
personhood behind each audio piece is never precisely spoken or situated, but rather conjured or 
reinvented as an experience in the present.  
In many ways, Hardy’s work opens up important conversations about method—about 
how the materials of oral interviews might be mobilized as materials for creative practice. 
Bringing to mind frameworks like Bruno Latour’s “compositionism” (“An Attempt” 473) and 
Brian Massumi’s call for “affirmative methods” (12), Hardy’s work maintains a radical openness 
to “techniques which embrace their own inventiveness and are not afraid to own up to the fact 
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that they add (if so meagerly) to reality” (Massumi 12-13). Beyond traditional documentary 
methods of “identify[ing] intersections between multiple oral history interviews” (McHugh 198), 
then, perhaps we might say that Hardy is practicing a more emergent, generative practice, based 
not simply on identifying preexisting connections in the materials at hand, but rather on creating 
new connections-in-the-making.138 Ultimately, for Hardy, audio art presents itself to aural 
historians as “a realm of open exploration,” within which we might use archival voices not 
simply to analyze, interpret or represent, but rather to “compose, sculpt, fabricate, [and] reveal” 
(161).139  
While Hardy does not explicitly acknowledge it, the notion of “fabrication” here is a 
provocative one, connoting a generic practice of making or assembling at the same time as it 
points toward more controversial and value-laden acts of deception and forgery. Indeed, while 
Hardy remains fairly faithful to the basic facts and speakerly intentions behind the stories he 
presents, the experimental techniques of performance and pastiche that he mobilizes also blur the 
boundaries of traditional nonfiction narrative. For example, in the “Mordecai Mordant” series, 
every episode begins with a theatrical introduction by “Mr. Mordant” himself—as performed by 
Hardy, complete with the heavily affected diction and faux-European accent used by radio 
announcers in the early twentieth century. And, similarly, while Hardy’s own voice never 
appears in “This Car to the Ballpark,” the novelty recording of the trolley conductor ultimately 
serves similar ends, mobilizing a fictional character to create an imagined stage on which the 
real-life drama of his narrators’ stories might play out. In this sense, Hardy’s practice stands in 
                                                
138 Following Massumi, we might say that Hardy’s interest in the materials of oral history here lies not in 
determining their place within an established “network of systemic connections,” but rather in harnessing 
their potentially infinite “connectibility” with other resonant materials (20). 
139 Indeed, Hardy even goes so far as to invite his readers to add to this list by “insert[ing] the verb or 
verbs of your choice” (161), suggesting a radical openness to ongoing invention and discovery.   
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contrast to traditional scholarly conventions of “accurate representation” (McHugh 198), 
working toward alternative objectives of “reanimat[ion]” (153) and world-building.   
That being said, while there is no doubt that Hardy’s material orientation toward the 
voices of oral history foregrounds an alternative set of priorities—based not only on meaning and 
knowing but also on feeling and experiencing—it is also true that the way he actually uses 
archival voices in his audio montages does not stand in overt conflict with their traditionally 
authorized uses under our prevailing frameworks of representational ethics. Far from embracing 
the recorded voice at the limits of its material manipulability, Hardy employs considerably more 
subtle methods—excerpting, layering, and combining voices in such a way that the stories and 
memories they recount remain more or less intact. While he readily presents voices 
independently of the original context of their articulation, he does so not in order to radically 
reorient them outward toward new contexts and constellations, but rather to focus the listener’s 
attention inward on the essential “deep truths and beauties” at their core (151). In this sense, 
while Hardy certainly recognizes and draws upon the material performativity of recorded voices 
themselves, imagined as “sonic artifacts” (153) and “acoustical vibrations” (155), in the end, he 
is arguably more concerned with the original, human performance of the speaker-as-storyteller—
after all, “[o]ral history interviews, as we all know, are performative” (151)—and works hard to 
remain faithful to the intentions behind it.  
Though Hardy never references him as a direct influence on his work, outside the 
disciplinary boundaries of oral history, we find in the work of Canadian pianist and composer 
Glenn Gould a strikingly similar dedication to this immersive, performative aesthetic in 
nonfiction storytelling, which is worthy of mention. Produced for CBC radio over a ten-year 
period between 1967 and 1977, Gould’s The Solitude Trilogy is comprised of three hour-long 
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experimental radio documentaries, in which Gould applies “musically derived” (Gould 193) 
techniques and arrangements to the traditionally non-musical sounds of recorded speech. In “The 
Idea of North,” the first and most famous of the three, Gould assembles five distinct voices from 
five separate audio interviews—each reflecting on his/her lived experience of the Canadian 
North—and weaves them together into an intricate audio collage. Evoking the aesthetic of 
theater and symphony at once, like Hardy’s oral history-based audio art, Gould’s “The Idea of 
North” appears to be equally concerned with the sounds of the voices as it is with the words that 
they speak. At times, the voices are edited and rearranged such that they appear to speak back to 
one another as if engaged in a mutual conversation or debate on a common theme. And, at times, 
they are overlapped such that they speak over top of one another in a cacophonous symphony of 
“contrapuntal” lines (393).140 And beneath all of these voice recordings is the “basso continuo” 
of a moving train (393). Much like Hardy’s trolley car in “Last Car to the Ballpark,” this so-
called “basso continuo” provides both “a foundation for the vocal textures we wanted to concoct 
above it” (Gould 393) and, in a sense, a kind of aural stage which draws together the disparate 
voices into a single, imaginable, immersive space of theatrical performance. However, while 
“The Idea of North” might in many ways “[think] of itself as a drama,” to the extent that it 
remains wedded to the practice of representational, nonfictional storytelling, it remains, in the 
end, “technically a documentary” (392). 
While this is certainly one way to approach oral interview-based audio art (and, might I 
add, with stunning results), it is also important that we acknowledge that this is not the only 
way—that, in fact, to open the voices of oral history to artistic intervention is to open the door to 
                                                
140 Gould came to call this technique “contrapuntal radio”—where “contrapuntal” typically applies to a 
work of music in which independent melody lines play simultaneously (393). 
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a much broader, more subversive set of practices that unsettle our established ethical conventions 
at their core. This is precisely the realization I came to in my work on the Converse project, as I 
set out to “fabricate” imagined conversations between my grandparents’ recorded voices. Like 
Gould and Hardy, I heard in these voices the resonant potential to “reanimate” stories and 
worlds—in my case, as illusions of spoken exchanges between two people who could no longer 
willingly converse. However, also like Gould and Hardy, I first heard in these voices only the 
potential to reanimate stories already told—stories that corresponded with the actual memories 
and experiences of my grandparents’ lives. But the more I worked with these materials as 
materials, the more I cut and pasted and layered and rearranged them into new configurations, 
the more I began to feel limited by my own attachment to this pre-given past, and the more I 
began to realize: that this was not the only way for my grandparents’ voices to converse; that, 
beyond their representational potential to recount experience already-lived, these voices also 
contained within them a visceral, recombinatorial potential to invent new, livable experience in 
the present and future—toward imaginative and even fictional ends.  
This conceptual shift from fabrication-as-assembly to fabrication-as-fiction was a pivotal 
one in my work with archival voices—a provocative possibility that would go on to shape my 
subsequent experiments in posthumous poetics and, in many ways, my larger inquiry into the 
material ethics of digital voice more generally. Notably, however, it was a possibility that has 
been left unrealized in my work with my grandparents’ voices in the Converse project. While I 
had originally imagined the project as a much larger series (and while I may very well return to it 
at some point in the future), following the completion of “Her Husband’s Wife’s Pancreas,” I 
went on to produce only one more conversation—based around two parallel but radically 
divergent stories of schoolyard altercations that left each of my grandparents with a black eye—
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and then promptly lost momentum. While I got immense pleasure from this close work with my 
grandparents’ voices, and while I did allow myself a certain degree of creative liberty in 
remixing them, ultimately, I found that I was simply too close to the people and lives and stories 
behind the voices to listen for the fullest potential of the voices themselves, as compositional 
materials. And I made the decision to set the project aside and move on to explore new 
archives—and new ethics for composing with them. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, in my survey of the methodological literature in oral history, I 
did not encounter any precedents for work that explicitly uses voice recordings as materials for 
fictional storytelling. And for his part, while Hardy makes great strides toward encouraging oral 
(“aural”) historians to use their interview recordings to “compose, sculpt, fabricate, reveal” and, 
ultimately, “to make sense of the human condition through recorded sounds” (161), he never 
explicitly addresses the ethical concerns surrounding these very practices. On one hand, this 
omission is incredibly refreshing, following decades of rigid proscriptions and admonitions in 
the field’s methodological literature, which have too often left storytellers little room to move. In 
a sense, we might say that Hardy’s major contribution lies in his ability to look beyond these 
knee-jerk reactions against intervention and propose another way forward. On the other hand, 
however, one has to wonder: What is at stake in this opening? How do the artistic techniques and 
values that Hardy proposes either reflect or deflect our present ethical frameworks? What 
responsibility do we have, as audio artists, to the materials of our practice?  
Traditionally, our ethical relationship to archival voices—both in the field of oral history 
and in our broader culture of memory—has been one of benevolent stewardship, with the archive 
serving as a “cemetery” for the so-called “speaking dead” (Sterne 327). As Sterne argues, this 
preservational impulse might be understood as a fight against time, driven by the tripartite sense 
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that: “we must preserve the voices of dying cultures so that we have them (linear-historical 
time); we must then preserve the recordings themselves so that we can keep them (geologic 
time), so that we may then break them down and study them at our leisure (fragmented time)” 
(330). Crucially, while we understand this preservational act as an “intrinsic good” (238) for the 
benefit of future generations, in fact, the only “future” that we allow archival voices themselves 
is one fundamentally oriented toward the past. Certainly, by imagining ourselves as the self-
appointed guardians of the voices of the dead, we ensure that these voices will in some sense 
“live on” and continue to “speak” beyond the lives of the bodies that produced them. At the same 
time, however, by approaching those voices as static memory objects and dead relics of the past, 
we erect substantial boundaries around their ability to do so.   
As Sterne has noted, since the earliest emergence of sound reproduction technologies, 
voice recordings—as present or future “voices of the dead”—have never been collected and 
preserved for their own sake, but rather so that they “may continue to perform a social function” 
(297). In the case of oral history, this social function has shifted over time, in line with the tides 
of history-at-large, from a function of historical “data,” or objective Truth, to one of memorial 
“text,” or subjective truth (Grele). In this context, we have seen increasing interest in the oral 
history narrative as a narrative—and, importantly, a narrative that is always co-constructed 
through the interaction between interviewer and narrator.141 Indeed, the term “narrator” itself has 
come to replace the more conventional “interviewee” as the preferred term as part of an explicit 
effort to afford due agency to the “voices” of oral history. Despite this shift, however, there is no 
question that the field tends to frame these voices largely in terms of their representational 
                                                
141 As oral historian Alessandro Portelli puts it, “There is no oral history before the encounter of two 
different subjects, one with a story to tell and the other with a history to reconstruct” (28). 
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value—or what they say as interpretive windows into the past (or at least a particular human 
being’s subjective experience of that past)—as opposed to their material value—or what they do 
as sonic events in the present and future. In this sense, we might say that the agency of these 
voices is seen to start and end with the interview itself, couched, as it is, in the conscious 
intentionality of live human speech. In other words, once a voice has been committed to tape (or 
the digital equivalent) and deposited in an archive, its job is complete. The voice becomes an 
object, not an agent—and, crucially, an object of our protection.  
Returning here to the work of Jason Stanyek and Benjamin Piekut—and to the 
idiosyncratic phenomenon of the posthumous duet—we find a provocative critique of this 
seemingly benevolent arrangement, in which “the living […] one-sidedly handle the dead” (14). 
As I discussed in Chapter Three, Stanyek and Piekut are notable in their efforts to push against 
the limited, human-centered notion of agency-as-intentionality in favor of Karen Barad’s 
alternative framework of agency-as-“effectivity” (18)—and, in doing so, to open up a space for 
the recorded voice to continue acting beyond the life of its speaker. Under this framework, the 
voices of the dead become not simply inert relics of the past, but rather vibrant material forces 
with the ability to create effects in the present and future—and, indeed, the ability to participate 
in relationships of “mutually effective co-laboring” with the living (14). In this sense, while it 
may be true that “the dead cannot respond, cannot change or adapt to their living counterparts” 
(18), this does not mean that they are simply passive objects at the mercy of the whims of the 
living. Instead, Stanyek and Piekut ask us to consider how these recorded voices—as complex 
“interanimations of voice, body, and identity” (17)—work to structure the possibilities and 
effects of our practice in substantive and lasting ways.  
In their case study of “Unforgettable,” a 1991 duet between Natalie Cole and Nat “King” 
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Cole, Stanyek and Piekut describe a complex set of “intra-action[s]” (34), through which Nat 
comes to assert an “effective presence” (17) in the duet despite the fact that it was produced 
almost 25 years after his death. Certainly, following Norie Neumark’s notion of the “authenticity 
effect,” we might take for granted that fact that Nat’s voice—as a vibrational performance of 
“intimacy and intensity” (95)—would continue to assert a large degree of influence over the 
ultimate effect/affect of the song as the audience experiences it. However, Stanyek and Piekut go 
further to suggest ways that his voice also served to shape the production of the song along the 
way, as a mutual co-participant in the contemporary composing process. They explain this 
function through the concept of “matching,” in which particular qualities of the original 
recording would help to determine the shape and arrangement of the later composition. For 
example, fluctuations in the tempo of Nat’s voice—which was recorded prior to the development 
of mechanized “click tracks” for keeping the beat—served to modulate the tempo of Natalie’s 
own vocal performance (29). However, just as she was forced to adapt her performance to that of 
her father, just as she might have in a “live” or antemortem duet, Stanyek and Piekut are careful 
to point out the ways in which his performance was also required to give way to the requirements 
and limitations of hers—for example, through the use of post-production “hard limiting” and 
dynamics processing to regulate variations in vocal amplitude (29). In this sense, rather than 
understanding matching as a process of “mere mimesis”—a rudimentary “fidelity to an inert 
aesthetic past”—Stanyek and Piekut propose it as “a method for reactivating the latent capital 
stored in recorded performances”—and, crucially, one which is always “shared” and “co-
performed” by past and present, living and dead (29).  
Furthermore, Stanyek and Piekut emphasize the extent to which this co-participation does 
not stop at the boundaries of the immediate human actors (in this case, Nat, Natalie, and the 
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accompanying musicians—many of whom had played with Nat during his lifetime) but rather 
extends to encompass the many nonhuman participants that also contribute to the effects of the 
final performance. And in this context, for these authors, “the role played by technology cannot 
be overstated” (33). Citing “[m]icrophones, cables, tape heads, headphones, and architectures” as 
some of the many technological players, Stanyek and Piekut describe how, in the production of 
“Unforgettable,” a major factor in the matching process came down to a question of microphone 
selection, wherein Natalie was provided with a vintage microphone of the same model her father 
had used in the original recording in 1961, in order to more closely match the distinctive “grain” 
or quality of his voice. In this sense, the form of “collaboration” that Stanyek and Piekut are 
asking us to imagine is one that takes up humanly-produced sounds as part of much larger 
material constellations of nonhuman bodies and technologies, which challenge the very 
categories of “living” and “dead” at their core.  
Certainly, in my work on Our Time is Up, I encountered many of these same 
requirements for “matching” and “co-labor” with the posthumous vocal recordings I was 
working with. Of course, as a dialogue-driven dramatic narrative, my work was not constrained 
by some of the more complex musical requirements of tempo and pitch, which were necessary in 
the Coles’ two-part harmony. However, because I sought to create an illusion of seamless 
dramatic co-presence, the overall consistency of the audio quality was a fundamental concern in 
my compositional process. In other words, because I wanted it to feel as if these three actors—
who were in fact speaking from three radically different times and places—were performing 
coterminously in a shared narrative space, I faced the challenge of conjuring and creating a 
shared acoustic space, which would provide a basis for this experience. While I was forced to 
consider how to match my own vocal performance to the posthumous performances, much as 
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Natalie Cole did in “Unforgettable,” because this was a composition for three voices instead of 
two, I was faced with the additional task of matching the two archival voice recordings with one 
another—and in some cases, as I will explain, with themselves. 
As a born-analog audio file dating back to 1980—when oral history approached audio 
interviews largely as a means to an end of alphabetic transcription—and digitized after years of 
deterioration, Juanita’s interview was by far the lower-fidelity of the two archival recordings, 
with a notably limited frequency range due to signal overload (otherwise known as “clipping”) 
and a fair amount of extraneous noise ranging from tape hiss to sporadic background sounds. 
Ultimately, because it is far easier to remove information from a digital audio file than it is to 
add information that simply is not there, of the three voice recordings, Juanita’s came to assert 
the most powerful influence over the overall audio quality of the final piece. While it may seem 
counterintuitive from the perspective of production value alone, in order to create a consistent 
acoustic texture across the three voices, I used digital audio software to deliberately reduce the 
quality and complexity of both my grandfather’s voice recording and my own vocal 
performance, both of which were recorded with amateur digital recording devices—for example, 
cutting out the higher and lower vocal frequencies and reducing the dynamic range to create a 
more classic analog aesthetic.  
At the same time, however, rather than aim to simply mimic the conditions of the lowest 
common denominator (and I mean that in strictly audio terms), I began by first cleaning up 
Juanita’s recording to the greatest extent possible, using dynamics processing, frequency 
equalization, and noise removal techniques to enhance the quality and clarity of her voice in 
relation to extraneous noise. In keeping with Stanyek and Piekut’s insistence on matching as “co-
labor” as opposed to simple mimicry, then, I enlisted the participation of all of the voices 
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involved in negotiating the optimal aesthetic balance between audio production values and the 
“authenticity effect” (Neumark 95) of a shared performance. Furthermore, because Juanita’s 
interview was conducted over four sessions stretched across a two-month period,142 the audio 
quality is also fairly inconsistent across the segments, presumably changing with microphone 
placement and movement around the space. In this sense, in addition to matching three different 
people’s voices with one another, I was also faced with the challenge of matching different 
iterations of the same person’s voice with itself (with varying degrees of success)143—a 
phenomenon that points to interesting questions of vocal multiplicity.  
Background noises in both of the archival recordings presented an additional challenge to 
the “matching” process, creating myriad sonic discontinuities and interruptions that intruded into 
the imagined space of the drama at random intervals. Like many oral histories, both Juanita’s and 
Josiah’s interview recordings were produced, at best, as records of a performance-already-given, 
rather than materials for a future re-performance in sound. And, like many oral histories, these 
interview recordings were produced far from the sanitized confines of the soundproof recording 
studio in the domestic spaces of the narrators’ homes. As such, these archival voices necessarily 
                                                
142 This timeframe (perhaps combined with short-term memory problems) also contributed to notable 
narrative repetition throughout the interview, in which Juanita told the same story—often in almost the 
same words and intonation—at various moments, suggesting a kind of rehearsed performance of stories 
that have been told before and providing fodder for creative recombination in the final audio piece. 
143 One of the strategies I used to smooth over the transition between different segments of a single 
“actor’s” voice recording was to use clips in which the speaker coughed or cleared her throat, providing a 
kind of physiological apologetic for the sudden change in vocal tone or quality. This technique was 
inspired by Neepa Majumdar’s discussion of a song sequence in the Hindi film Naseeb, in which “[t]he 
clearing of the throat” is used to mark out the transition between the voice of the visible actress and her 
voice double, since the sound “could be coming equally from [either]” (178). 
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carried with them not only the sonic register of the acoustical space itself,144 but also the many 
other sounds and rhythms of day-to-day life. Ranging from chirping birds and traffic sounds to 
the voices and activities of family members in adjacent rooms, these unwanted sounds, once 
committed to the recording, become largely inseparable from the voice itself—in the most 
practical, material sense—sounding behind it and with it and, in some cases, against it.  
Stanyek and Piekut might make sense of this phenomenon in terms of a so-called 
“leakage effect,” wherein “an activity in one area expands unexpectedly into another area, setting 
in motion a second process, project, or concern” (20).145 From a purely practical standpoint, such 
“perforations” (22) in the archival voice recordings I was working with stood as profoundly 
irritating obstacles to my best efforts to create an illusion of seamless dramatic co-presence. In 
many cases, an audio clip that I wanted to use for the sentiment or utterance or intonation it 
expressed would be unexpectedly imbricated with a revving engine or a chiming clock—or 
frequently a stray laugh or vocal affirmation from the interviewer or another person present in 
the room. (Indeed, in the case of my grandfather’s recording, it was frequently my own voice, 
speaking from the past as a granddaughter and an interviewer, which became an uninvited 
distraction). Not only did I often have difficulty imagining how these sounds might have reason 
to exist in the diegetic space of the drama that was taking shape, but also, because of the 
radically recombinatorial nature of the project—which drew together minute vocal fragments 
                                                
144 As Brandon LaBelle suggests “[s]ound… performs with and through space” (Background Noise xi) in 
a dynamic relation wherein “the materiality of a given room shapes the contours of sound, molding it 
according to reflection and absorption, reverberation and diffraction” (x). 
145 Stanyek and Piekut describe how this problem of “leakage” precipitated a trend toward “the ever-
increasing spatial segmentation of recording studios,” through “[p]artitioning disarticulated the bodies of 
engineers from those of the performers, as well as those spaces marked as ‘technological’ from those 
signifying ‘music’” (22). Indeed, they remind us that, despite the appearance of “liveness” and 
simultaneity, audio-visual media exist within an unspoken “culture of synchronization,” in which 
previously disarticulated sounds and bodies are sutured together to create an illusion of unity—or, more 
aptly, to recapture some original unity that itself is only a product of reproducibility itself (25). 
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from discontinuous moments across the interview—more often than not, these sounds in 
themselves were not sufficiently “whole” to make sense as plausible sounds-in-themselves.  
In my efforts to combat these leakages in my experiments with posthumous audio drama, 
I found I was left with the following options: First, to mitigate them with careful audio editing 
techniques that targeted specific unwanted frequencies; second, to incorporate them into the time 
and space of the dramatic narrative, often through conspicuous vocal references to revelatory 
external events;146 or, third, to simply accept them as (at worst) inevitable occupational hazards, 
or (at best) fascinating conceptual provocations, at the heart of collaborations with posthumous 
vocal archives. Indeed, despite my desire to sanitize, compartmentalize, and ultimately control 
the voices in this project, these leakages serve as an important reminder of the highly 
constructed, abstracted nature of the idealized voice sounding alone. As Frances Dyson explains 
it, “[s]ound is always a polyphony” and “[t]o isolate a particular sound within that polyphony a 
reduction must occur” (76). Thus, if it is true that “sounds and the bodies they emanate from 
surround, immerse, and belong to […] the multiple” (Dyson 80), then an oral history recording is 
never simply a recording of, in the words of Mladen Dolar, “a voice and nothing more.” Rather, 
we must take up the archival voice as embedded in a complex assemblage of other sonic events. 
In this sense, as we consider the fullest range of “entities that have effects” (Stanyek and Piekut 
33) in this compositional collaboration, perhaps we must consider not only the immediate human 
agents (both living and dead) who produced the voices in question and the immediate 
technological agents (microphones, recording devices, storage media, etc.) which helped to 
commit those voices to audio, but also the many marginal or coincidental agents—both human 
                                                
146 For example, in a deleted scene, when a chiming clock from Josiah’s interview recording intrudes into 
the diegetic space of the drama, I had the therapist respond with, “Excuse me. Sorry about that. Please 
continue,” suggesting that the sound was in fact an unwanted interruption, perhaps from her telephone or 
the doorbell to her office. 
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and nonhuman—that unwittingly attended or obstructed or constructed the voice as such.147  
Of course, thus far, I have only addressed the question of agency and co-labor in this 
project from the perspective of sound. For Stanyek and Piekut, who are approaching this 
question from an explicitly musical perspective, the sounds of the voices stand as the primary 
concern. While there are certainly words involved in the posthumous duet in the form of lyrics—
and while these lyrics necessarily structure the possibilities of Natalie’s performance, as she 
sings as an echo, and, at times, in anticipation of her father’s “pre-echo, sounding ahead from the 
past” (31)—presumably, they take a back seat to what we might call the unsaid of the music, 
which, as Christoph Cox suggests, “has always been recognized to be a peculiarly non-
representational art” (148). At least, this is the ultimate aim of good music, as Roland Barthes 
understands it, where the signification and meaning of voice in song is subordinated to its richly 
corporeal “grain”—“something [which] is there, manifest and stubborn (one hears only that), 
beyond (or before) the meaning of the words, their form (the litany), the melisma, and even the 
style of execution” (182). But if the question of voice-as-speech is not yet a part of the 
conversation Stanyek and Piekut have initiated, then what happens when we take the 
foundational principles of the posthumous duet and apply it to an overtly narrative art?  
Indeed, the initial concept for the posthumous audio drama was motivated, at least in 
part, by precisely this question—and by the ethical provocation that it arouses. If it is true, as 
Stanyek and Piekut argue, that objections to the presumed “exploit[ation]” of intermundane 
                                                
147 Indeed, if we were to follow a method like Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory, or “ANT” (see 
Latour’s Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory” for a detailed explication), 
it would be possible to move ever outward from even these tangibly registered sonic actors, to consider all 
of the actors responsible for bringing the clocks and cars into existence and into the precise temporal-
spatial configuration at hand. While this endeavor is beyond the scope of the present project, it is worth 
considering in its philosophical and methodological connection to the additive, affirmative approach I am 
taking to archival voices in this recombinatorial composition.  
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collaboration are “ostensibly concerned with defending the memory of the dead” (34), then it is 
safe to assume that these objections would only be heightened as we move from the non-
representational values of musical performance to the deeply representational values of oral 
history—a field of practice for which memory serves as the primary raison d'être. In this sense, 
we might argue that Stanyek and Piekut’s analysis has failed to account for what Jonathan Sterne 
has called the “social function” (297) for which these voices of the dead were recorded and 
preserved. Notably, in the context of the posthumous duet, Nat “King” Cole’s recorded voice is 
being repurposed toward a musical performance (not to mention a musical performance of a song 
that he knowingly recorded during his lifetime and with the voice of his own daughter). Thus, it 
follows that, while Nat may not have participated as a conscious actor in the particular 
configurations that constituted the performative event of the 1991 “duet,” there is still an extent 
to which the general “social function” for which his voice was originally recorded is being 
preserved.  
This underlying loyalty to social function stands an obvious point of departure between 
the posthumous duet and my experiments with posthumous audio drama in Our Time is Up. By 
taking the archival voices of oral history and repurposing them toward fictional narrative ends, 
there is no question that my work here is subverting the original purpose for which these voices 
were committed to tape: namely, to serve as nonfictional narrative accounts of the lived 
experiences and memories of the people who spoke them. To the extent that I have spliced, 
extracted, and rearranged fragments of these recorded voices into new configurations, contexts, 
and conversations, there is a sense in which I have removed Juanita and Josiah from their own 
life stories, such that they are no longer speaking of the people and events and experiences that 
their oral histories set out to chronicle. And, crucially, to the extent that I have mobilized this 
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recombinatorial labor toward the construction of an imaginative dramatic narrative—where 
Juanita becomes “Helen” and my grandfather becomes her husband, “Jake”—there is a way in 
which, at a fundamental level, these voices are no longer even speaking as themselves.148 (And, 
for that matter, as I play the role of their marriage counselor, neither am I.) In this context, when 
we account for the narrative content and speakerly intentions of oral history, my experimentation 
with posthumous audio drama might seem to suggest deeper, more troubling ethical quandaries 
that outstretch the stakes and boundaries of the posthumous duet.  
At the same time, however, if we take Stanyek and Piekut’s focus on the posthumous 
duet as simply an occasion for exploring the possibilities for “intermundane collaboration” more 
broadly, then the question of social function quickly recedes from view. Indeed, at the root of 
these authors’ argument is an effort to bracket the very notion of intentionality upon which this 
notion of “social function” is based and to consider the voices of the dead, instead, from the 
perspective of their effects. And, importantly, as Stanyek and Piekut understand it (via Karen 
Barad), effectivities are not proper to the voices themselves, as closed and discrete entities, but 
rather “are constituted, diffracted, translated, and variously deferred by other agencies in 
[temporary] assemblages” (18). In other words, agency is not a possession but a potentiality, 
which can only be actualized through mutual participation with other effective entities. In this 
sense, if we understand agency as effectivity, on one hand, and effectivity as relational, on the 
other, then the dilemma at hand becomes clear: In our very efforts to protect the voices of the 
dead from “exploitation” in the present, we are ultimately “fail[ing] to register their agency, their 
                                                
148 Of course, the question arises: Is it ever really possible to speak “as oneself”? Certainly, to make this 
claim would require us both to subscribe to a belief in some authentic, singular voice, which necessarily 
correlates with some form of essential, stable identity and to overlook the extent to which, even in 
everyday speech contexts, we are always already performing ourselves as fluid and multiple beings—or 
perhaps more aptly becomings.  
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effectivity within a mundanity from which they seem to have been banished” (34). That is to say, 
by holding them within the confines of their past intentions or social functions (as we imagine 
them to have been), we are ultimately denying these voices—and, crucially, the people who once 
spoke them—the opportunity to continue participating in the ongoing construction of new social 
functions with other agents and agencies in the present and future. 
On one hand, at its root, the form of agency and mutual effectivity that Stanyek and 
Piekut are after here is deeply material and deeply grounded in a notion of “corpauralities” (20) 
or sounding-bodies-in-relation. Rather than understanding voice recordings as mere “traces” of a 
past embodiment, which has come and gone with the life of the singer or speaker, these authors 
invite us to imagine them as existing in “an emergent, interactive, dialogic presence,” such that 
“we must hear the voice emerging from the resonant body as the body resonates in the voice” 
(31). And, crucially, for Stanyek and Piekut, this corpaural “imbrication of sounds with fleshy 
bodies” (19) does not stop at the boundary of the particular human body that produces a voice, or 
even at the boundary of the human body in general. Rather, it participates in an ongoing, 
relationally entwined agency with all manner of material bodies, begging the question: “Where 
does one body—one sound—begin and the other end?” (31)—and thus, by extension, where 
does one agency—one effectivity—begin and the other end?  
Of course, in the case of oral history and audio drama, as explicitly narrative arts, we 
might argue that it is not simply the sound of the recorded voices but also the words that they 
speak, which have the capacity to produce effects. If this is the case, then perhaps we need to 
think further about the extent to which language might also participate in the relational 
effectivity of an intermundane collaboration, and the extent to which it challenges or extends the 
possibilities for an “ethics of effects” (34). I find it useful here to return to the work of Mikhail 
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Bakhtin for a perspective on the fundamentally lived, dialogic nature of language. Rather than 
understand language as something apart from, other than, and superior to what Stanyek and 
Piekut call the “fleshy bodies” of the material world, Bakhtin’s approach to language allows for a 
similar form of mutual “imbrication” (19) through his attention to the socially-situated 
phenomenon of “expressive intonation” (“Speech Genres” 85). And, as I have argued in the 
previous chapter, this material dimension of language only becomes more palpable when we 
make the shift from writing in words to writing in voices.  
Indeed, in my work on Our Time is Up, it was not simply the linguistic material of the 
oral history recordings that structured the possibilities around which the drama could emerge, but 
rather, the fundamentally audible, intonational material of the spoken utterance. Importantly, 
unlike the Coerced Confessions project, where I sought to “perform the voice” as an intonational 
disruption, here I set out to “use the voice in performance” (LaBelle Background Noise 134) in 
such a way as to create an illusion of “natural” human speech. In this sense, it was not enough 
that the recordings I used contained words and phrases that would “make sense” in the context of 
the emerging dramatic narrative. Rather, there was an additional requirement that those words 
and phrases be accentuated or intoned with what Bakhtin would call an “emotionally evaluative 
attitude toward the subject” (“Speech Genres” 85), in order to suit the appropriate social context 
of the new performative utterance. Thus, while language played a key role in what we might 
consider the “matching” process of the posthumous audio drama, it did so in a way that was 
inextricably tied to with the material performativity or effectivity of the voice itself.  
As I sifted through my index of audio files from Josiah and Juanita’s recordings and 
worked to reassemble them into a dramatic dialogue, I was forced to confront this material 
excess at every turn, adapting my compositional process to the reality of the materials at hand. 
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There were countless instances in which, however much I might have wanted “Helen” to respond 
to “Jake” (or vice versa) with a particular configuration of language that I had located in my clip 
index,149 if the speech context called for solemnity but Juanita happened to have been laughing in 
her delivery, more often than not, I was forced to look elsewhere. Notably, unlike a director in a 
traditional work of live theater, in this project, I did not have the luxury of asking my actors to 
shift the tone of their performance to accommodate my artistic vision.150 In this sense, Josiah and 
Juanita’s role as “actors” in the drama went well beyond the (albeit far from simple) act of 
bringing to life a performance-already-scripted. Instead, they became co-participants in 
imagining the shape and possibilities of the story itself, such that the processes of scripting and 
performance became rolled together into a single, co-responsive compositional process.  
At the same time, however, this is not to suggest that what I am referring to as the “sticky 
intonation” of these digital voices in any way guarantees that the speakers’ original intention is 
preserved. Far from it. Rather, as Bakhtin reminds us, in seeking to “divine the real meaning of 
others’ words in everyday life, the following are surely of decisive significance: precisely who is 
speaking, and under what concrete circumstances” (“Discourse in the Novel” 340). In other 
words, context matters. And, in this compositional experiment, while my practice was 
constrained by both the finite set of words contained in the archival recordings and with what 
Bakhtin might call the “brute materiality” (340) of their original intonations, it is precisely the 
context that becomes malleable as I work to disarticulate and rearrange fragments of these voice 
                                                
149 Because I had chosen to name the audio files in my index largely according to the words they 
contained for the ease of retrieval in the re-composition process—only in the most extreme cases adding a 
vague intonational qualifier (eg. “sadly,” “laughing,” etc.)—my experience of working with these 
materials was characterized by a constant rising and falling of expectations, such that I would be sure I 
had found the missing piece of the puzzle, only to listen to the clip and find my plans to be thwarted.  
150 In a few instances, I took advantage of the capacity of digital audio editing to change the speed (but 
not the tempo) of an audio clip to make a fragment of speech more closely match the pace of adjacent 
fragments that made up a given phrase or utterance. 
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recordings into new recombinatorial configurations. And, indeed, through my close work with 
Josiah and Juanita’s voices in this project, I found that Bakhtin is quite right in suggesting that, 
“[b]y manipulating the effects of context, it is very easy to […] make even the most serious 
utterance comical” (340). In fact, as I took up fragments of speech laced with laughter from my 
grandfather’s recording and repurposed them for new contexts as convulsive expressions of pain, 
I found the opposite to be true, as well. In this sense, while it might be tempting to presume that 
intonation gives way to a form of posthumous agency-as-intentionality, we must remember that 
the archival voice, as recorded sound, is only, in the words of Jonathan Sterne, an “exteriority” or 
“a resonant tomb” (290).  
With this in mind, perhaps I should also be careful not to underplay the extent of my 
participation in this process. Effectivity aside, as the only conscious, intentional agent in the 
collaboration, there is no question that I did, in fact, possess a great degree of compositional 
“author-ity” (Frisch Shared Authority 226) over the final shape of the work through a range of 
activities and capacities, which were fundamentally unavailable to the two posthumous actors. 
While the material speech and performative effects of Josiah and Juanita’s recorded voices did 
provide formidable constraints, and thus considerable direction, for the thematic and aesthetic 
development of the drama, in the end, the decision of precisely how to recombine these materials 
within the given structures of possibility and toward what end was ultimately mine to make—not 
to mention the very decision to undertake the project in the first place. In this sense, while I 
sincerely believe this project to be a work of collaboration—between myself, my grandfather, a 
woman named Juanita who neither of us has met, and a whole range of other material agents—it 
would be absurd to suggest that it were somehow a collaboration between equal partners. 
Undoubtedly, certain “asymmetries of power—and thus of responsibility—persist” (Stanyek and 
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Piekut 34). However, as Stanyek and Piekut are quick to point out, “[C]ollaborations with the 
dead are no different in this regard than those with the living, and we should be careful not to 
condemn intermundane projects out of hand” (34).  
From an ethical standpoint, then, if we can begin to move beyond our knee-jerk 
objections to intermundane collaboration as a concept, then perhaps we can look more closely at 
how this collaboration is actually playing out in practice—and how it fits into our existing 
frameworks for ethical writing practice, in particular. Certainly, if we imagine spoken language 
as something “owned,” as the private property of closed and individuated agents, then it becomes 
difficult to imagine how my appropriation of these posthumous oral histories for the audio drama 
would be anything but a work of thievery and exploitation. (And our prevailing cultural 
conventions around copyright, citation, and plagiarism might indeed suggest this to be the case.) 
Furthermore, if we consider the ways in which I have abstracted, rearticulated, and recombined 
these words and stories such that they no longer even attempt to reflect the intentions of the 
original speakers, then we may have no choice but to view this project as a flagrant work of 
misrepresentation. But are these the only ways to approach the ethics of this project? How might 
we productively reimagine not only the voice but also its manifestation as language in such a 
way as to make possible new forms of inventive and collaborative practice?  
Again, Bakhtin’s sociological theory of language offers a productive inroad into this 
project. Recall that, for Bakhtin, human language use is, at its core, an appropriative practice. 
Rather than presuming that we own the words we speak (or, for that matter, the words we write) 
in the particular configurations that we speak them, Bakhtin suggests that we are always already 
revoicing the words of others—that if we ever succeed in making words “our own,” it is only for 
a fleeting moment, before they are taken up again, in new contexts and for new intentions, in the 
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“mouths” of others (“Discourse in the Novel” 293). Following a Bakhtinian understanding of 
language, then, we might argue that the appropriative revoicing that I am practicing in this 
project—as I take up speech, quite literally, from “other people’s mouths, in other people’s 
contexts, serving other people’s intentions” and “make [them my] own” (294)—is neither an 
ethical abomination nor even an anomaly, but rather something more like a self-conscious, 
technologically mediated, material enactment of precisely the way that language functions in the 
first place. “[I]t is not, after all,” Bakhtin reminds us, “out of a dictionary that the speaker gets 
his words!” (294). 
Notably, Bakhtin’s appropriative theory of language applies not only to the context of 
everyday speech genres, but also, in a very particular way, to the secondary genres of literary and 
artistic practice. In “Discourse in the Novel,” Bakhtin famously argues for the concept of 
“heteroglossia” or “double-voiced discourse” (324) as a special form of speech through which 
the prose writer “makes use of words that are already populated with the social intentions of 
others and compels them to serve his own new intentions, to serve a second master” (300). In 
this context, we find a provocative distinction between the practice of speaking (or, more aptly, 
writing) “in language” in some abstract sense, and speaking (writing) “through language,” 
imagined as always already “the linguistic medium of another” (313). In this sense, rather than 
glorifying the novelist as a master of linguistic invention, conjuring literary language out of thin 
air, Bakhtin works to reimagine authorship as a form of highly practiced “ventriloqu[ism]” (299), 
through which every act of novelistic speech brings together “two voices, two meanings, […] 
two expressions” and, ultimately “two different intentions: the direct intention of the character 
who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author” (324).  
For Bakhtin, this meeting of  “voices” and intentions is necessarily a “struggle,” through 
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which each of these competing forces “oppose or dialogically interanimate each other” (354) in a 
dynamic interaction. Importantly, however, rather than lauding those authors whose own 
“voices” win out over those of their characters in this battle of wills, Bakhtin holds up as 
exemplars those who succeed in creating a “plurality of independent and unmerged voices,” 
which remain “capable of standing alongside their creator, capable of not agreeing with him and 
even of rebelling against him” (“Dostoevsky’s Poetics” 6). Indeed, in his writings on “Problems 
of Dostoevsky’s Poetics,” Bakhtin identifies this quality as the defining feature of Fyodor 
Dostoevsky’s novels, suggesting that his mastery lies in his unique ability to create “a genuine 
polyphony of fully valid voices” (6). Importantly, these voices are not simply the dummies or 
puppets at the mercy of the author’s will, as the earlier notion of “ventriloquism” might suggest. 
Rather than serving only as inert “objects of authorial discourse,” these voices stand as 
autonomous “subjects of their own directly signifying discourse” (7), which, when brought 
together into the common space Dostoevsky has designed for them, bring with them their own 
personalities, wills, and worlds.  
Considered in this context, we might say that my experiment in posthumous poetics is 
drawing not only on the appropriative nature of everyday language use, in the world according to 
Bakhtin, but also on a venerated tradition of literary practice. In much the same way that the 
novelist draws from her experience with the actual, audible voices of others in everyday contexts 
as the material for her characters’ speech, in this project, I am drawing my characters’ speech 
quite literally from the voices of others—in this case, the recorded voices of Josiah and Juanita, 
which, as digital archives, make themselves materially accessible for subsequent “re-voicing” 
and reanimation in new contexts and with new intentions. And, following Bakhtin’s notion of 
“heteroglossia” (324), we might say that these new intentions are fundamentally multiple, 
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expressing my own authorial purposes at the same time as they express the divergent intentions 
(if we may call them that) of my characters—both of which are necessarily informed by the 
expressive intonations and material effects of the original speakers to create a form of what we 
might call triple-voiced speech. Finally, we might even go so far as to suggest that the 
compositional practice I am exploring here might be in some way an audible materialization of 
Bakhtin’s notion of “polyphony,” to the extent that, by its very nature, the posthumous audio 
drama cannot help but bring these in(ter)dependent wills and worlds—imagined not as 
intentions, but rather as effects—together into a fundamentally heterogeneous unity. And, 
indeed, if the posthumous duet was one source of inspiration for my work in this project, then 
Dostoevsky’s “polyphonic novel” (30) was certainly another.  
Despite these parallels, however, it is important to keep in mind a key factor that sets my 
practice apart from those that Bakhtin’s theory addresses—namely, that the notion of voice he is 
mobilizing is, at least from the perspective of method, most certainly the silent “voice” of textual 
metaphor, as it is manifested through the equally metaphorical notion of “speech” on the page. 
By no means unaware of this fact, Bakhtin himself is quick to point out the inadequacies of 
“polyphony” as a metaphor for print-based, novelistic practice.151 Certainly, we have seen how 
the audible, material nature of my digital voice-based practice has allowed me to enact and even 
in some cases extend Bakhtin’s ideas about human language use in both colloquial and literary 
contexts—for example, helping to dramatize the materiality of speech through expressive 
intonation, as well as the centrality of context to meaning. However, there are also ways in which 
my use of actual, audible voices in this project necessarily serves to complicate the act of 
                                                
151 According to Bakhtin, “[T]he material of music and of the novel are too dissimilar for there to be 
anything more between them than a graphic analogy, a simple metaphor. We are transforming this 
metaphor into the term ‘polyphonic novel,’ since we have not found a more appropriate label. It should 
not be forgotten, however, that the term has its origin in metaphor” (22). 
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appropriation, raising further ethical quandaries that are worthy of consideration.  
Thus far in this dissertation, I have tried to suggest how we might productively reimagine 
the voice—like speech for Bakhtin—not as the private property of an individual human 
body/speaker/subject, but rather as a fundamentally relational “event” (Connor 4) or “effect” 
(Neumark 95), moving beyond forensic questions of who owns a voice toward more flexible and 
relational modes of being—and, by extension, more relational and even collaborative modes of 
composing. In many ways, this move parallels the move Bakhtin is making with regard to human 
speech and literary language, in that it seeks to reevaluate our cultural attitudes toward the act of 
appropriation, framing it no longer as a negative act of pilfering and deception, but rather as a 
positive, generative, and even inevitable act of reinvention and reuse. At the same time, however, 
we must still acknowledge the fact that the act of mediated, material appropriation—which takes 
up not simply the words and (silent) intonations of others’ speech, but rather the vibrational 
performativity of their voices-as-audio—is a relatively recent phenomenon (made possible in 
earnest only in the middle of the last century, as N. Katherine Hayles has argued, with the rise of 
magnetic tape), and one that Bakhtin’s work does not address. So the question arises: What 
difference does the voice make to the ethics of appropriative composing? Why—and how—does 
vocality matter in the context of re-voiced speech?  
Questions of ownership and identity aside, the question of identifiability152 re-emerges 
here as a legitimate ethical concern—one which is understandably not within the scope of 
Bakhtin’s theories of appropriation and literary speech. While, in an alphabetic work of fiction 
like those Bakhtin considers, the characters’ “voices” (metaphorically speaking) might be drawn 
from the actual audible voices of others in everyday speech contexts, when they are translated 
                                                
152 Again, this distinction between “identity” and “identifiability” (185) is one that I am drawing from 
Darsie Bowden’s writing on the history of the voice metaphor in composition pedagogy. 
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into alphabetic text on the page of a novel, they no longer bear the identifiable traces of their 
original speakers. In other words, these “voices” may very well contain and express the implicit 
intentions and (silent, textual) intonations of someone else’s speech—of course, alongside the 
refracted intentions of the author as a form of “double-voiced discourse” (Bakhtin “Discourse in 
the Novel” 324)—but, from a reader’s perspective, they do not necessarily appear as the speech 
of a particular, identifiable, embodied someone else.153 In contrast, in my work on Our Time is 
Up, Josiah and Juanita’s recorded voices, after being radically “re-voiced” toward new contexts 
and alternative configurations of fictional characters’ speech, still remain audibly and 
inextricably identifiable as the voices of the two particular people who spoke them. Whether we 
frame this phenomenon empirically through the notion of the “voiceprint” (Yancey 
“Introduction” viii), philosophically as an indication of “incarnate singularity” (Cavarero 7), we 
cannot get around the fact that the material, audible voice is always heard as the voice of a 
particular someone (Cavarero 177). 
Of course, the primary risk here is that the posthumous actors’ participation in this 
project—which we have thus far reconciled through a combined theory of agency-as-effectivity 
(Stanyek and Piekut) and speech- and authorship-as-appropriation (Bakhtin)—might be mistaken 
by its audience for another kind of participation altogether: namely, intentional performance (if 
not precisely speech). Drawing as it does from the conventions of the audio drama form, this 
experiment in posthumous poetics necessarily invites its audience to experience an illusion of 
simultaneous, live performance—or at least conscious performance by witting “actors,” in every 
sense of the term. As would be the case in nearly any work of drama, in Our Time is Up, Josiah 
                                                
153 For Jonathan Rée, this distinction represents “the vital difference between speech and voice: speech by 
its nature can be repeated, whereas voices can only be imitated. The repetition of people’s words signifies 
something very different from the imitation of their voices” (68).  
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and Juanita do not purport to be playing themselves, but rather the fictional characters, Jake and 
Helen McCleary, around which the narrative has been constructed. At the same time, however, it 
is important to recall that neither Josiah nor Juanita have had the capacity to make the conscious 
decision to use their voices to enact these characters in the first place—and, crucially, that there 
is nothing built in to the construction of the work itself that makes this fact clear to a listening 
audience. In this sense, we might say that the ethical dilemma that arises here is not an 
ontological question of being or owning, but rather a phenomenological question of being 
received—and thus being implicated in the consequences and effects of the work at hand.  
Ultimately, if we take seriously Stanyek and Piekut’s suggestion that “[a]ll entities” in 
intermundane collaborations “are co-responsive but not always co-responsible” (34), then 
perhaps we must consider what kinds of responsibilities might be expected of those of us capable 
of exercising them—and, in particular, what forms of accountability we owe to our posthumous 
collaborators in a project like this one. While there is no question that Josiah and Juanita should 
receive credit for their participation in this project, which, in so many ways, would not have been 
possible without them, it is also important that this credit be clearly defined and delimited. At the 
same time as we must be careful not to treat Josiah and Juanita’s voices as inert, passive objects 
at the mercy of my compositional whims, it is also important that they not be mistaken for 
conscious, intentional subjects with the ability to direct and account for the consequences of their 
participation. With this in mind, speaking from the here and now, perhaps we might say that 
ethical approaches to intermundane collaboration are those which are transparent about their 
status as such, making evident both the power and the limitations of all entities involved. Perhaps 
what is called for is a new model of compositional ethics, one that does not preemptively restrict 
the terms of our engagement with compositional materials, but rather seeks to make our 
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relationship with those materials self-evident as a core requirement of the composition itself.154  
As a tentative opening into this possibility, in the context of the present project, I find it 
useful to turn to another practice of aberrant vocal performance for a potential inroad. In my 
earliest experiments with posthumous vocal archives, I became intrigued by the potential 
parallels with the practice of ventriloquism, as an idiosyncratic art of “speaking in another voice 
or even in another’s voice” (Goldblatt 38) for performative effect. Despite the obvious points of 
departure between these two practices (not least of which is the fact that, unlike the ventriloquist, 
I am not “throwing” my own voice, but rather digitally manipulating the recorded voice of 
another), the points of convergence are certainly striking. Like the ventriloquist, I am engaged in 
a practice of mobilizing other voices in order to “facilitate the appearance of conversation” 
(38)—a strange kind of conversation, which is at once an act of talking with myself and with 
talking with another. And, like the ventriloquist, my practice is characterized by a back-and-forth 
responsivity in which I must “act as if listening to another while, at the same time, speaking for 
that other” (39) in turn. Building on these connections, I wonder if we might take inspiration 
from what David Goldblatt has called the guiding principle of the ventriloquial performance: the 
performance of “illusion without deception” (37). Unlike puppetry, which attempts to hide the 
source of the dummy’s voice behind a curtain, “in ventriloquism the voice-source appears with, 
is present to the figure and is itself a character in the performance as the ventriloquist impresses 
the appearance of the singularity of her role” (39). And, unlike the magician, whose success is 
based on the audience’s inability to determine how the act was performed, “[a] ventriloquist who 
actually deceives an audience would undermine his own act” (41).  
                                                
154 Indeed, in the vocal introduction to Our Time is Up, I make explicit reference to the fact Josiah and 
Juanita’s deaths, years before the conception of the project, while at the same time crediting them for their 
role not only as performers, but also as unconscious but integral collaborators in the work’s production. 
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It seems to me that this model—of “illusion without deception” (Goldblatt 37)—might be 
a powerful ethical framework not only for “intermundane collaborations” with the voices of the 
dead, but also for recombinatorial work with archival voices more broadly. As I have noted, in 
Our Time is Up, one of my core compositional goals was to fracture and recombine these 
recorded voices to create an illusion of simultaneous, “live” drama through fluid, intonationally 
driven editing—a feature that sets this work apart from my approach in the Coerced Confessions 
videos. At the same time, however, it was in no way my intention to trick my audience into 
believing that the actors’ voices—as voices of the dead—are in fact the voices of conscious 
speaking subjects. To the contrary, to succeed in passing off Josiah and Juanita as intentional, 
“live” performers would be to undermine the very foundation of the conceptual experiment I am 
undertaking, as well as the uncanny nature of the experience I am seeking to create. Far from 
aiming to dissimulate the highly constructed nature of the piece and the true sources of the voices 
from which it is comprised, my goal here is to present to my audience an impossible dramatic 
encounter between the voices of the living and the voices of the dead—voices which feel as if 
they could be sitting in a room, speaking to one another, sorting through their differences in the 
familiar ways that people do, but which we all know obviously cannot.  
Like ventriloquism, then, I see this experiment as an “occasion for letting strange voices 
speak” (Goldblatt 42)—and, in the process, an occasion for letting the voice itself become 
strange in ways that allow us to hear it differently and to reimagine our relationship to it. Just as 
ventriloquism asks us to challenge “one general assumption of our adult form of life: that things 
do not speak” (Goldblatt xii, emphasis mine), my work here asks us to examine our fundamental 
assumption that the dead do not speak—or, perhaps more aptly, that we cannot speak with or 
through the voices of others. Importantly, in doing so, this practice may have the potential, like 
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ventriloquism, to “[extend] the domain of relationships we have with things”—or, in our case, 
voices—which are “ordinarily off-limits to conversation” (xii). By taking on this ventriloquial 
experience of “being outside the self” by speaking through and alongside other voices, perhaps 
we, as composers, might even begin to “recogniz[e] other voices in ourselves” and to 
“problematiz[e] the idea that the self is located in the behavior of a single mind or body” (49). 
Indeed, it is in this sense that I see my experiment in posthumous poetics not simply as a 
challenge to our prevailing model of representational ethics and its negative proscriptions against 
certain forms of engagement with vocal materials, but also as an opening to a positive, 
generative ethical alternative. I will consider this possibility further in my concluding chapter. 
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6.0  MAKING. VOICE. MATTER. A REFLECTION ON MATERIAL ETHICS 
 “Compose. (No ideas but in things) Invent!”  
— William Carlos Williams 
 
One of the key underlying questions which has run throughout this project, but which has been 
left unresolved (as if it could be resolved), is the question of ethics. In my opening chapter, I 
described how the impetus for this dissertation emerged out of my own practice with voice 
recordings in digital composing contexts, where I first confronted the ethical quandary of what it 
means to compose texts with the voices of others. As I explained, it was through early work with 
my grandmother's oral history recordings that I came up against a provocative and troubling gap: 
between what digital audio technologies allow us to do, in practical terms, with other people’s 
voices, on one hand, and what we actually allow ourselves to do under our present frameworks 
of representational ethics, on the other. Reflecting on this contradiction, I began to wonder if 
there might be other ways of making sense of these compositional practices and, if so, what new 
ethical frontiers they might suggest.  
Over the course of my dissertation, I have sought to address this question, taking up 
digital voice both as a concept for critical examination and as a material for compositional 
experimentation. In Chapter Two, I began by tracing the history of theoretical and pedagogical 
approaches to audible, sounding voice across the disciplinary discourse, describing how our 
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attachments to voice as language and identity might be limiting the extent to which we can 
imagine voice, in the digital age, as a material for compositional invention. In Chapter Three, I 
drew together a diverse body of voice scholarship from across fields and disciplines, working to 
construct the foundation for a comprehensive model of “digital vocality” for contemporary 
composition—and positioning it as a catalyst for new forms of embodied, performative, and 
collaborative practice. Finally, using a hybrid creative-critical approach in Chapters Four and 
Five, I pushed my theoretical engagement with digital voice one step further, putting it into 
practice through production-based experiments in audio-visual composing and using my 
experience with these projects as a springboard for further reflection. Ultimately, in working 
with digital voice across these disciplinary and methodological boundaries, I have sought to 
develop a richer, more nuanced sense of voice’s possibilities for inventive and ethical practice, 
branching out from narrow definitions of composition as a field in order to speak more widely to 
composition as a practice across broader spheres of creative production. 
Building on this opening—and by way of conclusion—I would like to take this final 
chapter as an occasion to draw together some of the ethical insights and opportunities that have 
emerged out of my creative-critical engagement with voice in these preceding chapters, and to 
extend them through a focused reflection on their implications for compositional practice. I will 
begin this chapter with a brief reflection on the historical role of the voice in Western ethics and 
political philosophy, picking up on earlier discussions of work by Mladen Dolar and Adriana 
Cavarero and expanding them to account for the contemporary lived experience of voice in 
networked digital culture. Next, I will return to discuss, in greater detail, the practice-based 
method that I have set forth in this dissertation, situating it in the context of a larger conversation 
about the relationship between ethics and aesthetic experience—represented, most notably, by 
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the work of Anne Frances Wysocki. Finally, I will take up my own aesthetic experience with 
digital voice as it played out in my experimental audio and video projects, reflecting on some 
tentative ethical openings that these projects present. Ultimately, in this concluding chapter, I 
hope to push my inquiry beyond the question of voice itself to consider the broader 
methodological and ethical implications of this work. 
6.1 THE ETHICS OF VOICE: A POINT OF ENTRY 
I began my analysis, in Chapter Two, with a reflection on the metaphorical tradition of ‘voice’ in 
composition and rhetoric, which has long taken up the human voice as a proxy for notions of 
style, agency, or presence in alphabetic writing practice. Looking back at this conversation, it 
occurs to me that, at times, I referred to metaphorical ‘voice,’ erroneously, as “the ‘voice’ 
metaphor” (emphasis added), in ways that might suggest it to be a singular or tightly bounded 
phenomenon. To the contrary, however (and as I have already argued), ‘voice’ is by no means a 
metaphor, but rather, it is part of a vast multiplicity or constellation of divergent metaphorical 
usages—or even, as Kuang-Ming Wu might suggest, part of an ongoing and reciprocal process 
of “metaphoring” (37). While I have attempted, throughout this dissertation, to address it as such, 
I should acknowledge the fact that, in addition to the many diverse manifestations of 
metaphorical ‘voice’ that I have explicitly or implicitly alluded to in my analysis, there are no 
doubt countless competing and even contradictory constructions that I have left unspoken and 
unexamined. Perhaps the most striking of these omissions, at least in the context of our present 
conversation, is the ethical figure of the voice of conscience. 
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In his chapter, “The Ethics of the Voice,” Mladen Dolar explores a rich metaphorical 
tradition of voice across the history of Western ethics and moral philosophy, from the divine 
“Socratic voice” (83), to Kant’s universal “voice of reason” (88), to Heidegger’s ontological 
voice of “pure injunction” (95). Marveling at the extent to which “the voice has been the guiding 
trope of reflections on moral questions, both in popular reasoning and in the grand philosophical 
tradition” (83), Dolar works through the philosophical nuances of each of these divergent 
manifestations and ultimately identifies two key points of convergence among them. First, is the 
location of the ethical ‘voice’ in a paradoxical relationship to the subject, such that “the voice 
comes from the Other, but this is the Other within” (102). And, second, is the extent to which all 
of these formulations of ethics “[require] a voice, but a voice which ultimately does not say 
anything” (98).155 In other words, finding the “argument, particular prescriptions and 
prohibitions” of signifying discourse to be inadequate to the task, it seems that Western 
philosophy has adopted the voice as the fundamentally “nonsignifying, meaningless foundation 
of ethics” (98). Referring to this ethical figure as an “enunciation without a statement,”156 Dolar 
argues that, in fact, “[t]his is the crucial point, the touchstone of morality: the voice is 
enunciation, and we have to supply the statement ourselves” (98).  
For our purposes, this move to locate ethics “beyond logos” (Dolar 85) and in the 
“imperative resonance” (98) of the voice appears as a provocative opening and, if nothing else, 
perhaps an argument for the importance of attending to questions of voice and ethics in the 
                                                
155 While these voices do not “say” anything, Dolar explains that they do have varying degrees of content, 
even if this content is not speech in any linguistic or logocentric sense. For Socrates, the voice is one that 
“dissuades him from certain actions, preventing him from doing wrong” (84). For Kant, it is “merely the 
injunction to submit to reason” (90). For Heidegger, however, the voice has no content whatsoever; 
rather, it simply “insists as pure injunction” (95) and serves as “an opening toward Being” (96). 
156 On the surface, the use of the term “enunciation” here seems problematic, considering its connection 
to words and language. However, as Dolar imagines it, enunciation might stand as “the invisible surplus 
of a statement” (98) in such a way as to maintain the figure of the statement without its content.   
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present project. At the same time, however, it is important to note that the ethical ‘voice’ that 
Dolar traces through the Western philosophical tradition is not simply “a voice which ultimately 
does not say anything” (98, emphasis mine); rather, like all metaphorical ‘voices,’157 it is 
fundamentally silent, and thus not rightly a “voice” at all, at least not in the vibrational, material 
sense that I have been approaching voice in this dissertation. As Dolar explains, the silence of the 
ethical voice is, in fact, essential to its function in the sense that “only the voice which is 
completely silent can ‘overcry’ all other voices” (90). And, of course, a silent voice can only 
ever be heard if it comes from within—not as one’s own voice, as Dolar has noted, but still 
“placed at the most intimate kernel of the subject” (102). Indeed, what is most striking about this 
approach to ethics is the extent to which it requires the figure of a singular, bounded subject 
without considering its interrelationship with others—save the silently shouting Other within—or 
with the broader material world. Clearly, this “ethics of the voice,” as it has been imagined by 
the dominant philosophical tradition, stands in stark contrast to the material, relational theory of 
voice that I have been working to construct in this dissertation. And we are left wondering: How 
might we begin to imagine an ethics of voice as sound? And how might such an alternative help 
us to understand ethical personhood in more fluid and relational ways?  
We find a powerful opening to this possibility in the work of philosopher Adriana 
Cavarero, which I briefly introduced in Chapter Three. In line with the philosophical tradition 
                                                
157 For Dolar, whether or not the voice of conscience is, in fact, a metaphor remains an open question and, 
in many ways, serves as an impetus for his analysis, as evidenced by the questions he poses in the 
opening of the chapter: “Is this internal voice of a moral injunction, the voice which issues warnings, 
commands, admonishments, the voice which cannot be silenced if one has acted wrongly, simply a 
metaphor? Is it the voice that one actually hears, or is the internal voice still a voice, or is a voice that has 
no empirical manifestation perhaps the voice in the proper sense, closer to the voice than the sounds one 
can physically hear?” (83). I am intrigued by Dolar’s attempt here to imagine the possibility of a silent but 
still non-metaphorical voice—a possibility that he pursues throughout the book. However, because I am 
dealing specifically with the materiality of digital voice in the context of this dissertation, I have chosen to 
constrain my definition of voice to its audible manifestations.    
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that Dolar presents, Cavarero’s approach to ethics is notable in its attempt to reach “beyond 
logos” (Dolar 85) to take up the voice as a “nonsignifying” (Dolar 98) excess, which attends 
language but is in no way reducible to it. However, Cavarero departs from this tradition quite 
markedly in her attention to the voice as a audible, corporeal, and relational phenomenon. As 
Cavarero explains it: 
Every act of speaking is thus from the start the relation of unique beings that address 
themselves to one another. They reciprocally expose themselves to one another, in 
proximity; they invoke one another and communicate themselves to one another. Or, 
better, they do not only communicate something, some content, some intention, some 
knowledge, or even less, a language. Rather they simply communicate, in the act of 
speaking, the radical proximity of their reciprocal communication (29). 
Thus, rather than locate the ethics of voice in a silent, transcendental “injunction” that sounds 
(without sounding at all) from within the autonomous and abstract subject, Cavarero offers an 
alternative ethical imaginary, which emerges out of the “reciprocal invocation” of two speaking 
bodies, bodies which establish their “corporeal uniqueness” through the audible act of 
vocalization itself (207). What we find in Cavarero’s proposal, then, is a route to ethical and 
political personhood through speech, but where “speech” is imagined not as linguistic content or 
rational discourse, but rather as a visceral, relational behavior. As Cavarero describes it, “One 
could call it a politics of Saying where the uniqueness of each speaker makes itself heard as a 
plurality of voices that are already linked to one another in resonance” (200). 
While Cavarero’s “politics of Saying” stands as a radical departure from prevailing 
logocentric traditions, from Aristotle on down, her work draws its inspiration from other key 
intellectual traditions, which are worth noting here. Most immediately, is the work of political 
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theorist Hannah Arendt. Central to Arendt’s work, as Cavarero mobilizes it, is the notion of 
speech as a relational politics, which communicates the “unrepeatable uniqueness of each 
speaker” (Cavarero 190)—and, by extension, the notion that “[t]his is what men have in 
common: uniqueness in plurality, or the uniqueness that makes them plural and the plurality that 
makes them unique” (191). By placing value on the act of speaking, over and above the content 
of that speech, and by highlighting the fundamentally sharable potential of specific lived 
experience, Arendt offers a provocative opening to Cavarero’s project. Ultimately, we might 
think of Cavarero’s contribution as an embodied extension of Arendt’s political vision, which 
presents the voice as a lived, material manifestation of, or medium for, this relational mode of 
being—which we might productively call a being unique together. 
In The Human Condition, Arendt offers the simple metaphor of a table as a tangible 
inroad into understanding this relational politics of “uniqueness in plurality” (Cavarero 190). 
Conjuring up the image of a group of people seated around a table, Arendt invites us to consider 
that table as an object that simultaneously brings us together in a gathering, while at the same 
time separating us from one another. In Arendt’s words, “To live in a world together means that 
a world of things is between those who have it in common, like a table. Worldly things relate and 
separate us at the same time” (52). While Cavarero does not explicitly mobilize Arendt’s table 
metaphor in her analysis, I find it productive to imagine her project as an effort to take up the 
voice as just such a “worldly thing”—an actual, material manifestation of the table and chairs, 
which is intrinsic to the act of speech itself and which, in this sense, we are always already sitting 
around.  
Of course, Arendt is not the only contemporary thinker to work toward a relational ethics 
through speech. Cavarero’s project also builds quite directly on the work of philosopher 
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Emmanuel Levinas. As Cavarero explains, Levinas is notable in his effort to establish an ethics 
of mutual responsibility based on the relational act of “Saying,” as opposed to the semantic 
content of “the Said” (29), a proposal on which she draws very explicitly throughout her book. 
Furthermore, unlike Arendt, Levinas is invested in pursuing a sensory, material grounding for 
this relational act, locating in the lived experience and embodied co-presence of face-to-face 
communication—and, more specifically, in the visual recognition of uniqueness in the human 
face itself (29). Picking up on Levinas’ sensory investments, but questioning his visual emphasis 
on the face, Cavarero offers up the voice as an alternative route to corporeal uniqueness—one 
which, unlike the face,158 establishes its uniqueness only in and through the act of speaking itself 
(30). In other words, while two people can look at one another from across a room and recognize 
the uniqueness of each other’s faces without ever approaching or even acknowledging one 
another, Cavarero suggests that it is through the immersive and identifiable vibrations of the 
voice that they actually come to experience one another’s uniqueness as a lived reality.159 For 
Cavarero, then, the voice possesses a unique capacity to bring us together with the other in a 
special kind of sensory encounter that we cannot experience through one another’s words or 
faces alone.  
In the context of my own work on voice in this dissertation, where I have sought to 
illuminate precisely these sensory and relational characteristics, Cavarero’s “politics of Saying” 
(200) emerges as an exciting point of entry into a possible material ethics, which is grounded in 
the resonant potential of the voice itself. But while Cavarero’s work is promising in its effort to 
move beyond a visualist focus on the face, the model of ethics that she proposes ultimately 
                                                
158 Cavarero argues that the face establishes its uniqueness in a passive manner prior to and independent 
from the act of speaking.  
159 Identifying the elements of sensation, proximity, and respiration as central to Levinas’ theory, 
Cavarero argues that the voice embodies these qualities perhaps even more so than the face (31).  
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remains firmly grounded in the same idealized scenario of face-to-face interaction that this 
previous model presumes. Positioning her politics, quite explicitly, “in contrast to those 
contemporary tendencies that celebrate the advent of the posthuman,” Cavarero imagines her 
project as firmly “rooted in [the] vocalic meaning of the human” (210). While there is one point, 
toward the end of her book, where Cavarero makes a brief nod to the existence of “[t]he intercom 
and the telephone,” noting their capacity to collapse the physical distances across which the 
human voice can travel (208), ultimately, she does not take this line of thinking any further. 
Instead, she quickly and simply concludes that such technologies “do not negate the material 
relationality of the vocalic” (208) and leaves it at that. Furthermore, in addition to this near 
erasure of sound transmission technologies, Cavarero also omits from the conversation entirely 
any mention of the other primary means through which we experience the voices of others—
namely, through sound reproduction technology, which redeploys the sound of the voice across 
both space and time. For Cavarero, the idea that “[t]he voice belongs to the living” appears 
entirely unproblematic, in that “it communicates the presence of an existent in flesh and bone; it 
signals a throat, a particular body” (177). As we have seen, however, the temporal dimensions of 
sound reproduction technology have—since the invention of Edison’s phonograph in the 
nineteenth century—profoundly complicated this notion of “presence,” making possible, or at 
least as an imaginable, the uncanny specter of “the voices of the dead” (Sterne 293). 
As I have noted previously, this tendency to disregard or underplay the role of audio 
technologies, and thus to approach the voice, instead, “as a medium of an unmediated body,” is 
broadly characteristic of the work of voice scholars across the disciplines (Schlichter 46) and, in 
this sense, not a shortcoming of Cavarero’s work, in particular. However, if we step back and 
consider the many diverse ways in which we actually encounter voices in our day-to-day lives—
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not simply over intercoms and telephones, but also in voicemails and podcasts, through live 
streaming video, even as the artificially intelligent “personal assistants” on our handheld 
devices—then, certainly, this tidy model of immediate, “live,” incontrovertibly human 
conversation can’t help but appear a little nostalgic or out of touch. That is not to say that we do 
not also encounter one another as physically co-present voices in face-to-face conversations; 
obviously, we do, and I don’t mean to downplay the value of such treasured, dare I say “analog” 
traditions of human communion. I am merely suggesting that, if we wish to imagine a material, 
relational ethics that is truly relevant to the complex ways in which we actually live—materially 
and relationally—in today’s networked digital culture, then perhaps we must also consider the 
ethical valences of these other, less straightforward manifestations of vocal practice.  
As I have argued, up to the present, our dominant cultural approach to the ethics of vocal 
technologies has been characterized by a narrowly proscriptive question of what not to do with 
the recorded voices of others. By clinging to the safety and security of our text-driven 
representational frameworks, we have erected formidable boundaries around the terms of our 
engagement with these technologies and effectively closed down the many forms of creative and 
compositional practice with recorded voices, which might fall outside of these value systems. 
What we have not done, however, is imagine the shape and possibility for positive, generative 
forms of ethical engagement with such voices, as writers, as media-makers, or simply as 
listeners. Indeed, if we imagine ethics, as Dolar suggests we might, as an “enunciation without a 
statement” wherein “we have to supply the statement ourselves” (98), then perhaps we might 
best seek out such a statement by engaging with—as opposed to shying away from—the material 
complexities of our world.  
 200 
6.2 COMPOSING ETHICS: THE CASE OF DIGITAL AESTHETICS 
In her essay, “Unfitting Beauties of Transducing Bodies,” Anne Frances Wysocki provides a 
promising inroad to this project, exploring the intersection between ethics and aesthetics in 
digital arts and media. Starting, in this essay, from the premise that “our senses are persuadable” 
(110), Wysocki pushes us to think beyond purely rational and discursive notions of rhetoric to 
consider the role of bodily perception and aesthetic experience in our cultural formation as 
ethical beings. Again, we are reminded here that ethics is not simply an argument for doing the 
right thing—or, for that matter, an argument against doing wrong. Rather, as Wysocki imagines 
it, it is a richly embodied, sensual orientation toward others and toward the broader material 
world—an orientation that begins from the ways we experience the world as sensing, perceiving 
beings. In this context, she argues that the multisensory texts, which we routinely produce, 
consume, and interact with in contemporary digital environments, have the palpable potential to 
“shape our senses of selves by shaping our senses themselves” (95), providing a platform 
through which we might come to experience our bodies in new sensory relationships and 
configurations. Ultimately, Wysocki suggests, “By highlighting current aesthetic possibilities of 
our texts—digital as well as nondigital—we might practice having bodies that can alertly convert 
sensuous experience into ethical practice” (95). 
Central to Wysocki’s argument here is a critique of eighteenth century approaches to 
ethics, which are grounded in a fundamentally “solitary, ahistorical, nonparticular” notion of 
aesthetic experience (101). Working against this false presumption of “natural” and “universal” 
sensory experience—which she locates as a persistent theme in writing on contemporary digital 
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art160—Wysocki suggests that, today, we must instead “learn to be bodies that somehow perceive 
not alone but socially” (107). Importantly, as she argues, it is not enough that we are simply 
convinced, through conventional rhetorical argument, “to believe that our sense experience is the 
result of being raised within a particular social regime” (107). Rather, we must also come to 
“experience having such an unnatural, learned body” (107, emphasis mine) through visceral 
sensory encounters, which work to unsettle our culturally habituated relationships to our own 
bodies, the bodies of others, and the many non-human material bodies that make up our world.  
Taken up in this context, I wonder if we might fruitfully consider our vibratory, sensory 
experience of the voice—both at the level of perception and the level of production—as one of 
these many modes through which we have been taught by our own “social regime” (Wysocki 
107) to mark off and maintain our present ethical boundaries—between subject and object, self 
and other, human and nonhuman, living and dead. As I have argued in this dissertation, we have 
been taught, as a culture, to hear in the voice primarily the language it transmits and the identity 
it expresses, as a marker of the closed, self-contained, speaking subject. If we follow Wysocki 
here, then perhaps we should consider not only the ways in which these sensory orientations 
have come to influence our ethical ability to take up and compose with the recorded voices of 
others, but also the ways in which we fashion ourselves as ethical beings in relation to those 
others. And, while scholars like Dolar and Cavarero might prefer to present the voice as if it 
were a pure, unmediated, and indisputably human phenomenon, Wysocki’s work also suggests 
that we would do well to consider the role of technology in this process and, more specifically, 
                                                
160 As Wysocki notes, “The digital art that [Mark] Hansen, [Oliver] Grau, and [Anna] Munster consider is 
most often shaped to emphasize isolated, individual, private experience. These writers talk about a 
participant’s sensuous perceptions of the art as though the perceptions result not from how the 
participant’s repetitious and socially sensuous history shapes her to perceive but rather from a single 
technologized event experienced in isolation. This is to hold onto, and perhaps encourage, an eighteenth-
century notion of bodies” (105). 
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our sensory experience of the recorded voice.  
Of course, as we all know from experience, there is always something distinctly 
uncanny—and often unpleasant—in the simple act of hearing our own voices played back as a 
so-called “reproduction”161 in audio media. Douglas Kahn explains this phenomenon as a kind of 
rupture in the habituated auto-affective circuits through which we typically experience our voices 
“as [they are] conducted from the throat and mouth through bone to the inner regions of the ear” 
and “sensed intracranially” (7). In other words, rather than hearing our voices resonate from 
within our own skulls, “full with the immediacy of the body,” through sound reproduction 
technologies, we experience what Kahn calls “a deboned voice”—our voices as they are heard 
from outside of ourselves (7). Because we have been so well trained by our own social regime to 
hear our voices precisely as expressions of our selves, it makes sense that we would experience 
this sensation as deeply unsettling.162 However, rather than enabling us to distance ourselves 
from our “selves,” as closed and self-determining subjectivities, it is easy to imagine how such 
an experience might ultimately have the opposite effect, reinforcing the boundaries between self 
and other and only sending us deeper inward.163 
Aside from allowing us to hear ourselves beyond ourselves as foreign voices, the other 
achievement of sound reproduction technology lies in its ability to capture those voices as 
objects or media, which persist over time. As I have emphasized, with the rise of digital audio, 
                                                
161 Recall that sound theorists like Rick Altman and Jonathan Sterne have disputed the very assumption 
that sound reproduction is, in fact, a “reproduction” of one’s voice in the sense that we tend to assume. 
See Chapter Three of this dissertation for a fuller discussion of the topic. 
162 Of course, with the increasing accessibility and ubiquity of recording technologies over time, it is also 
possible that our sensory apparatuses have been gradually habituated, through repeated exposure to these 
technologies, such that we experience the sounds of our recorded voices as increasingly normalized. 
163 Hearing aids represent another technology that contributes to this “deboning” effect, changing the way 
that a speaker experiences his or her own voice, not as a recorded playback, but rather in the simultaneity 
of live speech. A fuller examination of the hearing aid’s role in vocal phenomenology is warranted. 
 203 
these objects have become both infinitely replicable, with no loss of “fidelity” in relation to their 
perceived “original,”164 and at the same time infinitely “flexible,” with radical potential to be 
manipulated and made new (Neumark 95). Thus, along with the potential to purportedly 
“preserve” the voice, and thus to submit it to our economies of writing, we find attendant 
anxieties emerging around the vulnerability of these very inscriptions. In other words, in the age 
of audio, “one loses control of the voice because it no longer disappears” (Kahn 8). Ultimately, 
then, in the sensory regime of our present commodity culture, we come to hear our voices as 
both potentialities and liabilities. Either way, we come to experiences our voices—like our words 
in the economy of citation—not simply as properties that define our personhood, but as yet 
another form of private property, which we own and must therefore protect. In this context, we 
can see how our experience of the voice might come to condition our experience of ourselves as 
ethical beings who always already stand apart from one another and from what we have come to 
call the “outside world.” 
Throughout this dissertation, I have discussed the overwhelmingly individuated, 
linguistic, and proprietary approach to voice, which characterizes our dominant ethical 
imagination. Then, drawing on the work of voice scholars from across the disciplines, I have 
worked to unsettle the notion that this approach is somehow “natural” or inevitable, proposing 
alternative theoretical openings through which we might begin to listen differently to our own 
voices and the voices of others. Following the work of theorists like Steven Connor, for example, 
I have suggested that we might more productively hear the voice not as an object, but as an 
“event” (Connor 23, Cox 156) or an “effect” (Stanyek and Piekut 18). And, taking a cue from 
philosophers like Adriana Cavarero, I have sought to reorient our attention away from language 
                                                
164 See Chapter Three for my discussion of Jonathan Sterne’s critique of “fidelity” and “originality” in 
sound reproduction. 
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and toward the rich, vibrational resonance of voicing bodies-in-relation. However, as Wysocki 
has noted, it is one thing to simply argue for (and, perhaps by extension, against) the culturally 
conditioned formation of our sensory apparatus. It is quite another to actually experience that 
formation as an embodied, affective encounter. Because our senses are so habituated, it seems 
reasonable to assume that we might have difficulty experiencing them as anything but a given, at 
least in the context of our everyday bodily practice. Perhaps it is here that we might imagine the 
ethical value of works of art and artifice: By forcing us outside of our conventionalized sensory 
orientations to the world and confronting us with disruptive and unfamiliar bodily terrains, such 
works may have the potential to make our own sensory experience accessible to us in ways that 
we might not otherwise encounter it.  
In this dissertation, I am interested in considering how my hybrid, creative-critical 
methodology might serve as potential point of entry to this project—or, at the very least, as a 
potential “[opening] to critical understandings of how our senses shape our relations with others” 
(Wysocki 109).165 Through my critical analysis, I have worked to create a sense of distance 
between the material vibrations of the voice and the deeply rooted cultural values, which have 
taught us to hear those vibrations as something we own, something we are, or something we say, 
in order that we might be recognized and understood as an autonomous, rational subject. On one 
hand, we might reasonably imagine this work of theoretical distancing as a necessary ethical 
prerequisite for the practice-based aesthetic experiments that I carried out in subsequent chapters, 
working to justify—before the fact—the otherwise ethically troubling compositional practices in 
which I engaged. On the other hand, I like to imagine the projects themselves functioning as a 
                                                
165 While Wysocki emphasizes the fact that “our senses are trained through repetition” (104) and thus 
privileges the ethical value of repetitious aesthetic experiences (e.g. video games), she also allows for the 
possibility that nonrepetitive experiences might serve as such ethical “openings,” as well (109). 
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form of emergent ethical practice, which unfolds through the sensory encounter between artist, 
audience, and materials. More specifically, I am interested in how these projects—precisely by 
disrupting our habituated sensory encounters with voice in everyday life—might begin to enable 
us to hear ourselves hearing the voices of others in ways that suggest new, more permeable ways 
of acting, voicing, and being.  
Central to this approach is a spirit of ethical experimentation—not in a scientific sense as 
hypothesis-driven empirical research, but rather as an open-ended, curiosity-driven act of 
aesthetic inquiry. Importantly, rather than taking up our pre-given ethical frameworks as the 
necessary limits of my creative practice, in these projects, I have sought to use my practice itself 
as a testing ground for working through the ethical complexities at hand. When I initially devised 
the concept for these projects, I imagined them as a narrowly reactive intervention into what I 
saw as the unnecessarily restrictive proscriptions of representational ethics, which limited our 
creative engagement with digital voice. At some point along the way, however, something 
shifted, and I have come to realize: that I am no longer simply working against an old ethical 
imaginary, but also, quite possibly, working to create a new one—one which I could never have 
anticipated or even articulated, but which I can’t help but feel has begun to emerge from my 
practice nonetheless. It is in this sense that I have come to see my work here as an exercise in 
composing ethics, as much as an exercise in composing media—and, by extension, as an 
inevitable work in progress. Ultimately, by engaging my own “bodily perceptions” (Wysocki 
110) in the material complexities of digital voice—and by opening that encounter to others as 
shareable “aesthetic experiences” (107)—I am interested in how I might begin to lay the 
groundwork for an ongoing, generative ethics-in-the-making, which begins from and returns to 
the material itself.  
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6.3 ETHICAL EFFECTS AND OPENINGS 
Of course, in considering the potential ethical effects of these projects, it is difficult to speak with 
any clarity to the “bodily perceptions” or “aesthetic experiences” of an outside audience. Rather, 
I can only speak to my own perceptions of and experiences with these projects—and, to a much 
lesser extent, to the outward responses of some of the projects’ key participants. In many ways, 
we might say that aesthetic experiences are powerful precisely for their potential to move and 
affect us beyond the abstraction of the language that we can bring to them. Thus, I would like to 
acknowledge that my attempt to “speak to” my embodied, affective encounters with digital voice 
in this section is, in some sense, to do them an enormous injustice—or, at the very least, to fail to 
fully express or exhaust the deeply felt (and unfelt)166 effects that they have most certainly had 
on me, as an artist and a collaborator, in this process.167 Despite these limitations, however, I 
would like to take this opportunity to listen more closely to these effects, as I have encountered 
them over the course of this exploratory compositional process, and to reflect upon the possible 
ethical openings they suggest.  
                                                
166 I am alluding here to Brian Massumi’s distinction between “affect” and “emotion” (derived from 
Spinoza) wherein “affect”—which he also refers to as “intensity”—is fundamentally prepersonal and thus 
not necessarily “felt” in the way that we might imagine it to be. Emotion, for Massumi, is, by contrast, 
“subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point 
onward defined as personal. […] It is intensity owned and recognized" (28). In this sense, while we can 
only “speak to” what is actually felt or experienced, and thus “owned and recognized” as emotion, we 
should not forget that there is so much more happening at the level of bodily perception that is 
inaccessible to our cognitive and linguistic sense of the “felt.”   
167 Not to mention that fact that I am most definitely writing and not actually “speaking” in the first 
place—to return to my discussion about metaphorical slippage in Chapter Two.  
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6.3.1 Disruption and Distance in Coerced Confessions 
As I discussed in Chapter Four, when I first developed the concept for the Coerced Confessions 
series, I imagined my work as a kind of ethical enactment of the dangers of digital deception—a 
playful acting-out of our deepest fears that our voices might, once committed to media, be made 
to speak against our will in troubling and terrifying ways. (Think back to Ursula and the Little 
Mermaid allegory from Chapter One.) In screening these videos for outside audiences, I have 
often been asked to discuss what I had hoped to accomplish with the project, and, to this day, I 
am not sure I can come up with a satisfying response. In the end, I always come back to the idea 
that I simply wanted to see (and hear) what would happen if? And, in many ways, what actually 
“happened” when I carried out the experiment of the Coerced Confessions project was exactly 
what I had expected: I succeeded in “coercing” a false confession from the body of an unwitting 
actor using only the tools of digital editing software and a bit of ingenuity. If it is true, as I have 
maintained throughout this dissertation, that the experimental method I have practiced here is 
definitively not a scientific method of posing and proving a given hypothesis, then the questions 
might reasonably arise: If all I set out to do was to demonstrate or enact something we all already 
know—namely, that digital voice is a highly manipulable material—then why undertake an 
experiment like this in the first place? What can such an experiment accomplish but to confirm 
our fears or reinforce our suspicions, both of technology and of one another? And where could 
we possibly find the affirmative ethical value in a project like this one? 
I pose these questions, at least in part, in the spirit of the devil’s advocate. As I have 
noted in Chapter Four, I believe that this project has the potential to spark promising critical 
conversation around our prevailing ethical proscriptions against interfering with the voices of 
others. Notably, while the project certainly performs the material manipulability of digital voice, 
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it also performs the fundamentally social limits of this potential—the extent to which, in its 
allegiance to language, the intonation (and thus intention168) of the voice always speaks itself 
beyond our aspirations for control. My decision to present this project in the manner that I 
have—as a series of juxtaposed performances in paired two-channel videos—is designed to bring 
about a moment of realization, in which the audience might apprehend the relationship between 
the two performances (with some gentle help from the title of the series) and then reflect upon 
precisely these ethical complexities. And, to this same end, my decision to draw on the 
politically charged, ethically loaded speech genre of the “coerced confession” was part of a 
calculated effort to incite in the audience a knee-jerk response of moral outrage—a response 
which might then become complicated or even assuaged by reflection on the ethical distance 
between an actual coerced confession and the playful (if problematic) approximation that I have 
carried out in this project. At the same time, however, I am also interested in considering how 
this project might encourage forms of engagement that move beyond this analytical a-ha! 
moment of solving the puzzle behind the videos’ construction—and beyond the equally cerebral 
reflection on the ethics of editing, which I imagine to follow. Indeed, if we consider this project 
in the context of Wysocki’s ethical aesthetics, then perhaps we might imagine its effects in more 
immediate, more visceral terms—disrupting not only the way we think about the voice, as an 
abstract concept, but also the way we inhabit our relationship to the voices we have come to call 
“our own.”  
Certainly, for the actors participating in the project, the experience of watching these 
videos—of witnessing themselves “confess” against their will to these infamous crimes and 
                                                
168 Recall that, for Bakhtin, intonation is expressive of speakerly intention. As his collaborator, Valentin 
Volosinov has suggested, intonation expresses a “double social orientation” toward both the listener and 
the topic or “hero” at hand, suggesting the speaker’s original attitudes and intentions in ways that stretch 
beyond the language itself (105). 
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indiscretions—must have been a profoundly uncanny one. Indeed, in informal comments 
following their initial exposure to the videos, the actors expressed a wide array of emotions, 
ranging from amusement to awe to alarm (often in the same sentence)169—but always with an 
undercurrent of surprise. Despite being informed of the project’s methods and intentions prior to 
their participation (they knew everything except the precise confession they would be “coerced” 
to perform), it is noteworthy that the actors still expressed a certain degree of shock at seeing 
their “coerced confession” unfold in front of them. On one hand, we might read this surprise as a 
rational, critical response to the project’s conceptual intervention: a realization of just how 
readily their voices could open themselves to such radical forms of appropriation, manipulation, 
and re-performance—and not simply in theory, but in practice. On the other hand, this surprise 
might be rooted in something more immediate, more surface-level: the jarring perceptual 
experience of witnessing one’s voice and one’s body sounding and moving and acting in ways 
that are fundamentally foreign —not simply at the level of language, but at a more visceral level 
of gesture, tone, and inflection.  
As the artist behind the Coerced Confessions project, I obviously had a very different 
point of entry into the project—one that left me feeling, at times, not unlike a puppetmaster 
pulling the strings behind the scenes. Notably, unlike the actors, I had full access to all of the 
inside information that made the project tick, including detailed knowledge of the source texts 
from which the scripts had been composed and into which the recorded performances would be 
reverse engineered—knowledge which was deliberately withheld from the actors themselves 
until after the editing was completed. Furthermore, I also had the added benefit of first-hand, 
                                                
169 For example, actor Ken Bolden, who unwittingly reenacted Bill Clinton’s Monica Lewinsky 
confession in the infamous “Map Room Speech,” wrote in an informal email responding to his initial 
viewing, “This is totally cool, disturbing and scary!! […] Amazing. Love it. The ramifications are really 
mind boggling.” 
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experiential access to the apparent “magic” behind project’s method—which is, of course, not 
magic at all, but simply a meticulous process of scripting, editing, and rearrangement. Given this 
position, then, it would be reasonable to assume that my response to the videos might be 
significantly more distant and measured. In the end, however, as I began to watch the “coerced 
confessions” emerge from the actors’ bodies in the editing process, I can remember feeling a 
similar sense of shock wash over me. And it wasn’t the simple fact that my plan had worked, 
which shocked me; the method was so tight that there was no reason to believe that it shouldn’t. 
Instead, it was something in my embodied encounter with the jarring, disjointed, sputtering 
voice-bodies produced by the method, which affected me the most.  
On a basic level, the radical nature of the “reverse remix” method that I invented for this 
project produces a disruptive digital performance of a voice performing itself170—not simply 
beyond its individual speakers’ intentions, but beyond our deeply habituated sensory conventions 
of intentional speech. As I have argued, it is incredibly difficult, in everyday speech contexts, to 
attune oneself to the sound of a voice without hearing first and foremost the language that it 
carries. As Don Ihde explains it, “In ordinary speech the sounding of words remains in the 
background […] as the context and setting in which what is said emerges as foreground” (157). 
This is not to say that we are still somehow being affected by the sound of that voice—again, as 
Brian Massumi puts it, “the skin is faster than the word” (86). However, I wonder if we might 
not be so well trained, by our dominant sensory “regime” (Wysocki 107), to listen to the voice as 
rational communication, that we may need to find ways of disrupting this “natural” flow of 
                                                
170 Again, I am implicitly mobilizing Brandon LaBelle’s distinction between works, which “perform the 
voice”—“plunder[ing] language to reinvent the voice”—versus those that simply “[use] the voice in 
performance, as in traditional theater or spoken-word poetry” (134).   
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communication (which is, of course, anything but natural) through such disorienting aesthetic 
experiences, in order to begin to reattune ourselves to the voice’s vibratory effects.  
In many ways, Adriana Cavarero’s proposal for an embodied “politics of Saying” (200) 
might be read as an attempt to reorient ethics away from the universality and abstraction of 
language and toward precisely the kind of visceral “bodily perceptions” (110) that Wysocki is 
after—in this case, perceptions grounded in the sensory immediacy and lived particularity of the 
voice-in-relation. If this is the case, then, perhaps our challenge is to determine precisely how we 
are to move beyond the universalizing distraction of the “what is said” (Ihde 157) in order to 
more fully immerse ourselves, as sensing bodies, in “the relational uniqueness of a vocal 
emission” (14), which is, for Cavarero, our route to ethical personhood. It strikes me that the 
Coerced Confessions project, as a disruptive vocal performance, might provide one potential 
opening to this project, enabling us to begin to hear ourselves hearing or feel ourselves listening 
to the voices of others in ways that we might not otherwise have access.  
That being said, the other key intervention that this project makes is to muddy these very 
boundaries between self and other, by disrupting the customary relationships between voice, 
body, and intentional speech. In my theoretical reflection on the project in Chapter Four, I posed 
the question: Who—or what—is it that is being coerced? Approached from another angle, we 
might just as easily ask: Who—or what—is it that is acting or performing? In traditional, live 
theatrical works, we might be trained to experience a vocal performance as the work of an 
individual actor, who owns, trains, produces, and controls the voice that emits from his or her 
body. In this project, however, what we experience is something quite different: a multilayered, 
distributed performance, which draws together the capacities of the actors, the artist/editor, the 
technology, and the voice itself, into a complex material assemblage; a performance, which 
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cannot be broken down and attributed to the agency of individual “actors,” in any sense of the 
term; a performance, perhaps, which enacts the material relationality of voice, as it actually 
functions in our contemporary technoculture.  
Returning to Cavarero’s proposal, then, perhaps what we find in the Coerced Confessions 
project is an aesthetic experience that complicates, without contradicting or cancelling out, the 
possibility for such a relational ethics of voicing. On one hand, in offering a palpable perceptual 
experience of the voice, as it is deployed, dispersed, and diffracted across complex constellations 
of material actants, this project goes great lengths to unsettle the neat one-to-one, face-to-face, 
human-to-human model of ethical relations that Cavarero proposes. On the other hand, amidst 
the mess of tangled bodies and capacities and effects that this project performs, one key element 
of Cavarero’s model remains: the unmistakable identifiability of the actors’ voices. Crucially, 
despite the fact that the actors’ speech-as-language has been transmitted, transduced, and then 
distorted beyond recognition in the course of this distributed digital performance, in watching 
that performance, it seems that we still can’t help but experience their speech-as-voice, in its 
“corporeal roots” (206) and “unrepeatable uniqueness” (190), as produced by the body of a 
particular someone. Perhaps what emerges here, then, is a possibility for the deeply felt relational 
ethics that Cavarero is after, but one that begins to imagine the voice not as a strictly human 
exchange, but rather as a perceptual opening to experience our ethical relations with the broader 
material world. In other words, rather than renouncing the role of personhood in ethical relations 
altogether—which, I admit, makes me as nervous as it makes Cavarero—perhaps we might 
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imagine the voice as an opening to an ethics of personhood-plus.171 I would like to examine this 
possibility further in my discussion of my second media project in the section that follows. 
6.3.2 Intimacy and Intensity172 in Our Time is Up 
In discussing my work on Our Time is Up in Chapter Five, I wrote at length about the practical, 
technical decisions involved in my effort to reimagine the recorded voices of the late Josiah 
Patton and Juanita Bowman as “actors”—and collaborators—in a fictional audio drama. Using 
Jason Stanyek and Benjamin Piekut’s concept of “matching” in the posthumous duet (29), I 
described my efforts to negotiate a shared sonic environment, in which the three voices—
Josiah’s, Juanita’s, and my own—could converse as if mutually cohabiting the imagined time 
and space of the drama. Then, drawing on Bakhtin’s sociological theories of language, I worked 
to extend the “matching” concept to account for the dilemma of appropriated speech, which 
arose from the context of the dramatic narrative genre. The initial concept for this project 
emerged out of a theoretical abstraction: my fascination with the possibility for collaboration 
with the dead. At first, I will admit, I saw Stanyek and Piekut’s notion of “intermundane 
collaboration” (32) as incredibly provocative but perhaps a little over the top for my taste. And, 
as such, at first, I expected I would simply apply this theoretical framework to my project, at a 
certain level of remove, in order to justify my ethical intervention—at least to my audience, if 
                                                
171 In this dissertation, I have approached the voice as what we might call a “born-human” phenomenon, 
limiting my inquiry to the sonic vibrations emitted from the human vocal chords and articulated by the 
tongue and mouth. However, as synthesized speech and vocal interfaces become increasingly common, 
perhaps we must also to attend to the paradoxical question of “nonhuman voice”—or voice that originates 
in the machine—and its ethical ramifications. I see this as a fruitful area for future research and practice. 
172 I am drawing here from Norie Neumark’s notion of digital voice as participating in “an aesthetics of 
intimacy and intensity” (95). 
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not also to myself. What I did not expect, however, was to actually experience this uncanny 
collaboration at the level of embodied, perceptual practice—to feel myself forming complex 
attachments and relationships across the threshold of death.  
In preparing for this project, I listened to dozens of voices of the dead, which I sourced 
from online oral history collections, downloaded to my hard drive, and assembled into a 
randomized playlist to keep me company on a solo cross-country drive. And, as I moved across 
the landscape, alone, over those four long days, I did feel strangely accompanied (I can think of 
no other suitable word), as if each voice were somehow a warm body, sitting next to me like a 
string of hitchhikers, telling me stories. Of course, the voices did tell stories, and those stories 
were most certainly part of the connection that I felt—even when the stories themselves were a 
little tedious, and at times they were. But the voices also sang songs and spoke of distant wars in 
languages I could not understand. And others only wailed faintly and indistinctly from beneath 
the static of decades of tape decay. Yet, still, I felt a certain closeness, a certain intimacy—not 
the deep, slow kind that develops over years of committed friendship, but the intense, fleeting 
kind that comes with the isolation and forced proximity of sharing ride across the sprawling 
Montana Rockies. Of course, from an ontological perspective, this notion of “presence” is deeply 
problematic, and, in fact, I have dedicated a significant portion of this dissertation to arguing 
against such metaphysical attachments. At the same time, however, there is a sense in which we 
cannot help but feel some presence of a person in the recorded voices of another. And, if we are 
working to imagine an ethics by way of aesthetic experience, then I have to believe that this 
sensation counts for something. 
As I have discussed in Chapter Three, media artist and theorist Norie Nuemark has 
suggested that we might account for this feeling as an “authenticity effect” (95). Rather than 
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denying or dismissing our affective encounters with vocal “presence” as nothing more than a 
problematic “call to (or from) essentialism,” Neumark argues that we might instead embrace 
them, as an expression of the performativity of digital voice itself. In other words, when taken up 
by digital arts and media, voice has the uniquely performative potential to enact what Neumark 
calls “an aesthetics of intimacy and intensity,” to the extent that it can actually reach out and 
“call the other into an intimate relationship—it can performatively effect [sic] intimacy” (95). 
Importantly, and in direct conversation with Cavarero, Neumark locates this performative 
potential not in the content of intimate speech, but, instead, in the vibrational effectivity of the 
voice itself. Here, the performativity of speech is not about “do[ing] things with words” (qtd. in 
Neumark 96), as J. L. Austin has suggested, but rather, about “Doing Things With Voices”—
and, as I have argued, by extension, allowing voices to do things with us.  
Considered in this context, it makes sense that my experience of these voices of the 
dead—particularly in the heightened sensory isolation of a long, lonely drive—might have had 
such a powerful effect on me. And it also makes sense that I might have had difficulty explaining 
or accounting for my precise motivations for selecting one particular voice—the voice of Clella 
Juanita Bowman (“Juanita”)—from among all of the others, to work with on this project. Indeed, 
in my reflection in Chapter Five, I noted the practical features that made Juanita’s interview 
stand out as a strong candidate for the project—the relatively (relatively) good audio quality, for 
example, and her tendency to theatrically reenact the speech of others. But, if I’m honest with 
myself, there were certainly other voices among those that I listened to along the road with 
cleaner sound and sufficient present-tense speech to make them viable candidates. Ultimately, 
what drew me to Juanita’s voice was not a matter of such technical concerns. Nor was it the 
stories she told, which were often (as the interviewer notes in her online record) long, rambling, 
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repetitious monologues.173 Rather, it was something in the energy and intensity with which spoke 
those stories, something inexplicable in her voice itself that made me want to listen and to get to 
know her better.  
And, over the course of the project, I did listen to Juanita—likely as no one has listened 
to her in decades, if ever, and certainly not since her death almost fifteen years back. Despite the 
open accessibility of her interview through the online archive, I have to wonder how many 
people have taken the time to listen to Juanita at all, let alone to listen to all seven scratchy hours 
of her prolific life story, with all of its wonderful wanderings and digressions and redundancies. 
Perhaps a history scholar writing on West Coast women’s role in wartime factory labor, but even 
then, such a task would presumably require a different kind of listening—more selective; more 
attentive to facts and meanings; less engrossed in the sound of every breath, every cough, every 
subtle shift in timbre and intonation. Indeed, over the weeks and months I spent with Juanita in 
producing this project, I believe I listened to her in a way that I have never listened to anyone, 
ever. And, for someone I have never met, someone I never will meet, someone who died quietly 
when I was a still a teenager in a suburb hundreds of miles away, I can’t help but feel—however 
strange it sounds—as if I came to know her all the same.  
Certainly, in this sense, my relationship with Juanita stands in stark contrast to my 
relationship with Josiah, the other key actor in this project—at least as a point of entry. 
Significantly, unlike Juanita, I did know Josiah, quite intimately, during his lifetime. As I have 
mentioned, I knew him as Grandpa. And I loved him for the lively, living, breathing, laughing, 
sobbing, sensitive, stubborn, proud, vulnerable human being that he was. My decision to use my 
                                                
173 This is not to say that these stories are not rich and fascinating and worth listening to, in full. I would 
encourage anyone who might have the inclination to visit Juanita’s record on the VOAHA website and 
listen to her interview. 
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grandfather’s voice for this project was driven by dual desires: First, it was motivated by my 
desire to challenge myself to more radically and deliberately depart from any preconceived ideas 
about the person and the story behind a given voice, as a “Voice of the Past,”174 in order to 
reimagine that voice’s many possible futures—a task which, as I have noted, I found incredibly 
difficult in my early experiments with posthumous voices in Converse: Conversations Between 
My Grandparents.175 And, second, it was motivated by my desire to keep myself in check, from 
an ethical standpoint, in the knowledge that anything I did with a dead person’s recorded voice in 
this project, I would have to be comfortable doing with the voice of someone I loved. But while I 
might have started this project with the premise that I knew Josiah Patton, in the end, I think I 
was surprised to find that I had come to know him differently.  
In casting the role of the therapist in the audio drama, at first, I seriously considered 
seeking out a professional voice actor to play the part (or at least someone with more theatrical 
experience than I had garnered over three summers of children’s drama camp). But, in the end, I 
bit the bullet and took the role myself, hoping that I could pull it off, if not gracefully then at 
least relatively inconspicuously. On a practical level, I simply did not have the resources to pay 
someone else to do the work, and I had already pressed my luck far enough requesting favors for 
the Coerced Confessions project. But, more than that, as I pieced together the exchange between 
the characters, I began to realize: That, somewhere along the line, I had actually started to feel 
like Jake and Helen’s therapist. Indeed, as I immersed myself in the painstaking listening and re-
listening and editing and re-voicing that went into composing this drama, I found that I was 
increasingly not sitting alone in my desk at home or at my regular post in my favorite coffee 
                                                
174 Again, I am implicitly referring here to oral historian Paul Thompson’s seminal book The Voice of the 
Past, which arguably set the stage for the explosion of the ‘voice’ metaphor in the field of oral history. 
175 See Chapter Five for a detailed discussion of this project. 
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shop, but in a high-backed chair across a low-lying coffee table, looking past a box of tissues 
into the eyes of two proud and weary people—people who were, perhaps like all of us, desperate 
to be heard, to be understood, to be loved.  
Of course, to suggest that I saw these things is perhaps inaccurate, but I certainly felt 
them. At times, it was painful. At other times, it was painfully funny. But either way, as I sat and 
listened—to the weighty heaves of Jake’s sobs or to the sad notes of resignation behind Helen’s 
all-too-curt responses—I began to feel them as if they were my own. And, in the process, I began 
to feel a sense of my own responsibility to them, my investment in their process: my desire to 
comfort or to heal, my impulse to reach out and put my hand on a slumped shoulder that wasn’t 
there—or, admittedly, at times, to reach out and smack some sense into the both of them. And 
then I would wake up to the sudden realization: That I was, in fact, sitting alone in my apartment 
or (worse) in the middle of a busy café, wincing awkwardly or laughing under my breath or 
fighting back the tears that I felt, inexplicably, for two people who I knew weren’t present, in 
any sense of the term, but who I had somehow come to experience as if they were. Indeed, this 
was, without a doubt, the most surprising—and most satisfying—outcome of my experience with 
this project: Not the extent to which I was able to change these voices into something new, but 
the extent to which, in doing so, these voices changed me.  
Of course, from a certain standpoint, this is all a work of fiction, and “Jake” and “Helen” 
are only characters that Josiah, Juanita, and I have worked together (if you buy my argument for 
collaboration) to conjure or invent. But even if that is true—and I’m not convinced that it’s so 
simple—does it really matter? Does it make my experience with their voices any less real? Does 
it leave me any less changed? If what we are seeking here is, in fact, an “ethics of effects” 
(Stanyek and Piekut 34), one which is grounded in the material relationality of the voice, then 
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perhaps it isn’t important from whence these voices come, or whether the bodies they conjure—
the “embodiment that the voice brings forth in the making” (Neumark 114)—are present or 
absent, living or dead. Ultimately, if what we are after here is a fundamentally visceral, 
perceptual “politics of Saying” (Cavarero 200), then shouldn’t our experience of that saying 
simply be enough?  
As I have noted, from where I stand, I can speak only to my own experience of the 
project—and, even then, only to the extent that it is possible to channel my feelings and 
sensations into words. For this reason, I will not attempt to guess at the potential experience of 
an outside audience encountering this project. Nor will I pretend that the actors in this project 
inhabit a state where “experience” is even a question. Obviously, they do not, and that fact is, in 
many ways, precisely the point. However, I do want to acknowledge the possibility, even the 
likelihood, that an audience’s experience with these voices might not produce the same 
effect/affect that I have experienced—or, at the very least, not to the same degree. However 
powerful an aesthetic encounter that this project might offer, it is ultimately incapable of 
replicating or reproducing for the audience my own bodily encounter with these voices, as artist, 
as editor, as therapist.  
Indeed, one important difference, which sets my experience with this project apart from 
that of a potential audience, relates to the question of temporality. A typical listener encountering 
this project from the outside, in whatever context they encounter it, is unlikely to spend more 
time with these voices than the total running time of the audio drama itself, from start to finish—
and, given the present economy of attention in which we live, likely far less than that. Perhaps 
the most eager audience will return for a second listen, but, for the most part, the experience the 
project invites is one that is brief, delimited, and singular. In comparison to the hours and weeks 
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and months that I spent with “Jake” and “Helen”—and, by extension Josiah and Juanita—well, 
there is no comparison. This is not to say that an audience might not come to experience some 
form of intense, fleeting intimacy with these voices, similar to that which I experienced with my 
initial posthumous playlist on that cross-country drive. However, there seems to me to be a 
palpable difference between the kind of bond that develops over short, singular encounters 
between speakers and listeners and the kind that grows out of more substantial investments of 
time, of energy, of collective labor. 
Of course, the connection between ethics and perception does not boil down to a simple 
question of duration: listen to someone for long enough and you’ll feel your connection to them. 
In fact, Cavarero’s proposal explicitly seeks to move away from the politics of identity and 
territory, which are established over time as static objects, in favor of a more contingent politics 
of the “absolute local,” which emerges fluidly in the momentary relationships created between 
voicing beings (210). As I have suggested, however, the problem might lie in the way that 
Cavarero defines this category of voicing beings, as “live,” living, and indisputably human 
speakers. Thus, if we are seeking to open this category to account for our complex 
interrelationships—with technologies, with nonhuman materialities, and with the dead—then 
perhaps what we need to do is train our senses to experience those interrelationships in the first 
place. And importantly, as Wysocki argues, “our senses are trained through repetition” (104, 
emphasis mine). If this is the case, then perhaps there is something not only in the time I spent 
listening to Josiah and Juanita’s voices, but also in the way in which that listening unfolded—
namely, as the highly repetitious practice of listening and re-listening, which the compositional 
process required. Similar to the aesthetics of disruption that I described in the Coerced 
Confessions project, perhaps there is a way in which this repetition enabled me to listen to these 
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voices beyond the depth of the words and meanings they conveyed to more closely attune myself 
to the surface-level vibrational intensity of the voices themselves. Unlike Coerced Confessions, 
however, what I experienced in this attunement was not a distancing from the people behind the 
voices or from the voice itself, but rather a paradoxical closeness and intimacy with these non-
people or past-people, through the visceral technological transductions of the voice itself.  
Which brings us to another key distinction between my own experience with the voices in 
this project and that of the audience: The “reciprocal invocation” (Cavarero 208) to both listen 
and respond. That is to say, while an audience is invited to experience the “intimacy and 
intensity” (Neumark 95) of these voices of the dead as passive listeners, the project does not, in 
any explicit way, prompt them to enter into the conversation. Of course, one might reasonably 
argue that, under Cavarero’s model, such a reply would be trivial, since there would ultimately 
be no conscious, living being on the other end to receive one’s voice. At the same time, however, 
if we take seriously Wysocki’s argument that we must “learn to be bodies that somehow perceive 
not alone but socially” (107), then I have to believe that this act of reciprocal sociality—this act 
of response—does matter and, in fact, matters deeply, in every sense of the term. While my 
experience of listening to Josiah and Juanita’s voices was, in itself, quite powerful, the thing that 
sets it apart, most markedly, from any experience of listening to archival voices of the dead was 
the sense of mutual reciprocation that our shared endeavor brought forth. In other words, built 
into my collaboration with Josiah and Juanita, there was a tacit requirement that I not only listen 
but also speak back—figuratively, as I worked to edit and rearrange the voices in response to the 
possibilities and limitations they presented, but also literally and materially, as I anticipated, 
scripted, and performed my own vocal responses to the characters that emerged. In the end, I 
believe it was this auto-affective sensation—of feeling myself listen and then feeling myself 
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respond in kind—which truly anchored my relationship to the voices in this project and out of 
which the most exciting ethical opening has emerged.  
My experience composing this posthumous audio drama is, of course, an example of a 
particularly “intensified” or “heightened” (109 Wysocki) aesthetic encounter with digital voice. I 
do not mean to present it as a direct analogue for the kind of work that we, as compositionists (in 
both the narrowest and broadest senses of the term),176 should be seeking to carry out on a 
broader scale. And I certainly don’t intend it as a replicable model for a new, experimental 
classroom genre. However, if it is indeed the case, as Wysocki argues, that “[a]ny text we 
compose engages us aesthetically” (110, emphasis mine), then perhaps we would do well to 
attend to these questions of perceptual experience, bodily encounter, and relational ethics in all 
of our work with digital voices, and even with the core materials of our practice, more generally. 
Most discussions of ethics and aesthetics (including those that Wysocki outlines in her essay) 
tend to focus exclusively on the bodily experience of an outside audience. However, as my work 
here suggests, perhaps we must also consider ourselves—as writers, artists, and composers—as a 
valid and valuable audience for the ethical attunements that emerge from our practice. Even 
when we are not entirely sure of the palpable “outcomes” that our work might produce (and I 
hope that, at times, we aren’t), perhaps we must remind ourselves: That the work is worth 
pursuing nonetheless, that there is ethical value in the making itself.  
                                                
176 I am alluding here both to the specific disciplinary use of the term to identify scholars of composition 
and rhetoric, on one hand, and to Bruno Latour’s broader political/ethical mobilization of the term in “An 
Attempt at a Compositionist Manifesto.”    
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6.4 ON “LIVING WELL TOGETHER” 
At the end of her essay, Wysocki poses the question: “What can we do, perceptually, to live well 
together?” (“Unfitting Beauties” 109). This, I believe, is the crux of the matter at hand. But, as 
my work here suggests, perhaps we must also step back and ask ourselves: Precisely who—or 
what—constitutes this we? As we have seen in the work of Adriana Cavarero, the voice emerges 
as a promising perceptual inroad to establishing this ethical “we,” through a relationally 
embodied “politics of Saying” (200). At the same time, however, the kind of voice that Cavarero 
imagines is one that is invariably “live,” living, and human—and thus, as I have argued, 
potentially out of touch with the many complex ways in which we actually encounter voice in 
our day to day lives. Throughout this dissertation, I have worked to move past such idealized 
frameworks, which tie the voice to the time and place of the live speaking body, proposing 
instead a more flexible, distributed model of digital vocality and using my practice as a platform 
for exploring its ethical potential. Ultimately, I am interested in how the voice—precisely in its 
complex material entanglements with humans and machines, with selves and others, with “the 
living, dead, and not-yet-born” (Stanyek and Piekut 34)—might provide us with a powerful 
opportunity to both anchor and expand that “we” to account for a fuller range of our ethical 
relations.  
If it is true, as Stanyek and Piekut suggest, that “[p]ersonhood is always collaborative,” 
that it “cut[s] across clear distinctions of materiality/discourse, technology/organicity, and 
bounded lifetimes/eternal deaths” (18), then perhaps the challenge we face—as writers, artists, 
and composers of all kinds—is to find ways of making that collaboration felt, as a visceral, 
perceptual way of being-in-the-world, and then to find ways of incorporating that feeling into our 
habituated sensory lives. In the course of my own aesthetic practice in two media projects that I 
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produced for this dissertation, I have explored the compositional potential of digital voice, in 
particular, as a possible point of entry to this pursuit. And, while I may have ultimately raised 
more questions than I have answered, I am heartened by the ethical openings that I have 
discovered in the process. In the end, however, it is important to remind ourselves that voice is 
just one of the many possible materials with which we might undertake this work: to perform, to 
enact, “to compose a common world” (Latour “An Attempt” 484). 
“What can we do, perceptually, to live well together?” (Wysocki 109). This is a question 
that is, or should be, at the heart of our work in the world. But it is not a question that we are 
likely to answer by standing back and looking at the world from a distance, by dissecting it into 
its component parts and simply leaving them to rot. Rather, it is a question that calls us to pick 
up those “ruins” and to work to “reassemble [them] piece by piece” (Latour 476). It is a question 
that calls us to surrender our incessant drive for meaning, mastery, and control. And, most 
importantly, it is a question that calls us to slow down, to lean in, to attune ourselves to our 
interconnectedness with others and with the felt—and even the not-yet-felt—material world. In 
the words of Bruno Latour, “It is time to compose—in all the meanings of the word, including to 
compose with, that is to compromise, to care…” (487). This is where I end. And where I begin.  
 225 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Altman, Rick. “The Material Heterogeneity of Recorded Sound.” Sound Theory, Sound Practice.  
Ed. Rick Altman. New York: Routledge, 1992. 15-31. Print. 
 
---. “Moving Lips: Cinema as Ventriloquism.” Yale French Studies 60 (1980): 67-79. Print. 
 
Andersen, Hans Christian. “The Little Mermaid.” Fairy Tales By Hans Andersen. London:  
Harrap, 1985. Print. 
 
Anderson, Erin R. “The Olive Project: An Oral History Composition in Multiple Modes.”  
Kairos: A Journal of Rhetoric, Technology, and Pedagogy 15.2 (2010). Web. 
 
Appelbaum, David. Voice. Albany: State University of New York, 1990. 1-41. Print. 
 
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998. Print. 
 
Austin, J. L. How To Do Things With Words. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1975. Print. 
 
Bakhtin, Mikhail M. “Discourse in the Novel.” The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Ed.  
Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas. 1981. Print. 
 
---. “Dostoevsky’s Polyphonic Novel and Its Treatment in Critical Literature.” Problems of  
Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Trans. Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 
1984. 5-46. Print. 
 
---. “The Problem of Speech Genres.” Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. Trans. Vern W.  
McGee. Austin: U of Texas P, 1986. 60-102. Print. 
 
Ball, Cheryl E. and Ryan M. Moeller. “Converging the ASS[umptions] between U and ME; or  
How new media can bridge a scholarly/creative split in English Studies.” Computers and 
Composition Online. Special Issue: Media Convergence. 2008. Web. 
 
Barad, Karen. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter  
and Meaning. Durham: Duke University, 2007. Print. 
 
Barthes, Roland. Image, Music, Text. Ed. Stephen Heath. London: Fontana, 1997. 179-189. Print. 
 
 226 
Bartholomae, David. “Writing with Teachers: A Conversation with Peter Elbow.” College  
Composition and Communication 46.1 (1995): 62-71. Print. 
 
--- and Peter Elbow. “Responses to Bartholomae and Elbow.” College Composition and  
Communication 46.1 (1995): 84-92. Print. 
 
Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Illuminations.  
Ed. Hannah Arendt. New York: Schocken, 1968. 217-251. Print. 
 
Blau, Herbert. Reality Principles: From the Absurd to the Virtual. Ann Arbor: University of  
Michigan, 2011. Print. 
 
Bolden, Ken. “Re: videos are up!” Message to the author. 10 Mar. 2013. E-mail. 
 
Bowden, Darsie. “The Rise of a Metaphor: ‘Voice’ in Composition Pedagogy.” Rhetoric Review  
14.1 (1995): 173-188. Print. 
 
Brooke, Collin Gifford. Lingua Fracta: Toward a Rhetoric of New Media. Cresskill, NJ:  
Hampton, 2009. Print. 
 
Brophy, Philip. “Vocalizing the Posthuman.” Voice: Vocal Aesthetics in Digital Arts and Media.  
Eds. Norie Neumark, Ross Gibson, and Theo van Leeuwen. Cambridge: MIT, 2010. 361-
382. Print. 
 
Brueggeman, Brenda Jo. “Delivering Disability, Willing Speech.” Bodies in Commotion:  
Disability and Performance. Ed. Carrie Sandahl and Philip Auslander. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan, 2005. 17-29. Print. 
 
Burgh, James. “An Essay on the Art of Speaking.” The Art of Speaking. Baltimore: John W.  
Butler, 1804. 3-54. Print. 
 
Burroughs, William S. The Ticket That Exploded. New York: Grove, 1967. Print. 
 
Case, Gretchen A. “Tic(k): A Performance of Time and Memory.” Remembering: Oral History  
Performance. Ed. Della Pollack. New York: Palgrave, 2005. 129-142. Print. 
 
Cavarero, Adriana. For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression.  
Stanford: Stanford University, 2005. Print. 
 
Chion, Michel. The Voice in Cinema. Ed. Claudia Gorbman. New York: Columbia University,  
1999. Print. 
 
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. “On the Character of the Orator: Book III.” Cicero on Oratory and  
Orators. Ed. and Trans. J.S. Watson. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University, 1970. 
191-261. Print. 
 
 227 
Clayton, Lenka. Qaeda, Quality, Question, Quickly, Quickly, Quiet. 2001. Video. 
 
Cleary, Cindy. “Bowman, Clella Juanita.” VOAHA II: Virtual Oral/Aural History Archive. n.d.  
California State Long Beach University Library. Web. 4 Nov. 2013. 
 
Comstock, Michelle and Mary E. Hocks. “Voice in the Cultural Soundscape: Sonic Literacy in  
Composition Studies.” Computers and Composition Online. 23.3 (2006). Web. 
 
Connor, Steven. Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism. New York: Oxford, 2000. 3  
43. Print. 
 
Connors, Robert J. “The Differences between Speech and Writing: Ethos, Pathos, and Logos.  
College Composition and Communication 30.3 (1979): 285-290. Print. 
 
Cox, Christoph. “Beyond Representation and Signification: Toward a Sonic Materialism.”  
Journal of Visual Culture 10.2 (2011): 145-161. Print. 
 
Crook, Tim. Radio Drama: Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge, 1999. Print 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1976. Print. 
 
Dolar, Mladen. A Voice and Nothing More. Cambridge: MIT, 2006. Print. 
 
Dougherty, Jack and Candace Simpson. “Oral History Interviews — Who Owns Oral History? A  
Creative Commons Solution.” On The Line: How Schooling, Housing, and Civil Rights 
Shaped Hartford and its Suburbs. 11 Aug 2012. Trinity College. Web. 1 Sept. 2013. 
 
Dyson, Frances. Sounding New Media: Immersion and Embodiment in the Arts and Culture.  
Berkeley: University of California, 2009. Print. 
 
Elbow, Peter. “The Shifting Relationships between Speech and Writing.” College Composition  
and Communication 36.3 (1985): 283-303. Print. 
 
---. Vernacular Eloquence: What Speech Can Bring to Writing. New York: Oxford, 2012. Print. 
 
---. “What Do We Mean When We Talk about Voice in Texts?” Voices on Voice: Perspectives,  
Definitions, Inquiry. Ed. Kathleen Blake Yancey. Urbana: National Council of Teachers 
of English, 1994. 1-35. Print. 
 
Eldred, Janet C. “The Technology of Voice.” College Composition and Communication 48.3  
(1997): 334-347. Print. 
 
Eynon, Bret. “Reflections on Oral History in the New Millennium: Roundtable Comments – Oral  
History and the New Century.” Oral History Review 26.2 (1999): 16-27. Print. 
 
Fast, Omer. “CNN Concatenated.” 2002. Video. 
 228 
 
Farmer, Frank. Saying and Silence: Listening to Composition with Bakhtin. Logan: Utah State  
University, 2001. Print. 
 
Frisch, Michael. “Oral History and the Digital Revolution: Toward a Post-Documentary  
Sensibility.” The Oral History Reader. Ed. Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson. New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 102-114. Print. 
 
---. A Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft and Meaning of Oral and Public History. Albany:  
State University of New York, 1990. Print. 
 
Gluck, Sherna Berger. “Reflections on Oral History in the New Millennium: Roundtable  
Comments – From First Generation Oral Historians to Fourth and Beyond.” Oral History  
Review 26.2 (1999): 1-9. Print. 
 
--- and Daphne Patai, eds. Women’s Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History. New York:  
Routledge, 1991. Print. 
 
Goldblatt, David. Art and Ventriloquism. New York: Routledge, 2006. Print. 
 
Goldsmith, Kenneth. Uncreative Writing: Managing Language in the Digital Age. New York:  
Columbia, 2011. Print. 
 
Gould, Glenn. The Glenn Gould Reader. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984. Print. 
 
---. “The Idea of North.” The Solitude Trilogy: Three Sound Documentaries. Canadian  
Broadcasting Corporation, 2000. MP3. 
 
Grele, Ronald J. “The History of Oral History.” YouTube. 30 June 2010. Columbia University.  
Web. 16 Apr. 2011. 
 
Halasek, Kay. A Pedagogy of Possibility: Bakhtinian Perspectives on Composition Studies.  
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1999. Print. 
 
Hardy, Charles III. “Painting in Sound: Aural History and Audio Art.” Oral History: The  
Challenges of Dialogue. Ed. Marta and Krzysztof Zamorski. Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins, 2009. 147-167. Print. 
 
Hawhee, Debra. Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece. Austin: University of  
Texas, 2005. Print. 
 
Hayles, N. Katherine. “Voices Out of Bodies, Bodies Out of Voices: Audiotape and the  
Production of Subjectivity.” Sound States: Innovative Poetics and Acoustical 
Technologies. Ed. Adalaide Kirby Morris. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 
1997. 74-96. Print. 
 
 229 
Ihde, Don. Listening and Voice: A Phenomenology of Sound. Albany: State University of New  
York, 2007. Print. 
 
Johnstone, Christopher Lyle. “Communicating in Classical Contexts: The Centrality of  
Delivery.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 87.2 (2001): 121-143. Print. 
 
Kahn, Douglas. Noise, Water, Meat: A History of Sound in the Arts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,  
1999. Print. 
 
---. “Reagan Speaks for Himself.” Ubuweb. 1980. Audio. 5 May 2013. 
 
Kane, Brian. “Acousmatic Fabrications: Les Paul and the ‘Les Paulverizer.’” Journal of Visual  
Culture 10.2 (2011): 212-231. Print. 
 
Kerr, Daniel. “‘We Know What the Problem is’: Using Oral History to Develop a Collaborative  
Analysis of Homelessness from the Bottom Up.” Oral History Review 30.1 (2003): 27-
45. Print. 
 
Kreiman, Jody and Diana Van Lancker Sidtis. Foundations of Voice Studies: An  
Interdisciplinary Approach to Voice Production and Perception. Malden: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011. 1-24. Print. 
 
LaBelle, Brandon. Background Noise: Perspectives on Sound Art. New York: Continuum  
International, 2006. Print. 
 
---. “Raw Orality: Sound Poetry and Live Bodies.” Voice: Vocal Aesthetics in Digital Arts and  
Media. Eds. Norie Neumark, Ross Gibson, and Theo van Leeuwen. Cambridge: MIT, 
2010. 147-171. Print. 
 
Latour, Bruno. “An Attempt at a ‘Compositionist Manifesto.” New Literary History 41  
(2010): 471-490. Print. 
 
---. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. New York: Oxford,  
2007. Print. 
 
Leggo, Carl. “Questions I Need to Ask before I Advise My Students to Write in Their Own  
Voices.” Rhetoric Review 10.1 (1991): 143-152. Print. 
 
The Little Mermaid. Dir. Ron Clements and John Musker. Perf. Jodi Benson, Samuel E. Wright,  
and Rene Auberjonois. Disney, 1989. Film. 
 
Lunsford, Andrea. “Writing Technologies, and the Fifth Canon.”  Computers and Composition  
23 (2006): 169-177. Print. 
 
Majumdar, Neepa. Wanted Cultured Ladies Only! Female Stardom and Cinema in India, 1930s -  
1950s. Urbana/Chicago: University of Illinois, 2009. Print. 
 230 
 
Massumi, Brian. Parables of the Virtual. Durham: Duke University Press, 2002. Print. 
 
McCaffery, Steve. “From Phonic to Sonic: The Emergence of the Audio-Poem.” Sound States:  
Innovative Poetics and Acoustical Technologies. Ed. Adalaide Kirby Morris. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina, 1997. 149-168. Print. 
 
McCorkle, Ben. Rhetorical Delivery as Technological Discourse: A Cross-Historical Study.  
Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2012. Print. 
 
McHugh, Siobhan. “The Affective Power of Sound: Oral History on Radio.” Oral History  
Review 39.2 (2012): 187-206. Print. 
 
McKee, Heidi. “Sound Matters: Notes Toward the Analysis and Design of Sound in Multimodal  
Webtexts.” Computers and Composition 23.3 (2006): 335-354. Print. 
 
Munster, Anna. Materializing New Media: Embodiment in Information Aesthetics. Hanover:  
Dartmouth College Press, 2006. Print.  
 
Nelson, Jon. “Douglas Kahn.” Some Assembly Required. 6 June 2008. Web. 29 April 2009. 
 
Neumark, Norie. “Doing Things with Voices: Performativity and Voice.” Voice: Vocal  
Aesthetics in Digital Arts and Media. Eds. Norie Neumark, Ross Gibson, and Theo van 
Leeuwen. Cambridge: MIT, 2010. 95-118. Print. 
 
---. “The Paradox of Voice.” Voice: Vocal Aesthetics in Digital Arts and Media. Eds. Norie  
Neumark, Ross Gibson, and Theo van Leeuwen. Cambridge: MIT, 2010. xv-xxxiii. Print. 
 
Odier, Daniel. The Job: Interviews with William S. Burroughs. New York: Penguin, 1989. Print. 
 
Ong, Walter J. The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious  
History. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981. Print. 
 
Palmeri, Jason. Remixing Composition: A History of Multimodal Writing Pedagogy. Carbondale:  
Southern Illinois University Press, 2012. Print. 
 
Pollack, Della. “Introduction: Remembering.” Remembering: Oral History Performance. Ed.  
Della Pollack. New York: Palgrave, 2005. 1-17. Print. 
 
Portelli, Alessandro. “Oral History as Genre.” Narrative and Genre. Eds. Mary Chamberlain and  
Paul Thompson. New York: Routledge, 1998. 23-45. Print. 
 
Quintilian. Institutes of Oratory. London: George Bell and Sons, 1876. Print. 
 
Radcliffe, Terry. “Talk-Write Composition: A Theoretical Model Proposing the Use of Speech to  
Improve Writing.” Research in the Teaching of English. 6.2 (1972): 187-199. Print. 
 231 
 
Rée, Jonathan. I See a Voice: Deafness, Language, and the Senses—a Philosophical History.  
New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999. Print. 
 
Rice, Jeff. “Making of Ka-Knowledge: Digital Aurality.” Computers and Composition 23.3  
(2006): 266-279. Print. 
 
Ridolfo, Jim and Dànielle Nicole DeVoss. “Composing for Recomposition: Rhetorical Velocity  
and Delivery.” Kairos: A Journal of Rhetoric, Technology, and Pedagogy 13.2 (2009). 
Web. 
 
Rouverol, Alicia J. “Trying to Be Good: Lessons in Oral History and Performance.”  
Remembering: Oral History Performance. Ed. Della Pollack. New York: Palgrave, 2005. 
19-43. Print. 
 
Rush, James. The Philosophy of the Human Voice. Philadelphia: Grigg & Elliot, 1833. Print. 
 
Sataloff, Robert Thayer. “Clinical Anatomy and Physiology of the Voice.” Voice Science. Ed.  
Robert Thayer Sataloff. San Diego: Plural Publications, 2005. 53-87. Print. 
 
Savran, David. Breaking the Rules: The Wooster Group. New York: Theater Communications  
Group, 1986. Print. 
 
Schaeffer, Pierre. “Acousmatics.” Audio Culture: Readings in Modern Music. Ed. Christopher  
Cox and Daniel Warner. New York: Continuum, 2004. 76-81. Print. 
 
Schlichter, Annette. “Do Voices Matter? Vocality, Materiality, Gender Performativity.” Body &  
Society 17.1 (2011): 31-52. Print. 
 
Selfe, Cynthia L. “The Movement of Air, the Breath of Meaning: Aurality and Multimodal  
Composing.” College Composition and Communication 60.4 (2009): 616-663. Print. 
 
Selzer, Jack. “Habeas Corpus: An Introduction.” Rhetorical Bodies. Eds. Jack Selzer and Sharon  
Crowley. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999. 3-15. Print. 
 
Shankar, Tara Rosenberger. “Speaking on the Record: A Theory of Composition.” Computers  
and Composition 23.3 (2006): 374-393. Print. 
 
Sharpless, Rebecca. “The History of Oral History.” History of Oral History. Ed. Thomas L.  
Charlton, Lois E. Myers, and Rebecca Sharpless. New York: Altamira, 2007. 9-32. Print. 
 
Sheridan, Thomas. A Course of Lectures on Elocution. London, 1796. Print. 
 
Shipka, Jody. “Sound Engineering: Toward a Theory of Multimodal Soundness.” Computers and  
Composition 23.3 (2006): 355-373. Print. 
 
 232 
Silbey, Jessica M. “Videotaped Confessions and the Genre of Documentary.” Fordham:  
Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 16.3 (2006): 789-807. Print. 
 
Sloan, Gary. “The Subversive Effects of an Oral Culture on Student Writing.” College  
Composition and Communication 30.2 (1979): 156-160. Print. 
 
Snipes, Wilson Currin. “Oral Composing as an Approach to Writing.” College Composition and  
Communication 24.2 (1973): 200-205. Print. 
 
Stanyek, Jason and Benjamin Piekut. “Deadness: Technologies of the Intermundane.” The  
Drama Review 54.1 (2010): 14-38. Print. 
 
Sterne, Jonathan. The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction. Durham: Duke  
University, 2003. Print. 
 
Tell, Dave. Confessional Crises and Cultural Politics in Twentieth-Century America. University  
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012. Print. 
 
Thompson, Paul. The Voice of the Past: Oral History. New York: Oxford, 1978. Print. 
 
van Leeuwen, Theo. “Voice: A Semiotics of Voice.” Sound and Music in Film and Visual  
Media: An Overview. Ed. Graeme Harper. New York: Continuum, 2009. 425-436. Print. 
 
Volosinov, Valentin. “Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art.” Freudianism: A Critical Sketch.  
Trans. I. R. Titunik. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976. 93-116. Print. 
 
Walker, John. Elements of Elocution. Philadelphia: Bennett and Walton, 1811. Print. 
 
Warren, Dan. “Son of Strelka, Son of God.” International House of Dancakes Blog and Podcast.  
6 July 2011. Audio. 5 May 2013. 
 
Weidman, Amanda J. Singing the Classical, Voicing the Modern: The Postcolonial Politics of  
Music in South India. Durham: Duke University, 2006. Print. 
 
Weigel, David. “A Whole New Obama Myth.” Slate. 11 July 2011. Web. 5 May 2013. 
 
Williams. Rhonda Y. “‘I’m a Keeper of Information’: History-Telling and Voice.” The Oral  
History Review 28.1. (2001): 41-63. Print. 
 
Wu, Kuang-Ming. On Metaphoring: A Cultural Hermeneutic. Brill: Boston, 2001. Print. 
 
Wysocki, Anne Frances. “Opening New Media to Writing: Openings and Justifications.” Writing  
New Media: Theory and Applications for Expanding the Teaching of Composition. Anne 
Frances Wysocki, Johndan Johnson-Eilola, Cynthia L. Selfe, and Geoffrey Sirc (Eds.) 
Logan: Utah State University Press. 2004. Print. 
 
 233 
---. “Unfitting Beauties of Transducing Bodies.” Rhetorics and Technologies: New Directions in  
Writing and Communication. Columbia: University of South Carolina, 2010. 94-112. 
Print. 
 
Yancey, Kathleen Blake. “Introduction: Definition, Intersection, and Difference—Mapping the  
Landscape of Voice.” Voices on Voice: Perspectives, Definitions, Inquiry. Ed. Kathleen 
Blake Yancey. Urbana: National Council of Teachers of English, 1994. vii-xxiv. Print. 
 
---. “Made Not Only in Words: Composition in a New Key.” College Composition and  
Communication 56.2 (2004): 297-329. Print. 
 
Zoellner, Robert. “Talk-Write: A Behavioral Pedagogy for Composition.” College English 30.4  
(1969): 267-320. Print. 
 
Zumthor, Paul. Oral Poetry: An Introduction. Trans. Kathryn Murphy-Judy. Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press. 1990. Print. 
 
